board may exercise a power denied to some of its membership but conferred upon others.

While the full scope allotted to the joint boards can be ascertained only by reference to the local planning acts, it is beyond question considerable. Whether these boards, rather than independent governmental units, are the most appropriate organs for planning by cooperative action, is more open to dispute.

The State's role as planner is in some respects analogous to that of the region. Ideally it should act in relation to State-size problems as a commission of original jurisdiction and as a commission of appellate review to smaller ones. Their roles should differ, however, in much the same manner as that of the highest appellate court does from that of a court of intermediate review. Such conceptual differences are of minimal practical importance, however, since the legislatures have been chary of conferring any but hortatory powers on the Statelevel agencies.

The State planning laws are created in much the same mold as the regional ones. Thus, a primary task assigned the State planning department is the preparation of a master plan for the physical development of the State. The topics to be considered in some instances are virtually the same as those considered in the regional planning laws. The other tasks, too, duplicate those assigned the regional commissions. Some of the State planning agencies, for instance, are directed to engage in educational and propaganda activities and to promote both cooperation among subordinate levels of planning agencies and coordination of their plans.

The possibility exists-although admittedly slight-that State personnel might enjoy greater prestige than their regional counterparts and, by reason of it, secure greater compliance with their views. Except for this remote prospect, the State planning unit exercises as little control over the planning of units smaller than itself as the regional ones-virtually none.

Critique and evaluation.-All but two States make some provision for metropolitan or regional planning agencies. Of these, it is the rare piece of legislation which makes the very existence of the regional body independent of the desires of the local governmental units. Consequently, the traditional pattern has become that of a league of municipalities. Area and scope, too, usually are left for local determination. A planned, statewide coordination of regions, or even an enumeration of criteria for defining the different metropolitan areas in order to found land planning on a more rational basis than existing political boundaries, rarely is given active, affirmative support.

The legislation generally leaves basic issues largely unanswered; without authoritative State guidelines, areawide planning becomes rudderless. What ends did the State legislatures hope to achieve by prescribing the preparation of a metropolitan or regional plan? What strategic points of decisionmaking are intended to be influenced by it? Although perhaps unkind, it is not unfair to characterize most of the existing metropolitan planning enabling statutes as theoretical but hollow victories. As presently formulated, they are oriented toward the preparation of a regional plan, but not necessarily a plan fashioned to an end; nor is there a bridge whereby the plan can influence land development. Even the process of preparation generally is not cal

culated to elicit public support, nor to be illuminating either to the general citizenry or to the planning staffs and boards. Certainly the procedures for adoption do not hold much promise of stimulating discussion, of awakening wide public response, or of making the final acceptance of the plan a matter of public concern. Without such clarification, there is small hope for a reconciliation of divergent interests, without which planning becomes simply a pleasant intellectual hobby.

That the real clash of interests comes to the surface when the plan begins to bite on property rights focuses attention on the implementation of a plan. But as now conceived, the regional plan's recommendations do not lead to action. They dangle loosely in the middle of a firmament of local governmental units. There is no formal designation of a legislative body to adopt and enact such plans and subsequently implement the objectives through the normal land-use enactment-zoning, subdivision, streets, and building laws. The plans may be ignored by the local governmental units which comprise the region. Perhaps the outstanding characteristic and the greatest single flaw in the regional planning enabling statutes considered as a whole is the sink-or-swim approach to the problem adopted by the State. At each of the numerous points where the State effectively could guide, reconcile, or instigate, it fails to do so. The localities are thrown into a sea of permissive powers. Some, no doubt, stay afloat-utilizing the powers fully and wisely, with resulting benefits to the jurisdictions. Unfortunately there are probably also at least as many which, having taken an apathetic stroke or two, sink, because of misuse of the powers, and an even larger number which, refusing to swim at all, head back to shore as quickly as possible without even availing themselves of the planning powers.

The State government is in a far better position to achieve an overall view. If regions are susceptible of rational definition, using political criteria, the States are best able to perform the task. In this respect the California and Connecticut legislation points to a more logical path: planned statewide coordination of regions. Perhaps the statutory limitations on local self-determination of contiguity, adjacency, etc., are intended to provide the necessary guidance. But if so, they reintroduce the vice that metropolitan planning is designed to eliminate: the demarcation of planning areas by outdated political boundaries. More relevant criteria could, of course, be substituted, but it is extremely doubtful that they would suffice. The application of such criteria is not self-executing, and the expertise of an administrative agency is essential.

Moreover, the definitional task is only the starting point. Its accomplishment will obviously be futile unless the local units of government are induced to cooperate in the regional effort. Very few States, however, make joinder mandatory. Nonetheless, the State planning act provisions aimed at encouraging and promoting interlocal cooperation are steps in the right direction. But one most effective way of encouraging participation is almost entirely neglected, that of giving financial assistance to the regional commissions, and thereby relieving local governments of part of the burden. Another inducement to effective metropolitan planning might be to limit State financial aid or participation to projects pursuant to a master plan. To the extent

that Federal grants are made generally available, they can be channeled toward this same end.

The statutes are also open to criticism where they have legislated affirmatively. Take, for example, the matter of the composition and number of commission members. The prevailing view appears to favor the small commission-5 to 13 members, at the most. Presumably, this is a deliberate decision in favor of the small, efficient, flexible unit. Some statutes, however, do not specify a definite number, but set forth a formula-such as one representative for each member government. When this provision is taken, together with that permitting any number of localities to band together for planning purposes, a board, cumbersome and unwieldy in the extreme, might well result. It may be, of course, that such a legislative pattern results from a preference for a large board. Also likely, however, is the possibility that the problem was never fully considered. Further, the statutory formulas too often ignore differences in size between the potential constituent members, thereby glossing over basic power conflicts which must be compromised in some way. Frequently, the large metropolises, the so-called central cities, are jealous of their power and hence are unlikely voluntarily to reduce their voice to the same level as that of their smaller neighbors. This gains increasing importance with the increased segregation of unprivileged and minority groups in the central core. To them, direct access to Washington is a lifeline which the central cities cannot allow a majority vote of the surrounding suburbs to control. To ignore these pressures and make membership voluntary simply invites abstention which may negate any cooperation, if only because the abstainers are also likely to be the wealthiest and largest political subdivisions in that region.

If, on the other hand, voting weight were proportional to size, the smaller communities would object, for fear of being swamped. This divisive drive for power and control was recognized by the drafters of the standard act. Their reaction was ambivalent. In one marginal comment, they expressed the hope that the creation of a regional organization would allay fears of annexation by the central, dominant city. In another, they justified extraterritorial planning on the importance of the plan to coerce action.

It may be that full membership could be obtained by limiting the resulting board to a purely advisory role. But a more logical solution would be to meet the problem head-on by having the higher power of the State, whose creation the localities are, force acquiescence to its resolution. Even without the changes in legislative composition which Baker v. Carr will engender, State legislatures are likely to acquiesce in metropolitan programs if pushed by legislative representatives from these areas or if the program would qualify for a share of Federal funds made available on a metropolitan basis.

The core of the acts-the master plan for the region-also is open to serious criticisms, two of which will be mentioned here. First, without exception, the statutes simply list the topics which the planners are to consider, sometimes with the additional requirement that the principles, etc., underlying the plan be stated. In so doing, the legislature abdicates its function of making value judgments. While the planner properly should create a plan which will, for example, either tend to retard or to facilitate urbanization of a community, it is not his

province to decide which goal to pursue. Similarly, many other decisions implicit in a master plan require political rather than technical choices. The State may decline to be the arbiter, whether through the legislature or the Governor's office, although it certainly would seem to be the best qualified potential candidate. At the least, however, it should provide by statute for some democratically responsible body to make such decisions before, not after, the plan is even tentatively drafted.

Second, there is a striking resemblance between the statutory provisions relating to local and county master plans and those relating to metropolitan plans. In many cases the difference consists only in the substitution of "regional" for "municipal," etc., sometimes with an additional direction, in the nature of a postscript, that the metropolitan commission confine its attention to only as many of the enumerated topics as affect the region as a whole or two or more political units. The suspicion naturally arises that the provisions relating to the metropolitan master plan simply were copied from those dealing with local master plans with little or no thought as to the appropriateness of each requirement in regional planning, or the special qualities which a regional perspective can inject into the land development process.

The State enabling acts also generally fail to provide for the effective coordination of the plans of the various units. Typically, they simply assert that the enactment of the regional planning law in no way abridges or modifies the powers conferred under other laws. The regional plan does not replace the plans of the localities within the region; it simply adds one to their number.

The possibility of conflict-both between the units' plans and with the regional plan-is obvious, and some effort is apparent in the statutes to devise a way of resolving those that do arise. The means selected, however, like participation in the first instance, rely far too heavily on voluntary efforts. Thus the regional commissions are exhorted to promote coordination among local plans and to point out conflicts and inconsistencies. Nowhere, however, are they given the responsibility and power to deal effectively with conflict situations. So, too, the regional commission sometimes is directed to prepare its plan in the light of conditions in neighboring regions or those of the State as a whole. With the best will in the world, a commission may fall short of this objective. Yet there is most often no agency responsible for reviewing plans or authorized to require the elimination of conflict, inadvertent or willful.

The conflict of plans is of academic interest only, however, as long as the plan remains unrelated to activity. It seems hardly likely that the relationship will become much closer under the existing statutory scheme, which typically does not link adoption of the plan to the normal land use enactments-zoning, subdivision, streets, and building laws.

Even in California, where the enabling act requires the incorporation of the regional master plan into any local master plan, the local legislature still has the final option of not adopting the master plan in this form; more significantly, adoption even of the local master plan has but limited effect on subsequent legislation to control land use, the primary concern of the private developer.

The statutes place the initiative in the localities, which are authorized to create regional planning bodies and to participate in their

activities. Were they the driving force behind the legislation, they might be assumed to have a program or theoretic framework in view which, even lacking universal assent, would fill the vacuum in the State legislation. But that they were not can be shown by the fact that, by and large, the localities have not sought to avail themselves of the planning powers conferred by the acts.

Who actually prompted the legislation is relatively unimportant. What is important is why there has not been more activity under it. Some credit, and probably a good part of it, must be given to the conflicting pull of home rule concepts. On occasion the desire for selfrule may lead municipalities to band together. In Kearns v. Ohio Power Co. (163 Ohio St. 451, 127 N.E. 2d 394 (1955)), for example, the municipalities backed up the regional planning organization in opposing the larger power of the State. But this was the relatively rare case, posing the necessity to choose between unequal evils. Generally, this unpleasant necessity does not exist, and municipalities, lacking the incentive to pull together, pull apart for the same purpose of guarding intact their governmental powers. Thus the regional plan again is reduced to virtually a didactic exercise. While the usefuiness denoted by its very existence should not be minimized, it must be recognized that the effect of such regional plans in directing the application of human energies in land development is indeed small. Perhaps this is all, however, that one can realistically expect at the present time.

The growing interdependency of metropolitan land activities and the multiplication of Federal programs affecting metropolitan areas make this situation of State planning legislation increasingly less satisfactory. There is a need to review proposed Federal and private plans and projects for compatibility with a comprehensive metropolitan plan. A vast expansion of the Federal financial stake in metropolitan areas-notably in mortgage insurance, public housing, highway, and urban renewal has great impact on the land uses of the metropolitan area and on its structure of government. Such programs call for coordination among themselves and with local projects on a governmental basis but, as yet, this growing problem has received scant attention in the State legislation.

This omission may be attributable to a single, very basic cause. While the number of State statutes allowing metropolitan planning reflects a general acceptance by State legislators of its desirability, a reading of the statutes raises doubts as to what is comprehended within that acceptance. Neither expressly, nor implicitly, in the sum of the provisions, is there a specific content, any theory of the nature of the region, of the relationship of the component units to each other and to the whole arising out of location within a common region, or of the function of the region, beyond vague generalities. In short, the statutes are more accurately described as permitting metropolitan planning, rather than providing for it or even fully understanding its reason for being, its implications, or its implementation. Too often the existence of a metropolitan planning agency is taken as an end in itself. That it should engage in a comprehensive planning process, that the planning should be directed toward problems and solutions, and that the agency should be assigned a defined role in the overall political process are the next tasks for State legislators to consider. 118

116 See app. E for possible techniques for interested State governments to employ.