such conveyance, subject only to the provisions of the next section.' This statute plainly applies, and, no creditor being concerned, the succeeding section has no application. Nor, as we have pointed out, is the claimant within the protection of section 5571, which provides that section 5569 shall not extend to cases where the alienee named in the conveyance shall have taken the same as an absolute conveyance, in his own name, without the knowledge or consent of the person paying the consideration, or when such alienee, in violation of some trust, shall have purchased the land so conveyed with moneys belonging to another person. Nor can it be said that property paid for by copartners may by them, or either of them, be placed wholly or in part in the name of a third person, and a trust result in favor of the partnership, or any member thereof. No such exception to the rule exists in favor of a copartnership. The cases arising between partners rest on very different considerations. As was said in Way v. Stebbins, 47 Mich., at page 299: "They come plainly within the equities of part performance, because, the parties having acted upon them in such a way as to render it impossible to adjust their rights in any ordinary legal action, it would be a fraud to allow the legal form of the title to cut off the equities.' But no equity applies in favor of revesting a copartnership with property which is voluntarily conveyed or caused to be conveyed to a third person which does not apply with equal force in the case of a similar transfer of property by an individual. There was no error in the ruling of the circuit judge. The judgment will he affirmed, with costs. The other Justices concurred. 99 80 146 2489 CHARLES R. WILLIAMS AND A. MILTON HOLDEN V. THE R. EVARTS AND EDWIN EVARTS V. THE SAME. [Two cases.] Garnishment-Foreign corporation-Summons-Affidavit. 1. The failure to describe the defendant as a foreign corporation Certiorari to Wayne. (Reilly, J.) Submitted on briefs. February 2, 1894. Decided February 12, 1894. Garnishment proceedings. Plaintiffs bring certiorari. For cases bearing upon the proper construction of How. Stat. § 8087, see: 1. Wilson v. Circuit Judge, 82 Mich. 169, holding that the statute does not cover a case where there are several defendants, some of whom are residents of this State, and who are personally served with process within the jurisdiction of the court." 2. Newland v. Circuit Judge, 85 Mich. 151, holding: a-That the statute covers a case where the plaintiff is also a non-resident. b-That it points out the mode of procedure to acquire jurisdiction over the principal defendant, not for the purpose of rendering a personal judgment against him, but to subject the choses in action in the hands of the third party to the payment of the plaintiff's demand, and to this extent it confers jurisdiction upon the court to proceed. Judgments quashing proceedings reversed. stated in the opinion. D. F. Glidden, for appellants. Harry F. Chipman, for defendants. The facts are GRANT, J. The records in these cases are identical. The praecipe and summons in each did not describe the principal defendant as a foreign corporation or as a nonresident of the State. The affidavit for the writ of garnishment, which was made and filed at the same time that the praecipe was filed and the summons issued, stated that "The said defendant is a non-resident of this State, and a corporation created by the state of Illinois." The affidavit is in compliance with How. Stat. § 8087, under which the proceedings were instituted. This section. will be found in full in Newland v. Circuit Judge, 85 Mich. 152. It is contended that the court had no jurisdiction in the principal case, because the defendant therein was not described in the praecipe and summons as a foreign corporation, and therefore it must be inferred that the defendant named was a domestic corporation. Such particularity is not required in the praecipe and summons. It is sufficient to state therein the names of the parties to the suit. The declaration must state the character of the parties plaintiff and defendant, and the capacity in which they sue and are sued. The praecipe and summons do not state whether the plaintiffs sue as copartners or otherwise. This may be stated in the declaration. So it may be stated therein whether the defendant is a domestic or a foreign corporation. The statements in the affidavit determine the jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ of garnishment, 99 Mich.-6. where there are proper plaintiffs and defendant in the original suit. This affidavit, with the principal writ and writ of garnishment, is required to be served on the principal defendant within 60 days after service of the writ of garnishment on the garnishee defendant. The statute requires that the affidavit, not the principal summons, shall contain the evidence of non-residence, or that the defendant is a foreign corporation. This fact, therefore, need not be shown in the principal summons. The affidavit in each case was made by one of the plaintiffs, and stated all the requirements of the statute, and that the said plaintiffs "are justly apprehensive of the loss," etc., "unless a writ of garnishment issue." In Weimeister v. Manville, 44 Mich. 408, the affidavit was held defective because the agent of the plaintiff, who made the affidavit, swore that the plaintiff was justly apprehensive, a fact which he could not know. Where the affidavit is made by one of the plaintiffs, and he swears that they are justly apprehensive, it must be presumed that he has personal knowledge. We think the court was in error in quashing the proceedings, and the judgments are therefore reversed. The other Justices concurred. 1. Act No. 264, Laws of 1889, entitled " 'An act relative to disorderly persons," etc., is not open to the objection that the title gives no information as to what acts constitute a disorderly person, or that the third offense, for which a punishment is prescribed, is not expressed in the title.' 2. The term "disorderly persons" is comprehensive, and properly includes all those who are designated in the body of the act. 3. An objection that an information which charges the respondent with having been a disorderly person on a given date, and sets forth the dates of several convictions of the respondent for the same offense in certain courts, is fatally defective in failing to allege that said courts had jurisdiction, cannot be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, the respondent having pleaded not guilty to the information, without making any objection to its form; citing People v. Hanifan, 93 Mich. 33. 4. An objection that a sentence which is authorized by law, and within the exclusive province of the Legislature to prescribe, is excessive and unauthorized, is untenable. (Chambers, J.) Error to recorder's court of Detroit. Respondent was convicted of being a disorderly person, under Act No. 264, Laws of 1889, and sentenced to imprisonment in the Detroit House of Correction for two years. Judgment affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Elbridge F. Bacon, for respondent. A. A. Ellis, Attorney General, and A. H. Frazer, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. GRANT, J. 1. It is first contended that Act No. 264, Laws of 1889, is in conflict with section 20 of article 4 of the Constitution, in that it embraces more than one object. The act is entitled "An act relative to disorderly persons, and to repeal chapter 53 of the Compiled Laws of 1871, as amended by the several acts amendatory thereof." Section 2 of the act provides that 'See In re Jordan, 90 Mich. 3. |