Pursuant to a request by the Treasury Department, on January 29, 1982, we forwarded to Treasury an analysis of legal authorities which I now ask be included in the record of this hearing. This analysis restates the written and oral advice the Justice Department gave to the Treasury late in December and the first week of January. We also address in the analysis certain collateral legal questions which arose in the aftermath of the January 8 decision. During the course of the Department's deliberations on the legal questions raised in the Bob Jones and Goldsboro cases, letters were received from Congressman Trent Lott expressing interest and views on the matter. In April 1981, Congressman Lott sent a letter to the Attorney General in which he urged the Department to reverse the legal position it advanced in the court of appeals in the Bob Jones case. On behalf of the Attorney General, I responded to Congressman Lott and informed him that the Department intended to acquiesce in the grant of certiorari in the Bob Jones case. On October 30, 1981, Congressman Lott sent another letter to the Attorney General in which he advanced several legal reasons for the Department to reverse its legal position in the Bob Jones litigation. On December 15th, I informed the Congressman by letter that the United States would continue to argue in support of IRS authority to deny tax exemptions on the ground of federal public policy since the Department of Treasury, the client in the case, had not decided otherwise. 93-354 0-82--14 igation. On the other hand, the Department of ted with the responsibility of faithfully s and interpreting the Constitution and statutes. ach of this obligation if the Department of epart from an objective legal analysis for r reasons. I can assure this Committee that by the Department to advise the Treasury he Internal Revenue Service lacked authority to ns on the ground of federal public policy was e basis of objective legal analysis. as requiring organizations satisfying any of the enume also to be "charitable" in the common-law sense - - tha sense that the organization's purposes and practices m with public policy in order to qualify for tax-exem Green was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. Co 404 U.S. 997 (1971). However, summary affirmances tra little precedential value, and in this instance, as th has itself subsequently noted, the special circumstanc in Green made the summary affirmance of no binding sig 1/ The Service's 1970 reinterpretation of Section 501( spurred by the Green litigation. In Green, parents of public school students sued to enjoin the United State according tax-exempt status under Sec. 501 (c) (3) to pr schools in Mississippi that discriminate against black Service initially took the position that racially segr private schools were entitled to tax exemption under S but it reversed its position prior to entry of the dis istinct purposes or functions entitling nonprofit -exempt treatment, and by joining them in the e word "or," manifested a clear intent to tatus to any entity organized and operated for any ed purposes or functions. This common-sense he language of Section 501 (c) (3) is reinforced Code, sister provisions of Section 501 (c) (3), avor of plaintiffs. The Supreme Court's of Green, therefore, "lacks the precedential volving a truly adversary controversy" and Supreme Court the question whether Section 501(c)(3) ›f tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.ll enumerating eight distinct purposes or functions entit corporations to tax-exempt treatment, and by joining t disjunctive with the word "or," manifested a clear int accord tax-exempt status to any entity organized and o one of the enumerated purposes or functions. This com interpretation of the language of Section 501 (c) (3) is by the settled canon of statutory construction requiri related provisions be interpreted in para materia. Se 504, and 513 of the Code, sister provisions of Section 1/ (cont/d) Final decision in favor of plaintiffs. The Supreme Co summary affirmance of Green, therefore, "lacks the pre weight of a case involving a truly adversary controver leaves open in the Supreme Court the question whether authorizes denial of tax-exempt status to racially dis private schools. (1974). Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U |