...capable of analysis. We pass from a knowledge of the proposition a to a knowledge about the proposition by perceiving a logical relation between them. With...about, and in some cases of, the primary proposition. (p. 13) The knowledge of probability relationship, accordingly, was to be understood as a (direct)...

...least some probability relations by direct acquaintance or immediate logical intuition. As Keynes says: 'We pass from a knowledge of the proposition a to...this logical relation we have direct acquaintance. ' ( 1 92 1 : 13). Indeed. Keynes appears to argue at times that all logical relations are known by...

...least, to have something like a direct perception of logical probabilities. Thus he wrote (1921: 13): 'We pass from a knowledge of the proposition a to...this logical relation we have direct acquaintance', though he also added (1921: 18) that 'Some men - indeed it is obviously the case - may have a greater...

...probability relations by direct acquaintance or immediate logical intuition. As Keynes says (JMK VIII: 13): 'We pass from a knowledge of the proposition a to...this logical relation we have direct acquaintance.' A problem that arises on this account is how we can ever assign numerical values to probabilities....

...capable of analysis. We pass from a knowledge of the proposition a to a knowledge about the proposition by perceiving a logical relation between them. With...logic of knowledge is mainly occupied with a study of logical relations, direct acquaintance with which permits direct knowledge of the secondary proposition...