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able to "bearer," drawn by one L. upon the plaintiff several years previously, upon which the cashier of the bank had written the initials of his name. In 1867, L. gave the check so initialed to G, who kept it till a few days before the trial of the cause (1871), and then gave it to the defendant.

Held: 1. That if the check could be treated as an inland bill of exchange, the initialing of it would not operate as an acceptance within the statute. 2. That even if the initialing of the check could operate as an agreement by the plaintiffs to pay the amount to L., it was only a chose in action, which the defendant could not avail himself of in this suit.

Commercial Bank vs. Stephenson.-Defendant, at the request of the cashier, and for the benefit of the Bank, bid in certain shares of the bank stock, which were advertised for sale. Defendant had no funds in the bank, but the cashier told him he could draw a check for the amount of the purchase money, which he did, and the amount was paid by the bank to the seller of the shares, which were then transThe purchase of the shares was contrary to the charter of the bank. Defendant offered to transfer the shares to the bank, but they refused to accept them, and repudiated the whole transaction-the cashier having in the meantime become a defaulter and absconded.

ferred to the defendant.

Held: (Wetmore J. dissentiente) That no money having been received by the defendant on the check, and the money not having been paid for his use, but for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs, they could not recover the amount of the check.

Kay vs. Harrington.-The election of the defendant as a member of the House of Assembly was set aside under "The Bribery and Corruption and Election Petition Act, 1869," for bribery and treating by his agents-the Judge certifying that the bribery was not committed by or with the knowledge and consent of the defendant. At the election held to fill the vacancy, the defendant was again elected.

Held: That he was not disqualified for re-election, the Act not having declared any such disqualification, except where personal bribery had been committed; and that the practice of the Imperial Parliament in such case did not apply.

Dever vs. Morris.-M., a creditor of defendant, made a demand upon him under the 14th sect. of "The Insolvent Act of 1859," requiring him to make an assignment of his estate for the benefit of his creditors. No petition against this demand was presented within five days, as required by the Act, but after that time the defendant settled his debt witn M., who took no further proceedings.

Held That the estate of the defendant was nevertheless subject to compulsory liquidation, and that the demand of M. enured to the benefit of his other creditors,

McKay vs. The Commercial Bank.-L., residing in St. John, drew bills of exchange on the plaintiff at Liverpool, which he accepted for the accommodation of defendants, who agreed to guarantee the payment of them at maturity; these bills would fall due on the 2nd Sept. 1868. On the 11th August, L. drew other bills on the plaintiff, also for the defendants' accommodation. The plaintiff received L's letter advising the drawing of these bills on the 24th August, and not having at that time received funds from the defendants to take up the bills falling due on the 2nd Sept., telegraphed to L. that unless those funds were sent he would not accept the bills drawn on the 11th. At this time L. had become insolvent, and left the Province, having assigned his property to trustees, for the benefit of his creditors. L.'s trustees received the plaintiff's telegram, and took it to the cashier of the bank, who knew that L. had absconded, and an answer was sent to the plaintiff, by cable, in the name of L, stating that the funds had been sent by the last mail, which was the fact. In consequence of this answer, the plaintiff accepted the bills drawn on the 11th August, and was obliged to pay them, L. not having shipped to the plaintiff cargoes of lumber, as he had agreed. The telegram sent to the plaintiff was in the handwriting of one of L.'s trustees, but was sent to the telegraph office by the cashier of the bank, and the cost of transmitting it charged to L. in the bank books. The cashier swore that it was sent by direction of the president of the bank; but he, and also the directors, denied all knowledge of it till several months afterwards, and after the cashier had become a defaulter and absconded.

Held In an action against the bank for falsely representing by the telegram that L. was in St. John, whereby plaintiff was induced to accept the bills (per Allen & Fisher JJ., Weldon J. dissentiente) that the answering the telegram addressed to L. was not within the scope of the cashier's duties, and therefore that it should have been left to the jury to find out whether the answer was sent by the authority of the Directors; and Quære, whether the stockholders would be liable even if the Directors had authorised it.

Per Weldon J.: That as the telegram to L., related to the payment of the bills of exchange, in which the bank was interested, the cashier had authority to answer it, and the defendants were liable for his false representation.

Walker vs. The Mayor of St. John.-Defendants being the conservators of the harbour of St. John, with power by charter to regulate the navigation, anchoring and fastening of vessels, and to make by-laws, &c., granted to the plaintiff the right to build a wharf extending into the harbour, and to demand and receive the wharfage and emoluments to be derived from vessels lying at such wharf, and all other rights, privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging. The plaintiff built a wharf, and the defendants afterwards made a bye-law that no vessel should lie at this wharf with her bow to the south.

In consequence of this bye-law, the plaintiff lost the wharfage of a vessel which otherwise would have discharged her cargo at his wharf.

Held-per Allen and Fisher JJ., in an action on the case for depriving the plaintiff of the wharfage, that the defendants had no right to limit by contract their power to make by-laws relative to matters within their control under the charter, and that the grant must be taken subject to their right to make such bye-laws from time to time as they should deem necessary for the anchorage, &c., of vessels.

Henderson vs. The Mayor of St. John.-Defendants having authority by law to lay out and open streets in the city, laid out a street through an unenclosed and hilly piece of ground. Several houses were built on the line of this street, but the land in the vicinity remained unenclosed, and people were accustomed to pass over it in various directions as they pleased, though there was no right of way except by the street. Defendants having determined to level and improve the street, made cuttings through the hill in order to level the road, seveal feet deep in some places. The plaintiff had formerly lived in the neighbourhood of the street, and had been in the habit of crossing the open space. After the street was levelled, the plaintiff was crossing the open space in the night, and not being aware of the cutting, fell into the street, and was injured.

Held (per Allen J., Fisher J. contra): That there was no legal obligation on the defendants to light the street, or to fence the sides of it against persons using the adjoining lands, and therefore they were not liable for the plaintiff's injury.

ON REVIEW FROM MAGISTRATES' COURT.

Knapp vs. Trites.—A student in office of the plaintiff, and boarding with him, presenteď a family railway ticket of the latter, which contained a printed proviso that it should be used by the plaintiff or some "member of his family residing with him." The conductorTrites-forfeited the ticket, as being improperly used. In an action of trespass, a verdict was given for plaintiff. At the trial before the Magistrate, it was objected: 1st. That the action should have been trove and not trespass; 2nd. That the ticket was forfeited as being improperly used by one not a member of plaintiff's family. On review the learned judge over-ruled the first point under 1 Rev. Stat. cap. 37: and held that the student was a member of the "family" of plaintiff, and that the term "family" even includes lodgers or boarders. Judgment of Justices' Court confirmed with costs. Allen J.

LA RÉDACTION.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

American Trade-Mark Cases.-A compilation of all the reported Trade-Mark cases decided in the American Courts prior to the year 1871, with an appendix, containing the leading English cases, and the United States Act in relation to the registration of Trade-Marks, with constructions of the Commissioners of Patents affecting the same. Edited by ROWLAND COX. Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, 1871

Many collections of leading cases have been published within the last few years. The late J. W. Smith was the first adventurer in that direction, and the success which attended his experiment induced Messrs. Ross, Tudor and others to follow in his footsteps. Smith's leading cases have now reached the 6th edition. Two of the editions were edited by Messrs. Willes and Keating, then practising barristers, now judges of the Court of Common Pleas. The great value of all collections of leading cases lies very much in the notes of the editors. In them the jurisprudence of the courts is brought down to the date of publication. A volume containing all the reports of cases on one particular subject is a boon to the members of the bar. The necessity of examining the thousands of volumes published in England and the United States in order to discover all the cases on the subject is thereby done away with. It relieves the profession of a great deal of drudgery, and if the compilation is well and carefully done, the compiler deserves the thanks of his confrères.

We have examined " American Trade-Mark Cases" carefully, and are persuaded that Mr. Cox has performed his task well and faithfully. Henceforth his compilation will always be consulted by the lawyer as presenting in a most convenient form the body of English and American law on the subject of Trade-Marks.

LA REDACTION.

LE T. 1ER DE LA REVUE CRITIQUE.

1ÈRE LIVRAISON.

10. J. C. BLUNTSCHLI: Opinion impartiale sur la Ques

tion de l'Alabama

20. WM. H. KERR: The Fishery Question

30. D. GIROUARD: L'Arbitrage Provincial

40. JOHN A. PERKINS: My First Jury Trial.

50. EDW. CARTER, C. R: Bibliographie-Revue de l'ou

vrage de Mr. Kerr, "The Magistrate's Act of
1869, &c."