presence of the testator, by three or four credible witnesses, who need not subscribe or attest in the presence of each other, or at one and the same time the latter statute is silent as to the credibility of the witnesses; and execution in the presence of and attested by two witnesses, is as valid as if in the presence of and attested by three witnesses; and it is sufficient if such witnesses subscribe in the presence of cach other, without subscribing (as required by the statute of Charles) in the presence of the testator.

"Notwithstanding the act of William is silent as to credibility of the witnesses, that qualification still continues to be as requisite as under the act of Charles: Ryan v. Devereux, 26 U C. Q. B 107. The statute of Charles is not impliedly repealed by that of William : Crawford v. Curragh, 15 U. C. C. P. 55. It seems clear, therefore, that a will invalid as not complying, with the latter Act, is valid if it complies witht he former. In a late case (Crawford v. Curragh, supra), the court went further, and held, in effect, that the statutes were cumulative, and might be read together, and so that a will invalid under either statute, taken singly, might be supported on their joint authority. Thus a will executed in the presence of two witnesses, who subscribed in the presence of the testator, but not in presence of each other, has been held sufficient. The author does not presume to question the unanimous judgment of the court; but he deems it right in a matter of such importance, to refer to the language of Draper, C. J., in a subsequent case, and to suggest that it may be a proper precaution always to comply with the statute of William, and require that when there are only two witnesses, they should sign in presence of each other. In the case referred to Ryan v. Devereux, 26 U. C. Q. B. 107), Draper, C. J., in alluding to the doctrine laid down in Crawford v. Curragh. says, I advisedly abstain from expressing an opinion of concurrence in, or dissent from, that decision. I have not arrived at any positive conclusion upon it.'

"The practitioner should bear in mind that the Imp. Act I Vic. cap. 26, has in England varied the mode of execution of wills, and therefore the cases decided unler that act may be inapplicable here, unless on the words 'signature,' 'presence,' 'direction,' 'other person,' attested,' 'subcribed,' which are common to the Imperial Act of Victoria, the Statute of Frauds, and the Provincial Act."

"On again referring to the article in La Revue Critique, wo find it stated that

"Under the English law, as prevailing before 1st Victoria, chap ter 26, whether a will of freehold estate attested by a witness whose wife or husband had an interest in the will as devisee or legatee, would be invalid or not, was to some degree uncertain, though if the devise or legacy had been to the witness himself, under 25 Geo. II. chapter 6 the doubt as to the invalidity is removed, because it clearly make him competent, and declares the devise or legacy void."

"As to these observations, we would refer to Ryan v. Devereux, 26 U. C. Q. B. 107, decided here in 1866; also Little v. Aikman, 28 U. C. Q. B. 337; and in England to Holdfast v. Dowsing, 2 Str. 1253; and Halfort v. Thorp, 5 B. & Ald. 589. In the case of Ryan v. Devereux, the plaintiff claimed under a conveyance from the heir-at-law of John Devereux, sen., and the defendant claimed under Devereux's will. The question for the court was, whether a certain Peter McCann, who had been one of the two subscribing witnesses to the execution of the will, was disqualified on account of his being at that time married to a daughter and legatee of the testator. It was held that he was so disqualified that the bequest of a legacy to his wife was not avoided by 25 Geo. II. cap. 6; and that such bequest prevented him from being regarded as a credible witness within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. The English cases have never been questioned there, and are refered to in the text-books as undoubted law. See also Emanuel v. Constable, 3 Russ. 436. On this point, therefore, we cannot agree that there has been any uncertainty in England or here, or that, as is further stated in another place, the question here is open.

"Again, as regards obliterations, interlineations, or alterations. made in a will after its execution: the Statute of Frauds applies here as introduced with the other general English Law by the above Act of 32 Geo. III. cap. 1, subject to the provisions of 32 Vic. cap. 8.

"We have not, in the few remarks made above, touched upon all the points which are open to criticism in the article in La Revue Critique; but whilst the observations of the writer, and the mode he has adopted of comparing the law on the subject of wills in the different Provinces, would not, in our opinion, facilitate the object which is stated as the inducement for the article, we are free to admit that it gives the professional reader in Ontario some useful information as to the state of the law as to wills and intestacy in the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, with which the writer is probably more familiar than he is with that in Ontario."

Our learned correspondent from New Brunswick, in a letter addressed to one of the editors of La Revue, says:

"FREDERICTON, 10th Nov. 1871. "SIR, I notice in the article on "Wills and Intestacy," by Mr. Gray, published in the last number of La Revue Critique,

page 427, that he states the law of the Province relative to real estate, where a person dies intestate and without children, to be as follows, viz.: That the mother as well as the father would conjointly succeed to the real estate of the deceased (inasmuch as they being next of kin in equal degree, would succeed to the personal estate of the intestate, who, leaving no widow, died without issue, in exclusion of his brothers and sisters), and, assuming the father was dead, she being the nearest of kin according to the civil law, would be entitled to the whole,'-and he adds: 'so that with reference to real estate in New Brunswick, the mother is in a better position than she is with reference to personal estate.'

"Mr. Gray is entirely in error in this statement of our law, for the Supreme Court of the Province decided, in the year 1846, in the case of Doe dem Mahoney v. Crane, reported in 3 Kerr's Reports, 228, that where a person died intestate and without children, leaving a mother and brothers and sisters, the brothers and sisters were entitled to his real estate under the Act of Assembly, as the next of kindred in equal degree, to the exclusion of the mother.

"The same argument was used in that case in support of the mother's claim, as being the "next of kin," under the Statute of Distributions, 22 & 23 Car. 2, as Mr. Gray now uses, but the Court held, looking at the whole clause of the Act, that such was not the true construction; that the words "heir at law" being used, shewed that the principles of the common law, and not of the civil law, were to be resorted to in the construction; and that if the Legislature had contemplated that the real estate should ascend to the parents (contrary to the common law maxim) they would have made a special provision with regard to the share the mother would take, in case she survived the father, at the time of the intestate's death, as they had done in a subsequent part of the Act with respect to personal property.

"The question was again incidentally considered in 1857, in a case of Doe dem Lee v. Houghton (3 Allen 414) and the correctness of the decision in Doe v. Crane fully recognized on the point upon which I have stated it.

"As it is desirable that the law of inheritance in the several Provinces of the Dominion should not be mis-stated, perhaps you will correct Mr. Gray's statement of it in the next number of the Review,

SOMMAIRE DES DÉCISIONS RÉCENTES.

COUR D'APPEL.

Montréal, 12 Décembre, 1871.

The Queen vs. Coote.-Un point de droit ayant été reservé, le prisonnier, convaincu d'incendiat, fut admis à caution par la Cour ( Badgley J.); mais le montant du cautionnement ne fût pas fixé. Le cautionnement fut pris et fixé par un juge en Chambre. Sur motion de la Couronne que le cautionnement soit déclaré nul et que le prisonnier soit ré-incarcéré, Jugé que le cautionnement était régulier et valide. Duval J. C., Caron, Badgley et Drummond, JJ. Contra Monk J,qui était d'opinion que le cautionnement n'aurait dû être donné, fixé et pris que par la Cour et non par un juge en Chambre.

22 Décembre, 1871. McAndrews et Rowan.-Jugé que nonobstant le consentement des parties que le jugement dont est appel soit renversé, cette Cour doit le confirmer, si l'examen du dossier démontre qu'il est bien fondé, et dans l'espèce, elle le confirme-Duval J. C., Caron, Drummond. Badgley et Monk JJ.

Whitney et Shaw.-Jugé que dans l'espèce, Shaw, le gendre de Warren, connaissait l'insolvabilité de ce dernier au moment où il lui donnait une hypothèque pour $3,000, laquelle est par conséquent nulle. La parenté dans des causes de cette nature est toujours considérée comme une présomption de fraude, surtout si le créancier est en position de connaître l'état des affaires de son parent et débiteur-Duval J. C. Badgley et Drummond JJ. Contrà Caron et Monk quant à l'appréciation de la preuve. M. le juge Caron pense de plus que la parenté n'est pas une présomption de fraude.

COUR DE REVISION.

Montréal, 31 Octobre, 1871.

Dagenais vs. Douglass.-Jugé que le maître d'une barge a un privilé ge pour ses gages durant le dernier voyage; mais qu'il n'a pas de saisie-conservatoire ou saisie arrét sans affidavit, qui n'est accordée par notre Code qu'au dernier équipeur. Berthelot et Mackay JJ. Contrà Mondelet J.

Graham vs. Kempley.-Si les bornes d'un héritage ne sont pas établis, le propriétaire qui se plaint d'empiètements de la part de son voisin, doit avoir recours à l'action en bornage et non à l'action au pétitoire-Mêmes juges-Mondelet, J diss.

Perrault vs. Herdman.-Le compensation n'a lieu qu'entre des dettes également claires et liquides. Le défendeur rencontra une action

sur un billet promissoire en offrant en compensation une égale somme qu'il disait lui être dûe pour sa part de la récolte d'une terre dans laquelle les parties avaient un intérêt commun, et dont le demandeur refusait de lui rendre compte-jugé par Berthelot et Mackay que cette dette n'est pas également claire et liquide-Mondelet J. diss.

Roy et Vacher.-Jugé que la possession d'un im meuble en vertu d'un acte de donation accepté, mais non enrégistré, n'a aucun effet contre le porteur d'une obligation consentie par le donateur après la donation et enrégistrée plus d'un an après sa passation-Berthelot et Mackay J. J., Mondelet J. diss.

May vs. Ritchie.—Un jugement rendu à l'étranger, même dans le Haut-Canada, n'a aucun effet, à moins qne la copie ou exemplification constate que le défendeur a reçu signification de l'action dans le pays étranger. Mondelet, Berthelot et Mackay, JJ.

Lafond vs. Rankin.-Jugement mentionné à la page 476 du 1er volume de la Revue confirmé purement et simplement.

29 Décembre, 1871.

Brault vs. Barbeau.-Le décès d'un tuteur conjoint met fin à la tutèle de son co-tuteur survivant. Mondelet, Berthelot et Mackay JJ.

Marcoux vs. Morris.-Les parties, ci-devant en société, avaient fait un arrêté de leur compte social, par lequel le défendeur se reconnut endetté au demandeur en la somme de $232. L'action intentée était l'assumpsit de la procédure anglaise, pour marchandises vendues et livrées, argents prêtés, matériaux fournis, account stated. Jugé que l'action doit être l'action pro socio et non pas l'assumpsit qui n'existe pas et ne peut être toléré dans notre système de procédure.-Mondelet et Berthelot, JJ. Dis-Mackay, J.

Tylee vs. Donegani.-Jugé que le locataire d'une maison inhabitable et malsaine a le droit de l'abondonner et par là même de résilier le bail, sans action, ni mettre en demeure son propriétaire, et cela quand bien même la nuisance aurait pu être enlevée à peu de frais et sous peu de temps.-Berthelot et Torrance JJ. Dis. Mondelet, J.

In Re Martin Ins., et St. Amour, Syndic, et Stewart, Syndic à la première faillite de Martin, créancier colloqué, et Charland, Cont.,Jugé que les significations d'actes de procédure en faillite doivent être faites au domicile du syndic officiel, créancier colloqué, et non à son bureau, comme dans les cas de procédure ordinaire, à peine de nullité-Berthelot, Mackay et Beaudry, JJ.

COUR SUPÉRIEURE.

Montréal, 31 Octobre, 1871. Mercantile Library Association, vs. Corporation de Montréal.-Pour qu'un propriétaire puisse réclamer une indemnité par suite du nivelage des rues, il faut que ce nivelage ait été fait sur la devanture de sa