was not insolvent, the rights of the plaintiff had been unjustifiably interfered with. What would be said of an Act of the Legislsture of Quebec, enacting that a man who had sold his house for £1,500 should take £1,250? This would be so glaring a case as to call for no argument. The Courts would have no hesitation in interfering. The authority of Blackstone had been cited in support of the position that there is no authority in the Courts to correct a wrong done by Parliament. I admit that. But when had the Imperial Parliament in modern times interfered with private contracts? From what had been said, it was evident that the Legislature of Quebec had exceeded the powers assigned to it. Could this Court interfere? I hold that the judges were bound to look to the Act of the Imperial Parliament, and to obey it. Take another instance- Criminal law was one of the subjects taken out of the power of the Local Legislature. If, then, the Local Legislature assume to legislate on the subject, would any judge sentence a man to the penitentiary under Act of the Local Parliament? Where then was the limit to be placed, or the line of distinction to be drawn? Either the Court had no power to interfere, or it had. It must either satisfy itself that the Act was legal, or it must blindly obey, and say that it is not answerable for the consequences. The majority of dhe Court had for these reosons come to the conclusion to confirm the judgment which had very properly been rendered by Mr. Justice Torrance.

DRUMMOND, J.

The question is whether the Courts of this country have power to refuse obedience to the Local Legislatures. The English authorities cited are not applicable, because they apply to the Imperial Parliament; but here we are under a Federal system, and the judgment of the majority of the Court has the effect not to destroy, but to maintain the power of the Imperial Legislature. The judgment of Mr. Justice Torrance expresses my view of the whole question in clear and express terms. There could be no doubt whatever in my opinion that the Courts not only have a right, but are bound to refuse obedience to the commands of the Local Legislature, when such commands are contrary to an Imperial law. The only quession in the case which admitted of any difficulty was, whether the Act of the Quebec Legislature had interfered with matters of insolvency. On this point I am

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with the plaintiff. The British Parliament has laid down the limits within which the Local Legislatures have authority to act, and beyond these limits they cannot go. If they legislate beyond their powers, their enactments are no more binding than the rules and regulations of any other unauthorized body. The simple sanction of the Governor-General could not give validity to an act beyond the powers of the Local Legislature.

MONK, J.

I agree with my colleagues the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Drummond in this case.

At the time of the argument, I was inclined to the opinion expressed by Judges Caron and Badgley, but upon careful condideration, I think we have the right, and that in fact, it is our duty, to disregard a law of the local Parliament if it be in conflict with the Imperial Act which confers a Constitution upon the Dominion. It is satisfactory to me to know that my brother Caron is also of that opinion, though he differs from the Court upon the ground that there is no conflict in this case. Several learned Judges of the Dominion and many text-writers, whose decisions and authority are applicable to this case, uphold that view, and I therefore readily yield to what appears to be the more approved doctrine.

It is said that our decision will lead to consequences of the gravest character. If this be so, the fault is not ours; we have the Imperial Act, which undoubtedly we are bound to obey and to enforce. If we find a local law in conflict with its provisions, we have no more right to give that effect, than we should a Byelaw of the Corporation contrary to a local law.

But assuming this doctrine as to the powers and duties of this Court to be sound, does this Act transgress the Dominion Act? Does then exist the conflict contended for by the Respondent?

It is argued and with considerable force, I think, that only general legislation on Insolvency was reserved to the Dominion or Federal Parliament and that this Act not possessing that character, it does not come within the prohibition. The law, however, does not, expressly or by clear implication, make that distinction, and, in that case, this Court would not probably feel justified in doing so. The local Act says in plain English that the Union St. Jacques, being Insolvent, unable to meet its liabilities and engagements and not being able to induce the Res

pondent and other ladies to accept a composition, the power of the local Parliament is invoked to legalize a reduction of the claims, in other words, to compel the interested parties to accept a forced composition. All this is said and enacted, in less precise, in milder words, yet, this is a concise statement of the case. The whole act means insolvency and forced composition; nothing more and nothing less.

If this be true, then the letter of the Imperial Act is plainly violated and, although I have some doubts as to whether that statute meant to prohibit the local Parliament from legislating on Insolvency in matters of the nature brought before us, yet there is a judgment of the Court below, and my doubts are not strong enough to induce me to disturb it more especially under the circumstances of this case.

WILLS AND INTESTACY.

Our correspondent at St. John, N.B., has sent us the following answer to the Hon. J. H. Gray's last article on this subject.

ST. JOHN, 18th July, 1872.

I have just seen the April number of La Revue Critique, containing Mr. Gray's answer to my observations upon his article on "Wills and Intestacy," and I take the earliest opportunity of stating that I think his reference to the Provincial Act, 21 Vict., c. 26, which he quotes on page 152, does not in any way support his position.

I was quite aware of that Act when I wrote my communication, but did not refer to it, because I never supposed that it could be contended that the effect of it was to make any other change in the law of inheritance than to deprive the heir-at-law of the double portion of the real estate, which, till then, he had been entitled to, leaving the other branch of the law, namely, the distribution among the next of kin, where the intestate left no children, just at it was under the Act 26, Geo. 3, c. 3.

Mr. Gray seems to rely upon the omission of the words "heirat-law" in the Act 21, Vict. c. 26, as supporting his view; but I cannot see any force in that argument, because now, there is no "heir at law" in the sense in which that term was previously used, the preference given to the eldest son by the common law, and by one Act 26, Geo. 3, in a limited degree, having been

abolished by the Act 21 Vict., c. 26, which divides the real estate among all the children equally, any reference then to the heir at law in this Act, would be, to say the least, meaningless.

As a judicial construction had been given to the words "next of kindred," when applied to the distribution of real estate, by the case of Doe v. Crane, decided in 1846, it must be presumed that when in the year 1858, the Legislature used the same words in the Act 21 Vict., c. 26, in reference to the same subject matters, they intended them to have the same meaning which had already been judicially assigned to them, and that if they had intended to alter that interpretation, and to give to those words the meaning contended for by Mr. Gray, they would certainly have used some language to shew that such was their intention. In the absence of the slightest indication of such an intended change, the only construction that can properly be given to the Act 21 Vict., c. 26, is, that the Legislature only intended to alter so much of the previous law, as gave the heir-at-law a double portion of the real estate, and that they did not intend to make, and have not made any change in the other part of the Act, relating to the next of kin, and which, consequently, remains as it was established by the case of Doe v. Crane.

The idea put forward by Mr. Gray as to the construction of this Act, is I believe, a novelty in this Province, unheard of hitherto, by either the Bench or the Bar, and I venture to affirm that his construction cannot possibly be sustained.

LE CONSEIL PRIVÉ.

Le Comité judiciaire du Conseil Privé est un tribunal devant lequel un nombre assez considérable de nos concitoyens vont demander justice et sur la composition et les habitudes duquel il règne en général d'assez vagues notions.

Voici ce qu'en disait récemment le London Times:

THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE,

The evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the working of the appellate jurisdiction exercised by that House and by the Privy Council, has recently been issued. Mr. Henry Reeve, the Registrar of the Privy Council, gave an account of the constitution and practice of the Judicial committee. It appears that the Lord President of the Council, a political functionary, has to settle (with the aid of information furnished by the Registrar) what members of the Judicial Committee shall be summoned to sit in any case that is coming on. The present Lord President, the Marquis of Ripon, intimated to the Registrar that in "purely legal cases" the Lord Chancellor is the fittest person to direct what members it is proper to summon, and, consequently, Mr. Reeve has communicated more with the Lord Chancellor and less with the Lord President than he had been in the habit of doing before. But he observes that many Lord Presidents have taken a very active part, and themselves decided on the composition of the Committee to sit upon a particular case. He mentions that the recent appointment of paid members has certainly not superseded the other members. In the Gorham case the whole of the Judicial Committee were summoned. The Lord President thought the Bennett case a matter of considerable public interest to the Church; the Registrrar mentioned to him the course pursued in the Gorham case, and again a step was taken which the Registrar describes as "not very common ;" a letter was written to every member of the Judicial Committee asking whether he would attend. reference to intervening ecclesiastical causes, the Westerton case, the Purchas case, the Voysey case, and the case connected with Essays and Reviews, the Registrar says,-"We summoned a very considerable number of the members; in all those cases I took precise directions either from the Lord President or the Lord Chancellor." The Marquis of Salisbury suggested that the practice of summoning the Court is "characterized by a certain amount of vagueness." The Lord President reminded the Registrar that no reference was made to him in the Purchas case; and the Registrar answered that in that case he took the directions of the Lord Chancellor. Mr. Reeve stated

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