will be considered to have abandoned it; or the vendor may petition for a resale and for payment of the amount remaining due to him, and for leave to prove for any deficiency (Dart's Vend., 3rd ed., p. 168. Lawrence v. Knowles, 7 Sc., 381).

VII.-If copyhold were devised to trustees upon trust for A. for life, and after his death to B. absolutely, and B. should sell his remainder, by what assurance should the property be conveyed to a purchaser, the trustee having been admitted?

ANS.-Where a copyhold is limited, as in the above question, for the benefit of one person with remainder over to another, the admission of the particular tenant, though a trustee, gives seisin or admission to the remainder-man, who may surrender that remainder to another, without taking a personal admittance (1 Watk. Copyh. 59). It is assumed from the question that the remainder was not equitable merely; if it were such, it might be assigned by deed (1 Atk. 388; 1 Watk. Copyh. 81).

VIII. State the law as to barring entails previously to the Fines and Recoveries Act, and how subsequently. The like of estates of married women in real property before and after the Fines and Recoveries Act.

ANS.-Previously to 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 74, entails were barred either by a common recovery, or by a fine; the former barred all remainders and executory interests; the latter merely barred the issue and created a base fee. Since that Act estates tail are barred by any assurance, except a will, which would suffice to pass an estate in fee simple absolute, being an actual conveyance, and not resting merely in contract, and being by deed, and enrolled in Chancery, within six calendar months after execution. Such conveyance bars the entail as against all persons claiming under the estate tail, or in respect of any ulterior estate. When the estate

tail to be barred is in remainder, the consent of any protector to the settlement must be obtained in order to bar any remainder over after the entail. A married woman, previously to 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 74, levied a fine to dispose of any interest she had in real estate, she being separately examined apart from her husband as to her consent. Since that Act married women convey by deed, the husband concurring therein, she being examined separately and apart from her husband, either before a judge or master in Chancery, or by two commissioners appointed for that purpose. The deed must be duly acknowledged by her, and a certificate thereof filed in the Common Pleas Office.

IX.-A., by will, devises an estate to B., and afterwards contracts to sell the estate to C., and dies before conveyance ;-who is entitled to the purchase-money, and state the authority?

ANS.-The contract for sale of a devised estate will operate as a revocation of the devise, so far, at least, that the legal estate will alone pass to B.; for by the 1 Vic., c. 26, all wills are to speak and take effect from the testator's death. If the contract be binding at the time of the testator's death the purchase-money, on the completion of the purchase, will belong to his executors (Dart's Vend., 169, 3rd ed.; i Wh. & Tud. Lead. Cas., 534; 4 L. C., 206). X.-A. devises an estate which is in mortgage to B., and appoints C. his residuary legatee; as between B. and C., who is liable to pay the mortgage money, and state the authority?

ANS.-Formerly, on a devise of land subject to a mortgage the debt was, like all other debts, payable, in the first place, out of the personal estate of the testator. But, by the 17 & 18 Vic., c. 113, where lands shall, after 31st December, 1854, descend or be devised to any person subject to a mortgage, such lands shall, in the absence of a contrary intention, be primarily liable to the payment of all mortgage debts with which the same are charged; and the heir or devisee shall not be entitled to have the same discharged out of the personal estate of the person from or by whom the same lands descended or were devised. B. is, therefore, primarily liable to pay the mortgage debt (F. Bk., 149; 1 L. C., 154; 7 W. R., 367; 2 Law Tim., N. S., 765).

XI.—When will trust estates pass under a general devise, and when will they not?

ANS.-Trust estates will pass under a general devise unless it can be collected from expressions in the will, or purposes or objects of the testator, that he did not mean that they should pass (see further, ante, p. 110).

XII.—In what way must a gift of land to a charity be carried out to be effectual, and what description of property can be disposed of to charitable uses by will?

ANS.-By the 9 Geo. II., c. 36, no estate or interest of any kind in land can be conveyed for charitable purposes (except to a few favoured institutions), unless made by deed indented, sealed, and delivered in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, and enrolled in the Court of Chancery within six calendar months next after the execution thereof, and unless the same be made

to take effect in possession for the charitable use intended immediately from the making thereof, and be without any power of revocation, reservation, trust, condition, limitation, clause, or agreement whatever for the benefit of the donor or grantor, or of any person or persons claiming under him, and, if not made for valuable consideration, it will be void in case of the decease of the conveying party within twelve calendar months after the execution of the deed, including the days of execution and death. No gift of any estate or interest in land for charitable purposes can be made by will: pure personalty can alone be bequeathed (F. Bk., 96–97— 162-175; 1 Steph. Com., 453-461, 4th ed.). By 24 Vic., c. 9, s. 1, no deed thereafter to be made for charitable uses shall be void by reason of not being indented, nor by reason of its containing certain stipulations for the donor's benefit, nor by reason of a copyhold assurance not being by deed. Provided that, in all reservations authorised by the Act, the donor, grantor, or vendor shall reserve the same benefit for his representatives as for himself; and, by s. 2, where charitable uses are declared by any separate or other deed, enrolment of such separate or other deed is to be sufficient.

XIII.-A., by will, devises an estate to his son B., in fee, B. dies in the lifetime of his father A., leaving a son who survives A. How, on A.'s death, would the estate devolve? State the authority for the answer.

ANS.-As by 1 Vic., c. 26, s. 33, if a devisee in fee, &c., being a child or other issue of the testator, die in the testator's lifetime, leaving issue, any of whom are living at the testator's death, the devise shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will. On B dying intestate his son will take the estate; on his dying testate his devisee will be entitled.

XIV. Can a mortgagee grant a lease without the concurrence of a mortgagor, and suppose a mortgagee and mortgagor concur in granting a lease, to whom should the rent be reserved, and with whom should the covenants be entered into? State the reasons for your answer.

ANS.-A mortgagee cannot grant a binding lease without the concurrence of the mortgagor, unless there be a power of leasing in the mortgage deed.

The mortgagor and mortgagee should concur, and the rent should be reserved to the mortgagee, his executors, &c., during the con

tinuance of the mortgage; and after payment and satisfaction thereof, to the mortgagor, his executors, &c.; and the lessee should covenant to and with the mortgagee, and also to and with the mortgagor, to pay the rent on the several days and times, and in manner as the same is reserved and made payable. The other covenants should be entered into with the mortgagee, his heirs and assigns, because when the estate is reconveyed to the mortgagor he takes the benefit of the covenants entered into with the mortgagee, in the same manner as any other grantee of the reversion (4 Bythewood's Conv., 711).

XV. Has any alteration been made as to the liability of purchasers to see to the application of purchase-money; if so, what alteration, and when was it made?

ANS. Two recent statutes have made, or purported to make, alterations as to the liability of purchasers to see to the application of their purchase-money. By s. 23 of 22 & 23 Vic., c. 35, the bona fide payment to and receipt of any person to whom any purchase or mortgage-money is payable upon any express or implied trust will discharge the person paying same from seeing to the application thereof, unless the contrary is expressly declared by the instrument creating the trust or security. The deficiency of the provision has been remedied by the 23 & 24 Vic. c. 145, s. 29, by which trustees' receipts for any money payable to them by reason or in exercise of any trust or power are to be sufficient discharges, and to exonerate purchasers (ante, pp. 31-32-78).

EQUITY.

I-At what stages of the suit may the respective parties, plaintiff and defendant, obtain an order for the production of documents in the possession of their opponents?

ANS-The plaintiff may make the application at any stage of the suit, but the defendant, in any suit where he is required to answer, cannot do so until after he has put in a full and sufficient answer, unless the court shall make any order to the contrary (15 & 16 Vic., c. 86, ss. 18, 20).

II.—In what manner must a subpoena be served in order to compel the attendance of a witness?

ANS. The service of a writ of subpoena is effected by delivering a copy thereof, and of the endorsement thereon, and at the same time producing the original writ to the witness and tendering him his reasonable expenses. Where the witness is required to attend

before an examiner there should, at the time of serving the subpoena, be a notice served to attend before the examiner, specifying the time and place appointed for the examination (Ayck. Pract., 6th ed., 167).

III.-If either party to a suit desires that the evidence in chief should be taken vivá voce at the hearing, what is now the mode of proceeding for this purpose?

ANS.-By Rule 3 of the Order of 5th Feb. 1861, in any cause in which issue is joined, the plaintiff, or any defendant, may, at any time within fourteen days after issue joined, apply to the judge in chambers, by summons to be served on the opposite party, for an order that the evidence in chief as to any facts or issues (specified in the summons) may be taken vicâ voce at the hearing, and the judge may order the evidence as to such facts or issues, or any of them, distinctly and concisely specified in such order, to be taken accordingly, or if satisfied that the application is unreasonable, or made for the purpose of delay, oppression, or vexation, may refuse such order. Where such order is made the examination in chief, cross-examination, and re-examination will be taken before the court at the hearing, and no affidavit or evidence taken before an examiner will be admissible at the hearing in respect of any such fact or issue included in such order.

IV.—If a bill be filed by a husband and wife relating to the personal property of the wife, what effect, if any, will the husband's death have upon the proceedings in the suit?

ANS. As on the husband's death, the demand which is in the nature of a chose in action of the wife, survives to her, the suit does not abate (1 Dan. Ch. Pract., 121, 2nd ed.).

V.—What is the effect of enrolling a decree or order of the Master

of the Rolls, or one of the Vice Chancellor's; and what is the effect of enrolling a decree of the Lord Chancellor or the Lords Justices?

ANS.-The effect of enrolling a decree or order of the Master of the Rolls or one of the Vice Chancellors is to prevent a rehearing or even an appeal to the Lord Chancellor or the Lords Justices; and the effect of enrolling a decree of the latter judges is also to prevent a re-hearing before them, and, as in the former instance, to force the appealing party into the House of Lords (F. Bk., 290; 1 L. C., 439, 451; 4 Id., 229).

VI. What are the several modes of commencing proceedings in Equity?