Mr. MYERS. What is predicted lead time before we could have a reactor online for production? Dr. REIS. The predicted lead time-if I could go back. Mr. MYERS. I should say a facility. Dr. REIS. Well, we believe an accelerator could actually be on line in about, you know, six or seven years, and that includes, if you will, the answering of the, if you will, the production questions. Mr. MYERS. We just happen to have a graph. Dr. REIS. Just happen to have a graph. It is the same thing. So what you see is with an accelerator. What you see is the accelerator would be on line by about the year 2000, basically 2007, whereas a reactor, we believe, would take longer to actually begin to produce. Mr. MYERS. Five or six years for an accelerator; is that right? Mr. MYERS. Longer for a reactor then? Dr. REIS. That is correct. That was based on the studies we have done so far. URANIUM SOLIDIFICATION Mr. MYERS. One last question I am going to ask today. The IG questioned the necessity for the uranium solidification facility at Savannah River. How can you respond to that question? Dr. REIS. I can't. I will have to provide it for the record. [The information follows:] URANIUM SOLIDIFICATION FACILITY AT SAVANNAH RIVER In February 1994, Defense Programs concurred in the Savannah River Operations Office recommendation to suspend construction of the Uranium Solidification Facility (USF) project pending further study of alternatives. The logic for this was that with no production reactor operation there was no need to continuously recover uranium from spent fuel to make new fuel. Thus, only a finite amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) solution and spent fuel require stabilization, hardly enough to justify the costs of USF, and that this material could be better handled by some less costly alternative. The alternatives for stabilizing Savannah River Site (SRS) HEU are being studied in the SRS Interim Management of Nuclear Materials Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Though not the preferred alternative, completion of USF is being analyzed. The preferred alternative, however, is to blend down the existing HEU-bearing solution, and any that would be produced from stabilizing spent fuel, to low enrichment uranium for storage at SRS. Following the issuance of the Record of Decision for this EIS, expected this summer, final action for the disposition of this project will be taken. URANIUM SOLIDIFICATION Mr. MYERS. I thought we were already doing it. Mr. MYERS. I thought we had already vitrified, is that a different process, solidification, it is a different process? Dr. REIS. I think that is a different process, yes. Mr. MYERS. See, here again Dr. REIS. You and I are in the same boat on this one. We will listen to the knock on that tractor at this time. Mr. MYERS. I hear the knock, but I don't get any answer. Well, I think we thank you very much, each of you, for your testimony today. It is an area certainly and a proliferation we have many questions we could have gotten into. How much has leaked out of the former Soviet Union, some of the satellite countries, Kazakhstan, I hope. I understand most of that is in Oak Ridge now. Ask a question about how we are going to dispose of it, who gets the profit if there is any such thing. There is lots of questions we have. Certainly, I am concerned about North Korea. In fact, if we don't have, we will clean it up, but they still retain the material, the fuel, and Russia the same way, I understand. They want to retain it, which kind of worries me. We do all the work and they still have potentially there the asset they could sell to somebody in the world, so that worries a lot of us on this, but there are a lot of questions we will provide for the record, and so, again, thank each of you very much for your answers today and your participation. Dr. REIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MYERS. The Members are all gone. They have to consider it as classified, unless they know otherwise. I guess they all left the material. Again, thank you very much. The committee stands in adjournment until 1:00 today. [The prepared statements of the witnesses and the questions and answers for the record follow:] WEAPONS NATIONAL LABORATORIES Mr. Myers. Dr. Reis, with the reduction in the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile, why do we need three weapons laboratories? Dr. Reis. The challenge before the DOE and its laboratories is not the smaller stockpile, but rather how to maintain confidence in the safety and security of the stockpile without underground testing. This will be accomplished through the Stockpile Stewardship/Stockpile Management program. For this program to succeed the science and technology base of the three laboratories -- Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia must be maintained. This program is a major scientific and technical challenge, one that will require the talents and skills of the scientists at all three laboratories. Mr. Myers. The energy research programs at the Department of Energy use peer review to determine laboratory activities while defense programs have used competition between laboratories. Could the peer review concept replace competition in these programs? Dr. Reis. First, I believe that the terms "competition" and "peer review" may not be very different in their meaning for the nuclear weapon design process. Secondly, the peer base obviously does not exist outside the two design laboratories relative to nuclear weapons. I just do not see how the attributes of peer review could be maintained under the energy research method without compromising national security and our confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. The systems that are being evaluated are so complicated, they must be studied from fundamentally different directions, using different approaches, both experimental and computational. If similar answers are obtained from these differing approaches, then the results have a greater chance of being correct. If the peer review system is attempted at a single facility, with the same management, the same experimental data, and the same computational codes, then the same answers will be obtained, but there will not be any increased level of confidence in the answers. Alternative methods of peer review will be examined to provide the basis for any decision. GALVIN REPORT Mr. Myers. Can you discuss the Galvin Report's recommendation that weapons research and development activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory be phased out? Dr. Reis. The Department supports the study of a careful phase-down of some of Lawrence Livermore's nuclear weapons work, combined with a reemphasis on nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and verification activities. Timing and details of phase-down will depend on assessment of how best to meet continuing national defense requirements in the absence of testing. Alternative methods of retaining peer review will be examined to provide a basis for any decisions. VIABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE Mr. Myers. Can you explain in layman's terms how the National Ignition Facility, NIF, and the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility, DARHT, will contribute to maintaining the viability of the nuclear weapons stockpile? Dr. Reis. Nuclear weapons work by initiating fission and fusion in materials brought to the proper density and temperature for a specified duration. A number of processes and details determine whether or not the required conditions for nuclear reactions are met. Without direct testing of weapons, the performance of any weapon is simulated by computer calculations combining physics and engineering principles with data and information from many sources which may include, in the future, DARHT and NIF. Because of aging, all weapons in the enduring stockpile will require surveillance and maintenance. Replacement materials and available manufacturing techniques will change over the years. Subtle chemical changes in materials, in solid-state characteristics of materials, in gaseous content of materials, and geometric changes in material parts, could affect the safety and performance of the weapons. Surrogate devices can be x-rayed while they are being tested with nonnuclear high explosives. The density of the materials that are penetrated by the x-ray is large, the distances penetrated are large (for x-rays), and the exposure times are extremely small (microseconds). These experimental parameters and the radiographic requirements stretch the state of the art in the science of radiography. These concerns are new to the character of the nation's stockpile, and a predictive capability in this area does not yet exist. An upgraded capability in radiography is essential in addressing these concerns. Greater resolution with multi-view and time-sequenced radiographs are required to begin this new phase of diagnostics. The proposed DARHT facility was designed to do just this. As detonation proceeds in an actual weapon, the densities and temperatures of the materials increase beyond any other process occurring on Earth. This is required for fusion to occur. The physical processes occurring in the anticipated, fusion-ignited capsule of the NIF would be similar to those in a weapon even though the capsule for the NIF would not be like a weapon. Designing the experiments at NIF to ignite is a difficult problem that would attract and challenge highly skilled scientists. The NIF would uniquely provide physics information on the processes, especially transfer of radiation and energy, that control the performance of a weapon at its highest temperature and density. Data from proposed facilities like DARHT and NIF would assist in evaluating whether or not small changes in the weapons will lead to changes in their performance. These facilities could contribute to maintaining the viability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. NEW TRITIUM SOURCE Mr. Myers. Can you discuss the advantages and disadvantages of an accelerator or reactor as a new tritium source? Dr. Reis. With regard to environment, safety, and health considerations, the accelerator option uses no fissile material, therefore generating no spent fuel. It produces much less low level and hazardous waste than the reactors, and has no potential for a severe accident having offsite consequences. Therefore, from an environment, safety, and health perspective, the accelerator is relatively "site-neutral," whereas there are substantially different impacts (particularly potential accident impacts) for the reactors, depending upon the site selected for evaluation. The reactor options have less potential to impact water resources and do not have the environmental impacts associated with an accelerator's relatively large demand for power. The accelerator, however, is easier to decontaminate and decommission at the end of life than a reactor. The environment, safety, and health impacts of the accelerator and each of the reactor options are discussed in Chapter 4 of the Draft Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, which has now been published for public review and comment. The Department is also examining technology, cost, institutional, and policy issues associated with each option. Completion of these analyses is necessary to support a decision on a tritium production source, and to provide a complete and comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons associated with each option. GALVIN REPORT Mr. Myers. The laboratory directors told the Galvin task force that they could reduce costs by 10% to 40% with less oversight from the Department and fewer audits. Now that the Secretary has committed to reduce these administrative burdens, how could your fiscal year 1996 budget request for the laboratories and weapons facilities be adjusted? Dr. Reis. We believe that the full achievement of the Secretary's commitment to reduce the oversight burden on the laboratories will take several years. Our FY 1996 budget request has assumed a reduction of $25 million as the first step in implementing the Secretary's commitment to contract reform; strategic realignment; and the Galvin report. We expect that additional savings will be realized from these initiatives over the next 5 years. At this point, projecting |