to

The instruction or training of the individual the purpose of improving or developing his abilities; or

The instruction of the public on subjects ful to the individual and beneficial to the munity.

.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (1959). 14/

xtent that the Service's regulations can be interuire "educational" organizations to also satisfy nts of "charitable" organizations, they are inconthe plain language of Section 501(c)(3) and are Supreme Court outlined the limits of the Execuretive powers in Manhattan General Equipment Comssioner, 297 U.S. 129, 130 (1935):

r of an administrative officer or board
ister a federal statute and to prescribe
d regulations to that end is not the power
law--for no such power can be delegated by
--but the power to adopt regulations to
to effect the will of Congress as expressed
tatute. A regulation which does not do
It operates to create a rule out of harmony
statute, is a mere nullity.

status to an otherwise qualified "educational" org because it does not also qualify as a common law

organization.

Significantly, the Commissioner of Internal R read Section 501(c)(3) and its predecessors any di until 1970--some 70 years after Congress' initial relevant statutory language. To the contrary, pri reversal of position in the middle of the Green li government had steadfastly maintained the position the unambiguous language of Section 501(c)(3), its tory, and the Service's own interpretative regulat an administrative reversal of position provides no ascribing to a much earlier Congress an intent at words used by Congress. 15/ Here, the original le

15/ Obviously, the Commissioner's 1970 revenue ru arguably a contemporaneous construction of the sta presumed to be aware of congressional intent " Nat Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477

93-354 0-82--10

ation reveals no legitimate basis for reaching ion.

with, it is well settled that the intent of a gress has little bearing on the interpretation nacted years earlier. "[T]he views of one Congress truction of a statute adopted many years before gress have 'very little, if any, significance.' nited States, 356 U.S. 590, 593; United States v. . 304, 313 (1960); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S.

nstance, because the language of the statute is biguous, a strong argument can be made that resort history, either before or after enactment of (3), is inappropriate. See Ernst & Ernst v. pra; Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, here is, however, no ambiguity in this Act to by resort to legislative history, either of the of subsequent legislative proposals which failed ").

the Court rejected the argument that a committee

ten eleven years after a statute was passed shou in construing the statute. The Court there stat

"It is the intent of the Congress that enac [the section] . that controls." Teamst United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977 Whatever evidence is provided by the 1978 C mittee Report of the intent of Congress in it is plainly insufficient to overcome the and convincing evidence that Congress inten [the statute to be interpreted as the Court Accord, Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GT 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980).

Similarly, evidence of congressional inacti accorded no weight by the courts in the effort t intent of an earlier Congress. As noted in Unit Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962):

[S]tatutes are construed by the courts with erence to the circumstances existing at the of the passage. The interpretation placed existing statute by a subsequent group of C men who are promoting legislation and who a successful has no persuasive significance h

count of their admissions policies or the he student body or faculty. (H.R. 68, 92d (January 22, 1971) (Congressman Abernethy); ong., 1st Sess. (January 25, 1971) (Congressman 350, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (March 2, 1971) ards); H.R. 1394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (January ssman Edwards)). (b) Bills providing that nd the deductibility of contributions to taxions shall not be construed as the provision tance. (H.R. 1002, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9) (Congressman Dornan); S. 449, 96th Cong., ary 22, 1979) (Senator Hatch); H.R. 5186, Sess. (December 11, 1981) (Congressman Dornan)). ding that the IRS may not terminate the exempt cational organization for reasons of racial nless the organization is adjudicated as inatory in a court. (H.R. 1905, 96th Cong., ary 8, 1979) (Congressman Ashbrook); H. R. 95, Sess.) (January 5, 1981) (Congressman Ashbrook); ong., 1st Sess.) (January 5, 1981) (Congressman 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (January 9, 1981)

ppell)).

(d) Bill providing a declaratory re for denying tax-exempt status to private asis of racial discrimination. (S. 995, 96th (April 24, 1979) (Senators Helms, Ford, ns, and Zorinsky)). (e) Bill to prevent the nting proposed rules relating to determination te schools have discriminatory policies. (S. 103, Sess. (January 18, 1979) (Senators Schmitt, chweiker, Goldwater, Stevens, Zorinsky, Hayakawa, Cochran, Tower, Warner, McClure, and Hatch)).

ese bills ever was voted upon on the floor of Congress.