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reason for this will, on reflection, be apparent, without the information being here given.-No. VII. is a peculiar case of copyhold law, and one is surprised how it could form a question at the examinations.-No. VIII. shows that the examiners sometimes require a knowledge of the repealed law, and in the particular instance this is not unfair, as the conveyancer has to deal, not only with the existing, but also with the old law. The question requires some knowledge of the uses of fines and recoveries, and the substituted modes of barring entails, and enabling married women to convey real estate (p. 130).No. IX. is too difficult a question for the examination (p. 131). It by no means suggests reference to the provision in the Wills' Act, that wills are to speak and take effect from the testator's death, and there are nice questions arising as to the contract being binding or not. As stated by Mr. Sweet (11 Jarm. Conv., 793, note), "As the law formerly stood, a contract for the sale of an estate, which the testator had previously devised, had the effect of revoking the devise in Equity, and the devisee took nothing but the mere legal estate of which he was a trustee for the purchaser. The right to the purchase-money passed with the other personal estate of the testator. A doubt was suggested (Sug. Wills, 53; 1 Sug. Vend., 304; omitted from subsequent editions) whether the doctrine remains unaltered; for which, however, there does not appear to be any foundation. * * In the case of a contract, the personalty is the fund to benefit by the sale; and it will do so as much against a devisee as against an heir. As against a general residuary devisee, it is obvious that it must be so; and as against a devisee of the specific property by description, it is equally clear that some special expressions would be required to raise any right against the personal representatives of the testator. But, where the contract is posterior to the devise, all pretence for such a construction fails. It has accordingly been decided that, where the testator devises an estate and then contracts to sell it, the devisee is not entitled to the purchase money (Farrar v. Wi., 5; Beav., 1; Moor v. Ra. 12 Sim., 123)." -No. X. is very frequently asked, and articled clerks should make themselves acquainted with the Act by which the heir, or devisee of a mortgagor, takes the estate with the burthen of the mortgage (p. 131). He is not, as formerly, entitled to have it discharged out of the deceased's personal estate. No. XI, as to trust estates passing or not under a general devise, has been before asked (p. 110).— No. XII. has been frequently asked in one form or another, the substance being that a gift of land to charity must be by deed enrolled, and that pure personalty only can be sworn by will to charity. It may be added, that by an Act of the past session, c. 9, some alterations have been made, for by s. 1 no future deed, &c., for charitable uses is to be void, by reason of not being indented, or of specified

stipulations for the donor's benefit, or (as to copyhold) for want of a deed; by s. 2, where future charitable uses are declared by any separate or other deed, &c., the latter must be enrolled. By s. 3 no past deed, &c., for charitable uses upon valuable consideration is to be void for any reason, if enrolled in Chancery, either before the Act or within twelve months after its passing (17th May, 1861); by s. 4, where charitable uses of any past deed, &c., not enrolled, are declared by any other deed, &c., the enrolment of such other deed is sufficient where neither deed, &c., is enrolled; the enrolment of such separate, or other deed, is requisite within twelve months after the passing of this Act (17th May, 1861). Secs. V. and VI. contain some special provisions as to pending suits, avoided deeds, &c.No. XIII. requires that it should be known that, independently of statutory provision, if a devisee in fee should die before the testator, the devise would not take effect, for even if the devisee should leave an heir, such heir could not claim the property mentioned in the limitation of the estate, as to A. B. and his heirs the heirs not being purchasers in their own right, but merely taking through their ancestor, who, by the hypothesis, did not live to take. The doctrines of the terms "words of limitation" and "words of purchase" must be borne in mind. Thus far of the common law doctrine, respecting the effect of the death of a devisee prior to the testator; by the 7 Will. IV., and 1 Vic., c. 26, s. 33, this common law doctrine is modified as to the children or other issue of the testator, both as to real and personal estate, for thereby gifts to children, or other issue who leave issue living at the testator's death, will not lapse, but will take effect as if the death of such person [devisee] had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." Contrast the above clause of the Act with the previous one relating to estates tail only; it is not confined, like the 33rd section, to the children or other issue of the testator. (See notice of s. 32, ante, p. 152, to which add a reference to the present page.) Observe that s. 33 does not substitute for the pre-deceased devisee, or legatee; the issue whose existence is the event or condition which excludes the lapse, but renders the subject of the gift the absolute property of the pre-deceased devisee or legatee, and therefore disposable by his will, notwithstanding his death before the death of the testator, from whose will he derives the estate (Johnson v. Jo., 8 Jur., 77. see Skinner v. Og., 9 Jur., 432).-As to No. XIV., which relates to the granting of leases of property in mortgage, it may by observed that where there is no power contained in the deed (p. 132), so that it is necessary that both the mortgagor and mortgagee should join, there are two modes of framing the lease, one of which is that mentioned ante, pp. 132, 133; another is to make the rent payable to the

mortgagee and his representatives, subject to the equity of redemption, andsubject to a proviso or agreement that, until the mortgagee shall require to have the receipt of the rents, and shall give the lessee a notice to that effect, the rent may be paid to the mortgagor or his representatives, whose receipts shall be a discharge; adding a clause empowering the mortgagor or his representatives until the giving of such notice to distrain for any arrears, and making the covenant with the mortgagor and mortgagee separately, to pay the mortgagor until such notice, and, thereafter, the mortgagee; and the covenant for quiet enjoyment being by both mortgagee and mortgagor. A form to this effect may be seen in Rouse's Conveyancer, No. 356. No. XV. relates to the provisions recently made for rendering it unneccssary for purchasers to see to the application of their purchase money on sales by trustees (p. 133). Our readers are that formerly on a sale by trustees, in pursuance of a power, if there were no power authorising them to give receipts (formally termed a receipt clause), and no indication of an intention that they should have such power could be implied, the trustees alone could not make a title, but all the persons interested in the property must have joined and a power to give receipts was implied where the trusts were, 1, for payment of debts generally, that is, unascertained debts; 2, in favour of unascertained or incompetent cestuis que trusts; 3, or requiring time and discretion; 4, or where the money was to be re-invested, if in this last case the purchaser saw to the re-investment and to the execution of a declaration of trust. (See Dart's Vend., 385, et seq.; where a very satisfactory statement of the law on the subject will be found.)

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There can be no objection made to the earlier questions in the division of Equity, but some of the latter are not such as could be expected to be answered by the candidates.-No. I. calls for the remark that both a plaintiff and a defendant in a suit in Equity may obtain production of the documents in the possession of his opponent; there is a difference between the times at which this application may be made, according as it is by a plaintiff or a defendant; it is not obvious why the defendant should be precluded (except on showing special grounds) from applying until he has put in a sufficient answer (p. 133). The reader is presumed to know that no answer can be said to be sufficient until the lapse of the time for the plaintiff taking exceptions thereto, but fortunately the courts have not felt themselves bound by the letter of the statute, and the application may be made immediately upon the defendant's answer being filed, but the court may give the plaintiff, if it desire it, a reasonable time to see whether or not he will except to the answer, and adjourn the application for that purpose. (3 Jurist,

N.S., 481).-No. II. relates to the mode of service of a subpoena on a witness as the object is to compel the attendance of an unwilling witness, or to punish him for his default, it is necessary that the service should be personal; no substituted service is permitted. The punishment for non-attendance is by attachment, which, however, does not issue until after the service of an order to attend within four days (Ayckb. Pract., 166-168, 6th ed.).-No. III. shows the mode of proceeding where either party to a suit in Equity desires that the evidence in chief should be taken viva voce at the hearing, that is, in open court. The answer should be studied, as the subject of evidence in Equity is one frequently inquired about by the examiners, and is rather complex. It is assumed that the reader is aware that till lately no viva voce evidence (except only as to written documents neglected to be proved before the closing of evidence, or where the cause is heard on bill and answer; but this may be, and generally is, done by affidavit, and is called proving exhibits) was admitted at the hearing of a cause. By the 15 & 16 Vic., c. 86, s. 39, the Court of Chancery is authorised to require the production and oral examination before itself of any witness or party in the cause (16 Jur. 1125). It is also understood that evidence may be, independently of the above, taken either orally or by affidavit; if orally it is before one of the examiners of the court, or a special examiner (Ord. of 13th Jan., 1855), so that what is stated at p. 134, as to oral evidence, is to be understood of evidence taken in open court on the hearing of the cause, after the manner of a trial at common law; but still there may be oral evidence not given in court, but before an examiner.-No. IV., it is to be assumed, relates to the choses in action of the wife, and not to her personal property passing by delivery, for by the marriage these would, unless settled to her separate use, belong absolutely to the husband, and the wife would not be a proper person to sue in respect thereof; whilst, if they were her separate property, the husband would not be properly joined as a co-plaintiff. Then, if the property was a chose in action of the wife, it would not have been reduced into possession, and consequently would belong to the wife alone (ante, pp. 129-134).-As to No. V., the enrolment of the decree of a Vice-Chancellor, who is but the deputy of the Lord-Chancellor, makes it the decree of the latter, and thus obviously prevents the Vice-Chancellor from re-hearing the matter. The same is true of a decree of the Master of the Rolls, who, however, is not like a Vice-Chancellor, the deputy of the Lord Chancellor. This distinction between the Master of the Rolls and a Vice-Chancellor is of practical importance, for whilst the enrolment of a decree of a ViceChancellor does not require his signature, that of the Master of the Rolls must be signed by him (1 Phil., 267). It may seem singular

that whereas before enrolment the Master of the Rolls or a ViceChancellor may re-hear a matter decided by him, the Lord Chancellor, after enrolment, whereby the decree is said to become his, cannot hear the matter, but an appeal must be made to the Lords.No. VI. refers to the various modes in which proceedings may be initiated in courts of Equity (p. 135) Our readers are, of course, aware that the proceeding by claim has been abolished, and they understand that the most common initiatory proceeding is by bill; but that common administration suits may be initiated by summons in the Judges' Chambers. But they may not, perhaps, be aware that the personal representatives of the deceased cannot avail themselves of this summary and inexpensive proceeding; but they may proceed under Sir George Turner's Act (see ante, pp. 108, 145).No. VII. would require almost a volume for a satisfactory answer. The ordinary and less important steps in a suit initiated in court are taken in chambers, and several matters are there initiated. We must refer the reader to p. 135, though we fear that, without the aid of a good memory and some diligence, much will not be learnt.— No. VIII. (p. 135) refers to the necessity of filing and delivering interrogatories to a bill where the plaintiff requires an answer from a defendant, and the reader will notice, 1, the agreement between the times of filing the interrogatories and delivering the copies when the defendant appears within the time limited for his so doing; 2, the difference where the defendant does not so appear; in each case the time for filing is the same, but that for delivery is different (see 5 L. C., 104-106).-No. IX. (p. 136) requires it to be known that an executor cannot safely pay a simple contract creditor where he has notice of a specialty debt (Toller's Exec., 292-294).-No. X. refers to the disabilities of aliens, which, when they are not enemies, are chiefly a disqualification to hold land; absolutely as to a freehold interest, but qualified as to leaseholds, that is, unobjectionable where for the purpose of residence, or business, if the term do not exceed twentyone years. An alien, indeed, may purchase a freehold interest in land, but he cannot hold it as against the Crown after office found. The maxim is, that he may purchase or take, but cannot hold (F. Bk., 67, 162; 3 Jur., 69). The disability, being grounded on feudal reasons, does not extend to pure personalty. It has been decided that an alien may have the benefit of a trust, by will, to sell lands where the gift is of the proceeds as such (3 L. C., 241; F. Bk., 67). Mr. Sweet, in his edition of Jarman's Conveyancing, has thrown some doubts on this; but the decision has not been over-ruled, but has rather been acquiesced in by subsequent judges.-No. XI. requires an exact knowledge of the provisions in two recent Acts, and in an order of the Court of Chancery for investments by trustees and personal representatives (see ante, pp. 27, 46, 77, 107, 136).

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