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and whatever human skill had failed in accomplishing had been pronounced to be impossible. If enquirers, instead of each confining his attention to one particular art, had extended their examination throughout the general realm of nature, they would have found that what was obscure in one department was manifest and familiar in another. Another impediment to the progress of natural philosophy in every age had been superstition, and a blind and immoderate zeal for religion. Even in his own day, Bacon complains, the discussion of the facts and laws of nature had been made more difficult and perilous by the summaries and methods of the scholastic theologians, who, after having reduced divinity, as far as they could, into order and the form of an art, had mingled with the body of religious truth much more than was necessary of the pugnacious and thorny philosophy of Aristotle. Others, again, though in a different way, had done equal injury to both Christianity and philosophy by attempting to deduce and confirm the truths of religion out of the principles and the authority of philosophers. The various ways in which almost all access to philosophy was intercepted by the ignorance of divines are thus enumerated. Some were afraid that an inquisition into nature might penetrate beyond the established bounds of sobriety. Others thought that, if inter,mediate or secondary causes remained unknown, every thing would be more readily referred (as they conceived religion required) to the actual hand and directing wand of God; which, says Bacon, is nothing else than to wish to gratify God with a lie.* Others were afraid lest movement and change, once begun, in philosophy, should pass thence to religion. Others finally seemed to be anxious lest something should be found in the investigation of nature which might subvert or at least shake

*In the original, "quam Deo per mendacium gratificari velle." Mr. Wood erroneously translates, "that God wishes to be gratified by means of falsehood." Nor does his rendering of the next sentence give exactly Bacon's meaning ;-" but motion and change in philosophy should terminate in an attack upon religion."

religion, especially among the unlearned. But these two last apprehensions, Bacon declares, seem to him to savour wholly of animal wisdom, as if men in the recesses and secret thoughts of their minds were really diffident and doubtful about the strength of religion and the dominion of faith over the senses. He who truly considers the matter will perceive that natural philosophy is, after the word of God, the surest medicine against superstition, and the best minister of faith. The 90th aphorism, as translated by Mr. Wood, is as follows:

90. Again, in the habits and regulations of schools, universities, and the like assemblies, destined for the abode of learned men, and the improvement of learning, everything is found to be opposed to the progress of the sciences. For the lectures and exercises are so ordered, that anything out of the common track can scarcely enter the thoughts and contemplations of the mind. If, however, one or two have perhaps dared to use their liberty, they can only impose the labour on themselves, without deriving any advantage from the association of others: and if they put up with this, they will find their industry and spirit of no slight disadvantage to them in making their fortune. For the pursuits of men in such situations are, as it were, chained down to the writings of particular authors, and if any one dare to dissent from them, he is immediately attacked as a turbulent and revolutionary spirit. Yet how great is the difference between civil matters and the arts; for there is not the same danger from new activity and new light. In civil matters even a change for the better is suspected on account of the commotion it occasions: for civil government is supported by authority, unanimity, fame, and public opinion, and not by demonstration. In the arts and sciences, on the contrary, every department should resound, as in mines, with new works and advances. And this is the rational, though not the actual, view of the case: for that administration and government of science we have spoken of is wont too rigorously to repress its growth.

In the 91st aphorism the want of proper rewards for the cultivation of science is complained of. And here is the 92nd, also in Mr. Wood's version :

92. But by far the greatest obstacle to the advancement of

the sciences and the undertaking of any new attempt or department is to be found in men's despair and the idea of impossibility. For men of a prudent and exact turn of thought, are altogether diffident in matters of this nature, considering the obscurity of nature, the shortness of life, the deception of the senses, and weakness of the judgment. They think therefore that in the revolutions of ages and of the world there are certain floods and ebbs of the sciences, and that they grow and flourish at one time and wither and fall off at another, that, when they have attained a certain degree and condition, they can proceed no further.

If therefore any one believe or promise greater things, they impute it to an uncurbed and immature mind, and imagine that such efforts begin pleasantly, then become laborious, and end in confusion. And, since such thoughts easily enter the minds of men of dignity and excellent judgment, we must really take heed lest we should be captivated by our affection for an excellent and most beautiful object, and relax or diminish the severity of our judgment; and we must diligently examine what gleam of hope shines upon us, and in what direction it manifests itself, so that banishing her lighter dreams we may discuss and weigh whatever appears of more sound importance. We must consult the prudence of ordinary life too, which is diffident upon principle,* and in all human matters augurs the worst. Let us then speak of hope, especially as we are not vain promisers, nor are willing to force or ensnare men's judgment, but would rather lead them willingly forward. And, although we shall employ the most cogent means of enforcing hope when we bring them to particulars, and especially those which are digested and arranged in our Tables of Invention, (the subject partly of the Second but principally of the Fourth Part of the Instauration), which are indeed rather the very object of our hopes than hope itself; yet to proceed more leniently we must treat of the preparation of men's minds, of which the manifestation of hope forms no slight part. For without it all that we have said tends rather to produce a gloom than to encourage activity or quicken the industry of experiment, by causing them to have a worse and more contemptuous opinion of things as they are than they now entertain, and to perceive and feel more thoroughly their unfortunate condition. We must therefore disclose and prefix our reasons

* Rather upon rule. The Latin is "ex praescripto."

for not thinking the hope of success improbable; as Columbus before his wonderful voyage over the Atlantic gave the reasous of his conviction that new lands and continents might be discovered besides those already known. And these reasons, though at first rejected, were yet proved by subsequent experience, and were the causes and beginuings of the greatest events.

The exposition of the grounds of hope for the future progress of philosophy occupies a number of subsequent aphorisms. Some religious considerations are first suggested:-as, that God is the author of good and the father of light; that, as it is said in regard to spiritual things that the kingdom of heaven cometh not with observation, so in every more considerable work of providence progress is made imperceptibly, and from the smallest beginnings; and that the prophet Daniel has declared that in the last days of the world many shall run to and fro and knowledge shall be increased. It is then remarked that even the errors and failures of the past afford hope for the future and encouragement for the trial of methods as yet unattempted. So Demosthenes argued, in his famous exhortation to the Athenians, that that which was worst in the past, their ill management of the war with Philip and their consequent misfortunes, was the very thing which chiefly entitled them to expect better success in the time to come, when they should have changed their system and corrected their errors. This remark introduces a more distinct or precise statement of the wrong courses that had been hitherto taken in the study of philosophy. Here is the 95th aphorism, as it is given by Shaw:

95. Those who have treated the sciences were either empirics or rationalists. The empirics, like ants, only lay up stores, and use them; the rationalists, like spiders, spin webs out of themselves; but the bee takes a middle course, gathering her matter from the flowers of the field and garden, and digesting and preparing it by her native powers. In like manner, that is the true office and work of philosophy, which, not trusting too much to the faculties of the mind, does not lay up the matter, afforded by natural history and mechanical experience, entire or unchioned in the memory, but treasures it after being first ela

borated and digested in the understanding. And, therefore, we have a good ground of hope, from the close and strict union of the experimental and rational faculty, which have not hitherto been united.

In the 96th aphorism it is observed that natural philosophy has never yet been found simple and pure, but always infected and corrupted by some foreign intermixture; as in the school of Aristotle by logic, in that of the later Platonists by mathematics. In the 97th it is added that no one has yet been found of sufficient constancy and firmness of mind to determine altogether to throw away common theories and notions, and to apply his understanding afresh to the examination of particular facts when it has been thus smoothed and made even. As Livy says of Alexander the Great that all he had done was only that he had judiciously dared to despise imaginary difficulties, so Bacon conceives that future times will say of him that he had achieved nothing very great, but had only looked upon some obstacles as of small account which were usually regarded as formidable. The 98th aphorism, as translated by Shaw, is as follows:

And for the foundations of experience, which is the next thing we must proceed to, they either have not hitherto been laid, or very weakly. Nor has a collection of materials, competent either in number, kind, or certainty, for informing the understanding, or any way sufficient, and worthy of the end proposed, been hitherto made; but, on the contrary, learned men, after an easy, indolent manner, have received certain rumours of experience, and the popular reports and tales thereof, both for building and strengthening their philosophy, and given them the weight of strong testimonials; which is just as if a kingdom should govern itself, not according to the advices and intelligences of its ambassadors, and trusty officers in foreign courts, but by the idle rumours and common town-talk of its people. For as to matter of experience, there is nothing hitherto well discovered, verified, adjusted, weighed, or measured in natural history, but whatever is undefined and vague in observation must needs be fallacious and deceitful in the information. And if this shall seem surprising, or the complaint appear unjust to any one, whilst so great a philosopher as Aristotle, assisted with the purse of so great a prince as Alex

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