further in answer to questions put to him, that it happened onceviz., in the Purchas case, that a moiety of the Court consisted of privy councillors not being lawyers. The case was heard by only four members, and two of them were prelates. Lord Westbury, in the course of the examination of Mr. Reeve, inquired whether what had occurred was not this:-That there having been some complaint or some murmur, with regard to summoning individual Judges, the conclusion arrived at in the Bennett case was that, instead of picking out Judges, it would be better to send a general circular to all the mempers of the Judicial Committee; and the Registrar answered that it was so. It has never been settled whether a member of the Judicial Committee not summoned or invited may attend. Another question arose-In the Orders made in 1627, " to be observed in assemblies of the Council," it is directed that a decision is to be "by the most voices," but that "no publication is afterwards to be made by any man how the particular voices and opinions went." The Star Chamber was then exercising jurisdiction; but it is considered that the practice and traditions of the Privy Council have not been affected by the abolition of the powers exercised by the Star Chamber, which was a Committee of the Privy Council. The rule was observed for two centuries, and was departed from in the Gorham case. The practise has always been that when the Judicial Committee have deliberated in private, some member is asked to draw up the judgment of the Committee, or of the majority; that document is generally sent to the Registrar of the Council, printed confidentially at the Cabinet Press, and circulated among the members of the Committee who heard the case. These make notes upon it, and suggest any alteration they think desirable, until at last it is got into a form which embodies the opinion of their Lordships or of the majority of them. It purports to be the opinion of "the Committee," and no mention is made of differences of opinion. The Registrar considers that "the Crown would be extremely embarrassed if, on applying to a Committee of its Privy Council for advice, It were told that three members of the Committee were of one opinion and two of another; the Crown requires a decisive opinion upon which to act." Lord Chelmsford came to the help of the witness by observing, in the form of putting a question, that the Crown does not necessarily understand that the recommendation is the unanimous opinion of the Committee. Lord Westbury, in another question, made the not unreasonable suggestion that it seems right that the truth should be stated to the Crown. The public and the profession also might as well be allowed to have the means of weighing the value of the decision. It appears, however, that shortly after the creation of the Judicial Committee this ques-tion of the publication or concealment of votes arose; the first time there was a difference of opinion, some of their Lordships were anxious to express their opinions. The Court consisted at that time of Lord Brougham, Mr. Baron Parke, and other Judges. The ancient

rule of 1627 was brought before them by Mr. Greville, then Clerk of the Council, and after careful consideration, they arrived at the conclusion that it was desirable to adhere to the old rule, and to confirm it by their own practice. But it has not been strictly adhered to. In the Gorham case, Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce, in the secret deliberations of the Committee, read a paper extremely adverse to the conclusion of the majority, and earnestly requested his colleagues to allow it to be stated that he did not concur in the judgment; and the Committee thought it right to defer to his wishes, and to announce, "Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce wishes it to be stated that he does not concur in this judgment." In a subsequent case, that of the Essays and Reviews, the Lord Chancellor, after delivering the judgment, added, "The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of York wish it to be understood that they do not concur in the latter part of this judgment," with reference to a particular article. Mr. Reeve observes that this is the utmost that has been done, and no reason for dissenting has ever yet been stated; but it is difficult to see the wisdom of this restriction, peculiar to this court. It may be observed that when the Judicial Committee was established in 1833, no Bishops were members of it; one of the first ecclesiastical cases heard before it was that of "Estcourt vs. Mastin," which determined the very important question of the validity of lay baptism, and no Prelates were present. In 1840, the Church Discipline Act was passed, and it is only by virtue of that Act that Bishops are members of the Judicial Committee. An appeal under that statute cannot be heard without them. Gorham's case was not under that Act; it was a case of what is called duplex querela. But the then Lord President, Lord Landsdowne, was of opinion that it was exceedingly desirable that the Prelates who were Privy Councillors should attend, and letters were written to them conveying Her Majesty's express commands to them to attend; but they had no vote. Any Privy Councillor may be summoned to attend at the sittings of the Judicial Committee; and many do attend. Indian Judges, appointed assessors attend; the Colonial Secretary has attended, and sometimes the Home Secretary. He has not a vote, but he may express his opinion. That is what the Bishops did in the Gorham case; they all expressed their opinions. But what they said was not made known to the public.

Une lettre de Londres, d'une date toute récente transmet les informations suivantes, de la part d'un citoyen de Montréal, ancien avocat: "Devant cette Cour, tout se fait et se passe simplement, sans bruit, sans effet, sans éloquence. L'éloquence serait non seulement inutile, mais nuisible. La Cour se tient dans une salle de trente pieds carrés, dont les quatre murs sont couverts de livres. Quoique l'accès en soit libre au public, c'est à peine si l'on y voit trois ou quatre personnes à la fois, durant les plaidoiries. Un petit espace est réservé aux avocats seuls, les solli

nous.

citeurs n'y ayant pas accès. Ces derniers sont assis derrière leurs Counsel respectifs, sur des bancs à part et séparés par une cloison de trois à quatre pieds de hauteur. Les juges au nombre de cinq sont assis de chaque coté d'une table verte et de plein pied,-c'est-à-dire sans trône et même sans estrade, comme chez L'extrémité inférieure de cette table oblongue, s'appuie contre un grillage à hauteur de ceinture, qui sépare les avocats des juges et au centre de laquelle vient se placer l'avocat pour plaider, en sorte qu'il n'aurait qu'à étendre le bras pour toucher les juges assis le plus près de lui. On comprend facilement que ces dispositions ne prêtent guères a l'éloquence. On se parle face à face, comme dans un salon. Le fait est que c'est, dans toute la force du term?, une argumentation, très souvent interrompue par les questions des juges, où le coloris et l'équivoque n'ont pas de place. Les juges ne s'impatientent pas, ils ne vous pressent pas; mais ils vous questionnent jusqu'à ce qu'ils se soient formé une conviction. Puis entre eux et de la même voix qu'ils parlent aux avocats, ils échangent leurs observations, en sorte que leur délibéré se fait pour ainsi dire séance tenante et qu'on peut dire à l'avance quel sera le jugement. Ce terre-àterre toutefois est aussi ouvert aux ressources sérieuses de l'avocat qu'il l'est peu à l'éloquence. J'ai été rempli d'admiration par la plaidoirie d'un Conseil de la Reine, dans une cause du Canada. Les plaideurs du Canada doublent leurs chances de succès en envoyant leurs avocats assister à la plaidoierie et aux conférences préparatoires avec leur Counsel. Je suis d'avis que si vous avez à Londres de bons avocats avec lesquels ceux du Canada ont eu le temps de bien s'entendre et se concerter, il vaut mieux laisser plaider les avocats anglais; car ils connaissent les dispositions des juges, la manière de convaincre chacun d'eux; ils savent quand et jusqu'où parler et quand s'arrêter. L'avocat canadien, étant à leur coude, pour suggérer, corriger, au besoin même prendre la parole, son rôle consisterait à surveiller et faire face à l'imprévu. Si D... gagne sa cause, il le devra à sa présence ici; car il a été fait une objection qui, s'il n'eut pas été présent, eut été fatale à sa cause; déjà tous les juges étaient contre lui. Il n'a eu qu'à citer un article de notre code et à le commenter (ce que n'eût pu faire son collègue anglais) et il a ramené les juges. Cela seul valait tous les frais de son voyage. De son coté, l'adversaire de D. assure que jamais son avocat n'eut

Une dépêche nous a appris depuis qu'il l'a gagnée.

fait ce qui a tellement excité mon admiration, s'il n'était pas venu le forcer à étudier sa cause, en travaillant avec lui. Et il parait que lorsque les Conseils de la Reine d'ici étudient une cause, ils en ont vu le fond en peu de temps et n'en perdent aucun détail utile. Il y a ici des causes venant de toutes les parties du monde. Après une cause du Canada, il en vient une autre de Dehli, de Calcutta, de Malte, de Gibraltar, de l'Isle Maurice, de la Guyanne, &c., &c. Il faut un grand fond de connaissances universelles et l'habitude d'étudier vite pour se plier à tant de législations variées. Naturellement il en faut encore supposer d'avantage chez les juges. Mais ici comme chez nous, et partout la partie ardue de l'étude est dévolue à l'avocat. Les juges ne se donnent pas la mission de connaître les causes mieux que les parties intéressées et ils les jugent, sur les prétentions qui leur ont été exposées et non sur des points qu'ils pourraient découvrir eux-mêmes. Ils ont l'expérience de la vie légale et le sens de la justice au plus haut dégré de développement et ils sentent que, juger un plaideur sur un point qui n'a pas été l'objet d'un débat devant eux, ce serait le juger sans l'entendre, c'est-àdire sans instruire son procès. Pour moi qui n'ai plus de cause à perdre ou à gagner, cela me semble être indiscutablement juste. La haute idée que je me suis formée de la manière d'administrer la justice ici, m'a rendu assez insouciant à l'égard des formes solennelles que prennent mos cours canadiennes. L'on n'est pas formaliste au Conseil Privé. Les juges siégent habillés comme de braves bourgeois, dans la vie ordinaire; c'est-à-dire que la plupart portent des pantalons gris plus ou moins foncé. Sir Robert Collier portait une cravate grise. Tous les juges avaient un surtout (walking coat) noir. Le greffier lui-même avait un pantalon gris. Les Solicitors assistent en cravates de couleur. Enfin l'impression que j'ai rapportée du Conseil Privé, c'est que c'est un beau tribunal arbitral, éclairé par les plus hautes lumières de la science générale, appliquée aux conditions les plus variées de l'humanité, inspiré par nul autre sentiment que celui d'être juste et parvenant à ses fins, sans s'embarrasser d'un formalisme qui n'est qu'une concession aux faiblesses des hommes. Mais hélas! C'est une justice qui coûte cher ! C'est un luxe qui n'appartient qu'aux riches, ou à ceux qui jouent tout pour tout."

H.

DIGEST OF RECENT DECISIONS.

MONTREAL DECISIONS.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

(Appeal Side.)

June 20th, 1872.

Pigeon & Dagenais.-Held that notes en brevêt, signed before two notaries, are not subject to the prescription of five years. Caron, Badgley and Monk, J.J.; Contrà Drummond, J.-M. M. Justices Badgley and Monk considered that they were bound by the decision of this Court in Séguin de la Salle v. Bergevin, 1865, although they were much inclined to think that it was wrong.

Conlan v. Clarke.-The decision of the Court of Review, recorded at page 473 of the 1st volume of La Revue Critique, was reversed in appeal by Drummond, Badgley and Monk, J.J., who held that a wife can sue her husband for pension alimentaire, without being séparée de biens and without an action en séparation de corps et de biens. Caron, J., dissenting.

June 21st.

The Glen Brick Co. & Welsh and others.-Judgments reported at page 121 of La Revue Critique, vol. 1, confirmed by Caron, Drummond and Monk, J.J. Badgley J. dissenting.

Kelly & Hamilton.-Judgment recorded at page 242, of vol. 1st of La Revue Critique confirmed. Per Duval, C. J., Caron and Badgley J.J.; Contrà Drummond and Monk, J.J.

Judah & The Corporation of Montreal.-Held that corporations, im using the power, conferred to them, of expropriating, are bound to use due diligence, and that, consequently, they are liable for the damages suffered by the expropriated proprietor by reason of unnecessary delays.

September 19th.

King & Tunstall.—Badgley, J., for the Court :-As the same points of law and fact are involved in these four cases, and as they will receive the same judgment, one statement and argument applying to the whole will suffice.

General Gabriel Christie had been stationed in Canada for some years towards the end of last century, and had become possessed as owner of the several seigniories and properties, the subject of the appellant's demand against the respondents, holding the same. The General had one legitimate son, hereafter referred to as Gen. Napier Christie Burton, and several daughters, and four natural sons. The daughters married as stated in the records and factums of these cases, and had legitimate children of their marriages. The son, General