ment. Sir Matthew Hale enforces the importance of method, and gives an outline of a course of study. First," he writes, “it is convenient for a student to spend two or three years in the diligent reading of Littleton, Perkins, Doctor and Student, Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, and especially my Lord Coke's Commentaries, and possibly his reports. This will fit him for exercise, and enable him to improve himself by conversation and discourse with others, and enable him profitably to attend the courts at Westminster." Afterwards he treats of common-placing, and, still later, of the Year Books, among which he mentions, as chiefly useful, the last part of Edw. III., the Book of Assizes, the second part of Hen. IV., Edw. IV., and Hen. VII. After these he lets the student come down to Plowden, Dyer, Coke's Reports the second time, and other reports then lately printed. He advises the student to compare case with case, and the pleadings of cases with the books of entries, especially Rastall's. Of this scheme of Sir M. Hale's, from which these suggestions are taken, Sir Thomas Reeve (Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the reign of George II.) writes that it was the best extant. He himself gives some advice to a nephew, mentioning successive objects which the student may set specially before him.

AUXILIARY STUDIES.-To turn from courses recommended to courses pursued, and from the special mode of studying English law to the auxiliary studies which eminent lawyers have taken as introductory or collateral. Here two instances occur as among the most obvious and common-history, and the Roman civil law. As to the latter we read of Sir M. Hale, that "he set himself much to the study of the Roman law, and though he liked the way of judicature in England by juries much better than that of the civil law, where so much was trusted to the judge, yet he often said that the true grounds and reasons of law were so well delivered in the digests, that a man could never understand law as a science so well as by seeking it there, and therefore lamented much that it was so little studied in England." Distinct authorities may be cited as especially pertinent to other branches of knowledge proper for the student: Lord Somers, as an authority for the study of constitutional law; Lord Mansfield for an enlarged view of the study of general history; Chief Justice Wilmot, as an attractive example of the consistency of studious and scholarly tastes, with fitness for eminent legal position and duties; Sir Wm. Blackstone, as one who, failing at first of professional success, was afterwards greatly assisted in arriving at it by the laborious study of books-coupled, in his case, it is true, with an especial skill and taste in the use of written language.

JONES AND ROMILLY.-To any one who should doubt whether a comprehensive cultivation of general literature is suitable to a lawyer,

Sir Samuel Romilly may be mentioned as an eminent instance. The extent of his studies would incline a reader to doubt the account of them if coming from unknown testimony, but we have his own authority for that account. Both Sir Samuel Romilly and Sir William Jones are leading examples of attention to oratory with a view to the bar, and Sir William is also memorable as an authority for the study of foreign law, both ancient and modern.

COGNATE STUDIES.-It is surely reasonable to expect to find instances of a widely-extended pursuit of knowledge in the members of such a profession. The studies and duties of the English bar seem to justify, if not to require, it. Real property law is connected with the history of feudalism; constitutional law with that of the English Government, and with the principles of government in general; commercial law with the growth of trade and manufactures; criminal law with the discussion and application of moral rules. The business of an advocate brings him into contact with the examination of the motives and dispositions which occasion or modify human actions, and some analytical study of the mind of man in the abstract seems not useless with a view to such an employment. Again, it is almost too little to say that the laws relating to contracts, to trusts, to partnerships, to frauds, and to other classes besides, derive illustration from a comparison with the laws of Rome. There are such points of resemblance and connection that a moderate amount of time spent on the civil law is among the most obvious of preparatory studies. And it is not these more cognate studies only that are fitted to be of real advantage to a lawyer— versatility and enlargement of mind are of use in professional duties, and so is a cultivated and ripened taste. It could scarcely be said with truth of any branch of practical science, that it could not be of valuable service to an advocate; and the advantage is real, though it may, perhaps, more easily escape attention, of gaining an acquaintance with all wholesome and sterling literature-in so far as such a habit does not trench on more essential studies,-as tending to raise the tone of the mind generally, and to make it more influential on others, on account of a genuine superiority.

PUBLIC SPEAKING.- With respect to a deliberate cultivation of the power of public speaking, there seems reason to doubt the wisdom of the comparative neglect of it. Several causes minister to this. One is an idea that eloquence, as well as poetry, is allotted to some favoured persons only, and that there is something of conceit in the attempt to cultivate the power of speaking, as implying pretensions to such an exceptional talent. But it may be answered that it is well that those who would never be great orators should yet speak with correctness, and clearly; that there is some inconsistency in a

man's going to the bar at all (except as chamber counsel) if he disclaims even a moderate aptitude for speaking; and that it is not desirable, either for the client's interests or the barrister's reputation, that the first dubious attempt should be made in a case where there are practical results immediately involved. Whether preparation and practice be more or less valuable with a view to make a really powerful speaker, they seem the proper means for correcting actual faults of style, and for supplying the degree of confidence, without which good enough materials will not be well handled. And in this, as well as many other things, it is probably true that he that aims high will shoot high, though he shoot not so high as he aims.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS.

SETTLEMENT.-Rectification-Mistake-Power of appointment— Omission of hotchpot clause in deed exercising power-Intention to produce equality.-Where the court interferes to rectify a deed, it inquires what was the intention of the parties at the time when the deed was executed, and not what would have been their intention if, when they executed it, the results of what they did had been present to their minds. A donee of a power of appointment executed the power by deed in favour of some of the objects who were under the instrument creating the power to take equally in default of appointment. The appointment did not contain any hotchpot clause. Evidence being brought to show that the omission of such a clause was a mistake, and that the intention of the donee and of all parties at the time was to produce equality between the objects taking under and in default of the appointment, the court ordered the deed of appointment to be rectified by the insertion of a clause similar to the usual hotchpot clause (Wilkinson v. Nelson, 9 Week. Rep., 393).

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Contract work and labour-Goods sold.The 17th sec. of the Statute of Frauds requires a contract for the sale of an article exceeding the value or price of £10 to be in writing, unless there be a part payment, acceptance, &c. (Rosc. Evid., 269, et seq., 5th ed.; Com. L. Princ., 171, et seq.). In some cases it is difficult to say whether a contract is one for work, labour, and materials, or one of goods bargained and sold (see Clay v. Yates, 4 W. R., 557). Perhaps, if the chattel which is supplied be entirely subordinate and ancillary to the work and labour, as in the case of the paper supplied for printing a manuscript, a count for work, &c., would lie; but it is not correct to say that wherever it is the skill of the plaintiff which

makes the article of value that there he can recover for work so done. The case of one party ordering a chattel of another, where the contract is to make a thing and to supply it to another, is always a contract within the Statute of Frauds. These matters were considered in a recent case, where it appeared that A. agreed to make for B. two sets of artificial teeth, according to a model of her mouth which he took for the purpose, and it was held that this was a contract for the sale of goods, within sec. 17 of the Statute of Frauds, and that A. could not recover on the common count for work, labour, and materials (Lee v. Griffin, 9 Week. Rep., 702).

BANKRUPTS' LEASEHOLDS.-Acceptance by assignees of bankrupts leasehold property within a reasonable time.-The leasehold interests of a bankrupt do not necessarily vest in his assignees by virtue of their mere appointment, as is, with certain exceptions, the case with the other property of the bankrupt. The assignees may elect either to accept or reject the leaseholds, but it has usually been considered that the property is in them subject to such right of rejection The following case shows that a long delay in dealing with a term may justify a jury in finding that the assignees had previously declined to accept the leasehold interest :-It appeared that A., being possessed of certain leasehold property, became bankrupt in 1848. No step was taken with regard to his leasehold property until 1859, when, upon the application of an equitable mortgagee, the assignees under an order of the Court of Bankruptcy assigned the lease to the equitable mortgagee. Held-first, that the mere act of assignment was a sufficient acceptance of the lease by the assignees; secondly, that the assignees were not bound to elect within any limited time, and that accordingly the assignment would be a good acceptance, if they had not previously declined to accept; thirdly, that it was for the jury to decide whether the assignees had not elected to accept within a reasonable time, under the particular circumstances of the case, or whether they had not previously elected to refuse the lease (Mackley v. Pattenden, 9 Week. Rep., 601).

INFANT.-Administrator-Next friend-Costs.—Where a bill in Chancery is filed by an infant against his trustees and guardians, and a decree is made for the usual accounts, the Court of Chancery will not, at the same time, direct an inquiry whether any and what benefit has accrued to the infant from the institution of the suit. It is a prima facie benefit to an infant to be made a ward of court, and to have his property secured and duly administered. The court will take into consideration the motives which actuated the next friend in instituting the suit, and if it appears that the next friend had other motives than the benefit of the infant, the court will deprive him of his costs (Clayton v. Clark, 9 Week. Rep., 718).

COSTS.-Certificate to deprive plaintiff of, under 23 & 24 Vic., c. 126, s. 34 [see ante, p. 107]-Negative certificate-Wilful and malicious. That part of a judge's certificate to deprive a plaintiff of costs, under sec. 34 of the 23 & 24 Vic., c. 126 (ante, p. 105), which relates to the trespass or grievance being wilful and malicious, need only state that it was not wilful, or that it was not malicious, inasmuch as if there has been absence of one of those qualities there cannot be a presence of both (Sanders v. Kirwin, 9 Week. Rep., 706).

MORTGAGE.-Tacking-Priority-Bankruptcy-Exercising power of sale contained in one of the several mortgages.-The following case presents an illustration of the difficulty experienced in getting rid of old notions, it having been contended, notwithstanding the case of Watts v. Symes (i De G., M.. and G., 240), that though in a suit to redeem a mortgage (which is necessarily brought by the mortgagor or those claiming under him in respect of the equity of redemption), the mortgagee has a right to tack all his securities, yet in a suit for foreclosure (being, therefore, at the instance of the mortgagee or those claiming under him) he has no such right; but as the L. C. said it was a mistake to suppose that the right of a mortgagee to tack in a suit for foreclosure was an innovation, for though there had been doubts the doctrine was supported by prior authorities, "and on principle there seems to be no reason to vary the rights of the mortgagee, whether he be active or passive in the suit which is to bring the mortgage transactions to a close." In the following case (9 W. R., 583) it was held that where a bankrupt has, prior to his bankruptcy, executed mortgages of several estates, any of the mortgagees whose security is insufficient may, if the assignees in bankruptcy of the mortgagor do not immediately redeem, take a transfer of another.of the mortgages where the value of the land exceeds the sum secured, and tack it to the debt due under the mortgage to himself. The right of such mortgagee is not prejudiced by reason of his having exercised the power of sale contained in the mortgage so transferred to him, and he is entitled to retain the surplus of the purchase-money beyond the amount secured on that mortgage to satisfy the sum due to him on his own mortgage. The right of a mortgagee to tack is the same in a suit to foreclose as in a suit to redeem (Selby v. Pomfret, 9 Week. Rep., 583).

MORTMAIN.-9 Geo. II. c. 36-Interests in land-Arrears of interest on-Money secured by mortgage-Money secured by equitable mortgage. As the examiners so frequently ask questions upon the Mortmain Act it may be useful to call attention to the decision of the Master of the Rolls, that arrears of interest due at the time of the testator's death, on money secured by mortgages of real estate,