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are interests in land within the provisions of the Mortmain Act. So is money secured by bond or promissory note, and a memorandum of deposit of title deeds of real estate. So is money secured by a debenture of the Ipswich Dock Commissioners, whereby the rates and duties arising by virtue of their acts were assigned by way of security for the loan (Alexander v. Brame, 9 Week. Rep., 719).

PARTNERS.-Purchasing real estate-Effect of.—In a late case Lord Justice Turner made some remarks on the effect of the purchase by partners of real estate, which it may be useful to notice here. He observed: "It cannot be laid down as an universal rule that where lands are bought by partners in trade, and are paid for out of the partnership assets, they of necessity become part of the joint estate of the partners. There are different purposes for which the lands may have been bought. They may have been bought for the purpose of being used and employed in the trade; they may have been bought not for the purpose of being used and employed in the trade, but for the purpose of a mere speculation on account of the partnership, for I know nothing which can prevent partners from speculating in land if they think proper to do so as freely as they may speculate in mere articles of commerce, though foreign to their trade. Again, they may have been bought without reference to the purposes of the trade or the benefit of the partnership, with the intention of withdrawing from the trade the amount employed in the purchase, and converting that amount into separate property of the partners; or they may have been bought on account of one or more of the partners, he or they becoming debtor or debtors to the partnership for the amount laid out in the purchase. The form of the conveyance in these cases does not settle the question, for in whatever form the conveyance may be there may be a trust of the land which may follow the money, liable, however, as other trusts of the like nature are, to be rebutted by evidence. Where the land purchased is not merely paid for out of the partnership assets, but is bought for the purpose of being used and employed in the partnership trade, it is scarcely possible to conceive a case in which there could be sufficient evidence to rebut the trust, and accordingly in these cases we find the decisions almost, if not entirely, uniform, that the freehold land forms part of the joint estate of the partnership, but where the land is not purchased for these purposes the question becomes more open, and we have to consider whether the circumstances attending the purchase show that it was made on account of the partnership, or on account of the partners individually, or of any one or more of them" (McKenna v. Streatfield, 4 Law Term Rep., N. S., 604.)

EXAMINATION STUDIES.

(TRINITY TERM, 1860.)

THE questions in the division of Common Law (pp. 121-127) are unobjectionable, involving such matters as it may be reasonably expected that an articled clerk should be acquainted with.-No. I. (p. 121) requires it to be known that on non-payment of a bill by the acceptor (who is the party always primarily liable), notice of such fact, or, as it is termed, of the dishonour of the bill, should be given to the other parties to the bill upon whose liability the holder intends to insist. That the parties to a bill other than the acceptor are in the nature of sureties, and, therefore, entitled to notice of the default of the principal debtor. The reader will bear in mind that there is another kind of dishonour, viz., a refusal to accept the bill; but this is not of such frequent occurrence as the other. As stated in Selw. N.P., pp. 351-384, 11th ed., "The acceptor by reason of his acceptance, which is prima facie evidence of his having in his hands effects of the drawer, to answer the amount of the bill, is considered the principal debtor, and primarily liable to all the parties to the bill; and an express agreement only will discharge him, although an acceptor by his acceptance only undertakes to pay the debt of another, viz., of the drawer, yet he is primarily liable; for it is incumbent on the holder of the bill to resort to him in the first instance. Under this view, although his engagement is really only a collateral engagement, yet he may in this respect be considered as the principal debtor, and the remaining parties as sureties only." We have given the above extracts in order to support our previous statements. -No. II. refers to the recent act, giving a summary remedy on bills and notes, which have become due within six months, for, if not prompt in his proceedings, the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of the act. The chief advantage is, that it prevents the action being defended without leave from a judge (p. 121).-No. III. relates to the mode in which a creditor may obtain interest on his debt where it does not properly bear interest, viz., by demand of payment and notice that interest will thenceforth be claimed (p. 122). Every solicitor should bear this in mind, but it is very frequently overlooked. -No. IV. relates to the subject of set off (p. 122), with which, as questions are often asked, and the doctrines are not very extensive, it would be prudent for every articled clerk to make himself thoroughly acquainted. The leading points are, 1, that set off originated not at the common law, but by statute, and therefore the language of the statute requires to be considered; 2, that the debts must be mutual and due in the same right; 3, that unliquidated demands cannot be set off; 4, that a debt barred by the statute of limitations

cannot be set off; 5, that the set off must be pleaded; 6, that a simple contract may be set off against a specialty; 7, that where there is a specialty with a penal sum, the set off must be pleaded in bar. (See Selw. N.P., 154; et seq., 591; et seq., 11th ed.)-No. V. requires a knowledge of the provisions of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, respecting the service of defendants out of the jurisdiction of the court -a novelty, as formerly this could not be done either with subjects or aliens; indeed, the writ could not be served in a different county from that into which it was issued, much less be served out of the jurisdiction of the court. The reader will attend to the fact, that the cause of action must have arisen within the jurisdiction, so that, for a debt arising in Ireland, Scotland, France, &c., no writ can be issued for service abroad. The distinction between a subject and a foreigner is pointed out at p. 123, and more at large in Com. L. Pract., 65-69, and the reader should bear it in mind.—No. VI. refers to the distinction arising between claims for goods sold and delivered, and goods bargained and sold; the former are not within the statute of frauds; the latter are. If I sell goods and deliver them to the buyer who receives them, no writing is requisite; if I merely contract to sell goods, of the value of £10 at the least, and there is no delivery or acceptance, then a writing is required, unless there have been part payment. The reader will notice that this does not apply to contracts for goods of less value than £10, which has given rise in some instances to questions, whether several bargains are to be considered as one or distinct; as to which see Com. L. Princ., p. 178, 179.— No. VII. requires it to be known that a man, by marrying a shedebtor, becomes liable to the creditor, but not absolutely; for the wife must be joined, and, should she die before any joint action is commenced, he is no longer liable qua husband, though, as shown (ante, p. 124), he may become liable in a different character. This distinction is not nominal merely, for the liability is thus confined to the extent of the benefit conferred on the surviving husband. As to actions by husband and wife (see ante, p. 142). [In line six, insert "not" between "that having," so as to read "that not having been," &c.] The joinder of the two in action in her lifetime seems, at first sight, to be at variance with the maxim, "husband and wife are one person in law." (See Maxims, pp. 82, 139).— No. VIII. relates to the distinction between simple contracts and specialties, with reference to the length of time which may be allowed to lapse before commencing an action (p. 124). The statutes of limitation are more favourable to specialties than to simple contracts, which is not, however, a solitary instance of favour, for the law, in most other respects, favours specialties.—No. IX. requires it to be known that personal service of a writ of summons is not now indispensable, though formerly the courts were very

strict as to this. However, it is not a matter of course to enter an appearance for a defendant not personally served; leave is necessary (p. 124).-No. X. refers to the time for giving a notice of trial, which is now the same in country as in town causes, though formerly there was a difference (pp. 124, 125). Notice that there is still a difference between the full and short notice of trial, and ascertain when a defendant is bound to accept the latter.-No. XI. refers to the time for appearing to a writ of ejectment, which, it will be seen (p. 125), is different from, being longer than, an ordinary action; indeed, it is double the length. In country cases of ejectment by a landlord, where the right of entry accrues in or after an issuable term, the time is shortened to ten days. The reader will bear in mind that Hilary and Trinity Terms are called issuable terms, because the assizes are held after them.-No. XII. In the third line of this question, for "be referred to a judge," read, “be referred by a judge." Actions for claims, being mere matter of account, should be referred to an arbitrator or to a master; either party may apply; it has been held to be the duty of the attorney towards his client to apply for a reference, but this is a point seldom attended to. The subject of No. XIII. is interpleader at law, which is so fully noticed (ante, pp. 125, 126) that no further remarks appear requisite; the reader should attend to the difference between a sheriff's application and one by a private person, and to the late extensions of the remedy to adverse and independent rights; and where, in a sheriff's case, the claim to the goods is made under a security for a debt. The reader is aware that there is a jurisdiction in Equity by way of interpleader in fact, that the jurisdiction originally was there only, and he will bear in mind that at Common Law, unlike Equity, it depends on statutes which are comparatively modern.No. XIV. requires that it should be known that judgment can be signed for want of appearance to a specially indorsed writ, whereas in the case of writs not so indorsed no such judgment can be signed; but the plaintiff must appear for the defendant, and proceed to file a declaration (pp. 126, 127). The judgment is signed on the lapse of the time for appearance, but the plaintiff is not able to issue execution until the expiration of the further term of eight days, so that no time is saved, should not the defendant plead to the declaration, but the expense is lessened.-The answer to No. XV. sufficiently explains. itself (p. 127), it being understood that demurring is opposed to pleading in this; that the sufficiency of the other party's pleading in point of law is denied, the matters of fact being admitted.

In the division of Conveyancing (pp. 127-133), some of the questions are too difficult for mere articled clerks, but we cannot say this is so to an extent so great as in some former questions.-Na I. (p. 127) assumes that, in respect of timber and minerals, there is

difference between the waste lands of the manor and copyhold land; in the former the rights of the lord are absolute; in the latter they are concurrent with those of the copyholder.-No. II. requires it to be known (p. 127) that, by the inheritance act, two alterations were effected, viz., 1, that direct lineal ancestors may inherit, thus overturning the old maxim, "Haereditas nunquam ascendit" (see Maxims, pp. 8, 79; 2. Bl. Com. 211); 2, that the half-blood may now inherit, though formerly this was not allowed (see Maxims, 116-119).-No. III. depends upon an enactment in the Fines and Recoveries Abolition Act (p. 128), that money to be invested in land to be settled by way of entail is to be treated as the land to be purchased, and that the entail may be barred by an enrolled assignment. As Mr. Hayes (Convey. p. 183, 4th ed.) observes, the history of the law relating to entailed money is curious-" By the 3 & 4 W. IV., c. 74, the fund, when constituted of land made saleable, not being copyhold, is to be dealt with as freehold; or, being copyhold, as copyhold; and, when constituted of money, is to be dealt with as freehold land. But leaseholds for years and money, are to be treated, as to the person in whose favour the disentailing provision is made, as personal estate, and to be assigned by deed to be enrolled within six calendar months after the execution, except in the case of bankruptcy."-No. IV. involves a knowledge of the recent provision that, contrary to the former law, a release of part of lands from a rent-charge or judgment will not operate as a total extinguishment. An important practical difficulty is thus got rid of.— No. V. contains several questions connected merely as relating to the interests of husbands in their wives' property. Notice the distinction as to courtesy between lands of freehold tenure and those of copyhold tenure ; also the distinction between freeholds and copyholds on the one hand and leaseholds on the other, inasmuch as the husband may, except by will, dispose of the leaseholds absolutely, but cannot do so as to the freeholds or copyholds. Thus, the wife may be deprived of her leaseholds though she should survive her husband, and without having joined in the disposition. If the husband desires to have the benefit of his wife's choses in action, such as legacies, and debts, he should obtain payment thereof (or the equivalent), otherwise on his death they will belong to the surviving wife; should he survive, he can recover the choses in action, but only as administrator to his wife, and, therefore, subject to her debts. As to Mr. Malins' Act, see ante, p. 129.-No. VI. informs us (p. 129) that bankruptcy does not avoid a contract for sale, whether in the case of a vendor or a purchaser, but it points out that, as to a purchaser, the vendor may require the purchaser's assignees to elect, to abandon, or perform the contract (p. 129). The reader will notice that the provision does not extend to the case of a vendor becoming bankrupt, and the

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