later the well-publicized hearings of the Senate Special Committee under Senator Kefauver began. The Kefauver committee heard over 800 witnesses from nearly every State and temporarily aroused the concern of many communities. There was a brief series of local investigations in cities where the Senate committee had exposed organized crime operations and public corruption, but law enforcement generally failed to develop the investigative and prosecutive units necessary to root out the activities of the criminal cartels.

In 1957 the discovery of the meeting in Apalachin, N.Y., of at least 75 criminal cartel leaders from every section of the Nation aroused national interest again. This interest was further stimulated by disclosures in the hearings of Senator McClellan's Select Senate Committee investigating organized crime's infiltration of labor and business. 101 A concerted Federal enforcement response developed in the 1950's, and special, institutionalized efforts on the local level have been growing slowly since that time.

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Following the Kefauver hearings, the Department of Justice commenced a concerted drive against the leading racket figures identified in the hearings. Federal prosecutors throughout the Nation were encouraged to initiate investigations and prosecutions of such persons. As a result, a number of high level organized crime participants were convicted of Federal law violations. Under authority of the immigration statutes, the Department was successful in effecting the deportation of other racketeers. In 1954, the Justice Department formed an Organized Crime and Racketeering (OCR) Section to encourage the continuation of these prosecutive efforts. Efforts to institutionalize an antiracketeering intelligence program were hindered by a lack of coordination and interest by some Federal investigative agencies.

In 1958, after Apalachin, an Attorney General's Special Group on Organized Crime was created in the Department of Justice with regional offices from which intelligence information was gathered and grand jury proceedings conducted, concerning the Apalachin conferees.102 After trial and reversal of the convictions of 20 of these conferees for conspiring to obstruct justice, the group's functions were assumed by the existing OCR Section.

In September 1960, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began to supply the OCR Section with regular intelligence reports on 400 of the Nation's organized crime figures. But with only 17 attorneys and minimal intelligence information from other Federal agencies, the section could not adequately fulfill its functions, which included coordinating all Federal law enforcement activities against organized crime, accumulating and correlating all necessary data, initiating and supervising investigations, formulating general prosecutive policies, and assisting the Federal prosecuting attorneys throughout the country.

In 1961, the OCR Section expanded its organized crime program to unprecedented proportions. In the next 3

101 McClellan, Labor-Mgt. Reps., 1st Interim Rep., s. REP. NO. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 2d INTERIM REP. (pts. 1 & 2), s. REP. NO. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Final Rep. (pts. 1-4), s. REP. NO. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).

10 The Special Group on Organized Crime in the United States was created on April 10, 1958. A detailed report analyzing Federal investigative and prosecu. tion requirements to contain organized crime successfully was submitted to the Attorney General on Feb. 10, 1959. See Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, at 102-10 (1961). 10 "In 1960, before this drive began, we secured the conviction of 45 persons for racketeering crimes. In 1961, after the drive was first under way, we secured 73 convictions. In 1962, the number doubled to 138. In 1963, it doubled again to 288. And last year, it doubled once more, to 546." Testimony of Att'y Gen.

years, regular intelligence reports were secured from 26 separate Federal agencies, the number of attorneys was nealy quadrupled, and convictions increased.103 Indicative of the cooperation during this enforcement effort was the pooling of information from several Federal agencies for investigative leads in income tax cases. Over 60 percent of the convictions secured between 1961 and July 1965 resulted from tax investigations conducted by the Internal Revenue Service. 10+ Several high-level members of organized crime families in New York City were convicted through the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 105

The FBI was responsible for convictions of organized crime figures in New York City, Chicago, and elsewhere. Enactment of statutes giving the FBI jurisdiction in interstate gambling cases 106 resulted in disruption, by investigation and prosecution, of major interstate gambling operations, including lay-off betting, which is essential to the success of local gambling businesses.

In 1965, a number of factors slowed the momentum of the organized crime drive. A Senate committee uncovered a few isolated instances of wiretapping and electronic surveillance by Treasury Department agents,107 and some officials began to question whether special emphasis upon

Nicholas Katzenbach, Long Comm. Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1158 (1965). 104 Id. at 1159.

105 These included John "Big John" Ormento, identified as a lieutenant in the Lucchese family, and Carmine Galante, underboss of the Bonnano family of New York City. McClellan, Narcotics Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 652 (charts F & E) (1963-64).

106 Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, 75 Stat. 498, 18 U.S.C. § 1952; interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, 75 Stat. 492, 18 U.S.C. § 1953; transmission of wagering information, 75 Stat. 491, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1964).

107 See generally Long Comm. Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-3, 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 4, 2d Sess., pts. 5-6 (1965).

organized crime in tax enforcement was appropriate or fair. The Department of Justice was accused of extensively using illegal electronic surveillance in investigations of rackeeter influence in Las Vegas casinos. 108 Federal prosecutors in some large cities demanded independence from OCR Section attorneys and prosecutive policies. Attacks appeared in the press on the intensity and tactics of the Federal investigative and prosecutive efforts. A high rate of turnover among OCR Section attorneys meant discontinuity of effort and reduced personnel by nearly 25 percent.

This combination of adverse circumstances apparently led the OCR Section to believe that it could no longer expect the high degree of cooperation it had received from some Federal investigative agencies, and the intensity of its efforts diminished. In May 1966, however, President Johnson directed Federal enforcement officials to review the status of the national program against organized crime. He restated his determination to continue and accelerate the program. In a White House momoran

dum he called upon the appropriate agencies and departments to coordinate their activities and cooperate to the utmost with the Department of Justice.109

STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Commission made a survey of 71 cities to determine the extent of State and local law enforcement

108 Grandi v. Central Telephone Co., No. A28157, 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dec. 10, 1965; Levinson v. Elson, No. A28156, 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dec. 10, 1965; Levinson v. Rogers, No. A28155, 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dec. 10, 1965.

109 Memorandum from Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson to Heads of Departments and Agencies Participating in the Federal Organized Crime Drive, May 5, 1966.

110 Like counterpart units in the Chicago and New York City Police Departments, the history of the Los Angeles Police Department's Intelligence Division can be traced back some years. Its current program, however, is of relatively recent date. Under the leadership of the late Chief William H. Parker, the division was created in 1950. It has responsibility for gathering information about all phases of organized crime in the Los Angeles area. The primary purpose of the division is intelligence; it has no criminal investigation responsibility. Few arrests are made, and the information it obtains is transmitted to field units for action. It has jurisdiction over some activities in addition to organized crime. For example, it maintains a close liaison with the Secret Service concerning persons who might be dangerous to the security of the President of the United States. Since it has no criminal investigation responsibility, no close, day-to-day liaison is maintained with the local district attorney's office. The prosecutor's office does not receive regular intelligence reports and does not participate in selection of targets for investigation. However, liaison is maintained with local, State, regional, national, and Federal agencies concerned with organized crime.

The Los Angeles Police Department has 5,177 officers exclusive of civilian employees. The Intelligence Division has 51 full-time men assigned to it. These include one captain and four lieutenants. The division reports directly to the Chief of Police. Similar in part to Chicago, street-level vice activity is handled by commanders; area-wide activity, by the Administrative Vice Division; and pure intelligence work, by the Intelligence Division. The turnover of personnel is small, less than 10 percent a year. The average length of service for field investigators is about 15 years; for supervisors, about 22 years. Promotion and retirement are the primary factors leading to transfers into and out of the division. The division makes extensive use of physical surveillance, not only as a means of obtaining information, but also to prevent hoodlum contacts from being made or illegitimate activity from being carried on. Although expensive, this procedure has been effective. The division also maintains a seven-man detail at the International Airport which covers the movements of hoodlums on a 24-hour basis. Extensive use is made of public sources of information. Use of electronic equipment, however, has been severely limited by State law and is seldom employed. This is in sharp contrast with the practices of a few years ago, when the use of such equipment was considered legal and was widely and, in the division's opinion, effectively employed.

The Los Angeles Police Department was one of the first local police agencies to become aware in detail of the cartel nature of the organization of modern organized crime. This was a major working premise in Los Angeles when it was denied or discounted elsewhere. The department believes that its ability to contain a serious and expanding organized crime problem was due in part to its use of electronic equipment. Today its personnel believe that the division's effectiveness is seriously undercut by its inability to use such equipment. Its present intelligence estimates, for example, reflect the lack of this source of information. In addition, the effectiveness of the department as a whole is believed to be undercut by the widespread use of the telephone by organized crime groups in both the gambling and narcotics fields. Little reliance is placed on the use of paid informants by the division although funds are available for the purchase of information.

Competence and dedication of the department has thus accounted, in part, for the present law enforcement control of organized crime in Los Angeles. The absence of serious political corruption problems has also played a major role. This is accounted for, in part, by the traditions of the State dating back to former Governor Earl Warren and the wide use of civil service.

The files of the Intelligence Division are indexed as to persons, classes of crime, areas of crime, and businesses. An excellent cross-index exists to speed information retrieval. The division regularly collects information from national

against organized crime. The survey revealed that only 12 of the 19 cities that acknowledged having organized crime have specialized units within the police department to investigate that activity. In only 6 of those 19 cities are prosecutors specially assigned to work on organized crime. Only 3 of the 43 police departments that answered that they had no organized crime in their area had created units to gather intelligence concerning the possibility of its existence. One of the three, Los Angeles, has a 55-man unit that gathers intelligence information to prevent the expansion of organized crime.110

111

At present, well-developed organized crime investigation units and effective intelligence programs exist within police and prosecutive agencies in only a handful of jurisdictions. There is, however, some evidence that local police and prosecutors are becoming more aware of the threat of organized crime. For example, in Philadelphia, both the police department and the prosecutor have created units to work exclusively in this area. In the Bronx County prosecutor's office responsibility for antiracketeering work has been centralized. The New England State Police Compact is a first step toward regional confrontations of organized crime.112 In addition to provisions for mutual assistance in a number of areas and for coordination of command training, the compact provides for a centralization of organized crime data to which all members contribute and from which all draw. This system should reduce current duplication and permit a better coordinated attack upon organized crime.

newspapers and congressional and other investigative hearings. Blakey, Local Law Enforcement Response to Organized Crime, Jan. 1967 (unpublished report to this Commission).

111 Illustrative of such organizations is that of the office of the district attorney for New York County, which has as its function the prosecution of all criminal matters occurring in that jurisdiction. The volume is staggering. In excess of 30,000 matters come up for consideration each year. The combined total is roughly equal to the other four counties which make up the greater New York area. These duties include listening to complaints brought directly to the office by citizens, examining matters brought to it by the police, preparing informations, presenting matters to the grand jury, handling preliminary matters in court, prosecuting trials, and defending and taking appeals. In addition, the office conducts or supervises certain direct and collateral investigations of its own.

The office regularly employs approximately 260 people. There are about 100 lawyers, 10 accountants, and 10 investigators. The rest are clerks, stenographers, process servers, and specialized employees, including a psychiatrist and a photographer. In addition, there are 70 to 75 New York City detectives regularly assigned to the office. The district attorney is elected, although since 1942 there have been no election contests. Staff personnel are covered by civil service. Legal personnel are selected without regard for politics, solely on the basis of merit. Salaries are lower than those offered for positions in private practice. Con. sequently, there is a relatively large turnover; most stay only four-five years, although some have remained in career positions out of dedication. All mem. bers of the staff work full time. Outside or personal work is not permitted. Since 1938, the office has been singularly free of corruption or political influence. The office itself is organized into 13 bureaus. The names of most indicate their functions. The major bureaus include a Complaint Bureau, an Indictment Bureau, a Supreme Court Bureau (handles felony trials), a Criminal Courts Bureau (handles misdemeanor trials), a Homicide Bureau, and an Appeals Bureau. In addition, the office has a Frauds Bureau, an Accounting Bureau, an Investigations Bureau, and in response to the challenge of organized crime-a Rackets Bureau.

Traditionally the function of the prosecutor has been to present to the court evidence of criminal activity developed by the police or brought to him by a a citizen. The concept of the Rackets Bureau as developed in New York County, however, has been a radical departure from that traditional view. From 1935 through 1937 Thomas E. Dewey conducted a special rackets investigation in New York County at the direction of Governor Herbert H. Lehman. When Dewey became district attorney in 1938, he carried into the office the experience of that signal investigation. The Rackets Bureau, the Frauds Bureau, the Accounting Bureau, and the Investigations Bureau were set up based on that experience and were, at that time, unparalleled in the country.

Dewey found that evidence of organized criminal activity and corruption was not to be had merely for the asking. Victims of underworld terror or exploitation did not volunteer to testify. Documentary proof of extortion or graft was care. fully concealed in doctored books and records. Dewey thus found that the traditional role of the district attorney-merely that of courtroom accuser-was inadequate if the challenge of organized crime and corruption was to be met. The Rackets Bureau and the Frauds Bureau operate in a similar fashion. The Frauds Bureau deals with modern commercial fraud. The Rackets Bureau deals with modern organized crime and corruption. Both employ the expert assistance of the trained criminal accountants and investigators of the Accounting and Investigations Bureaus.

The Rackets Bureau is headed by one top man and a chief assistant. Approximately 10 to 12 other assistant district attorneys are assigned to the bureau. The bureau shares 10 accountants with the Frauds Bureau, and each draws on the services of the office's own investigators and the New York City detectives assigned to it. The assistants in the bureau take charge of their cases at every stage: investigative, preparation, grand jury presentation, and trial. An integrated approach to each case is thus obtained. The bureau maintains its own files on major organized criminals, cultivates confidential sources of information-although

In 1956 the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit was established in California.113 This was the first step toward the development of a network for the exchange of data concerning people active in organized crime. The LEIU has since expanded to more than 150 members throughout the Nation. It maintains a central file in California, and information is available to its members on request.

The effectiveness of these State and local efforts is difficult to assess. But only New York and California

it has no paid informant program-and keeps tab on the movements of known criminals; it also maintains liaison with other law enforcement agencies in the New York area concerned with organized crime.

The Rackets Bureau has developed a special technique of investigation in organized crime and corruption cases, which combines the skillful use of physical surveillance, examination of records, and interrogation of witnesses under oath before the grand jury. Under a grant of immunity witnesses are faced with perjury if they lie or with a citation for contempt if they refuse to cooperate. The unanimous opinion of the staff is that the use, under strict controls and court orders, of electronic surveillance, both wiretaps and bugs, has been, virtually indispensable to the success of this means of investigation. Wiretaps were the mainstay of its activity prior to 1957, when Federal court rulings intervened. Now they are used solely for intelligence purposes, and reliance has been placed on court ordered bugs. The experience of the bureau with the dependence of racket figures on the phone as a means of communication and with the necessity to hold meetings confirms that of the CIB, see note 114 infra. The experience of the bureau, moreover, has shown that certain kinds of key witnesses-witnesses which often the bureau has had to protect before, during, and after trials, almost always found in organized crime or corruption cases cases which often take years to build-can only be induced to cooperate by playing for them the sound of their own voices, which they cannot deny, and then facing them with the choice of cooperation or jail for contempt or perjury. The opinion of the bureau is thus that the use of electronic equipment is the key to success in any serious organized crime drive. It has not found, however, that the meed to use the equipment required that it be employed extensively. The bureau has used an average of only about 19 bugs and 65 wiretaps per year since 1957. Yet its record of achievement in the area of major organized crime and corruption cases is unmatched anywhere in the United States on the local or State level The failure of the office to do more has been primarily attributable to the inherent difficulties in this kind of investigation and a lack of manpower resources at its command to deal with the problem. Blakey, Local Law Enforcement Response to Organized Crime. Jan. 1967 (unpublished report to this Commission). 112 The office of the Commissioner of the Connecticut State Police advised the Commission that the compact evolved from discussions between the six New England State Police Commissioners, who meet regularly to consider law enforcement matters of mutual interest. The compact was drafted by the Council of State Gov. ernments with the aid of the New England Council and has been enacted in Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 42-37-1 to -3 (Supp. 1965)) and Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1667 (Supp. 1966)); and will be effective upon enactment by one more New England State. Enabling legislation is now pending before the legislatures of each of the four remaining States.

113 The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit was conceived by Frank Ahern, then Chief of the San Francisco Police Department, and Capt. James Hamilton of the Los Angeles Police Department's Intelligence Division. The organiza. tion was formed on March 29, 1956, by law enforcement officials representing 26 police and sheriffs' departments in seven western States. It developed in response to the need felt by law enforcement officials for a means by which con. fidential information on certain persons and organizations could be exchanged; it provides a central clearinghouse for such information, outside the channels of routine, interdepartmental communication. As of Nov. 1, 1965, the LEIU had a membership of 152 different agencies including State police, sheriffs' departments, metropolitan police, prosecutors' offices, and such others as the investigative unit of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.

A requisite for membership in LEIU is that member departments maintain a permanent intelligence unit. Membership is not restricted to departments from areas of known organized crime activity. Although organized crime is not the exclusive interest of all participants, the subject is given substantial attention. Information is exchanged about persons and organizations engaged in various forms of criminal conduct.

The LEIU exists only as a unifying concept; it has no independent investigative authority or personnel. It operates through an executive board composed of three persons selected from among the members at large plus the four chairmen of member agencies in the four zones of the country, northwestern, southwestern, central, and eastern. The heart of the information clearing system which the organization has developed is a set of constantly increasing file cards which contain subjects' names, addresses, class of criminal activity, associates, and most important, the name of the unit contributing the descriptive information. This permits an interested agency to make direct inquiry to the department in possession of details on a subject of interest.

The processing and dissemination of these file cards to member agencies is handled by the Bureau of Identification and Investigation of the State of California. For an interesting discussion of the function of the LEIU and organized crime, see Paul Levy's article, The Quiet War on Big Crime, in the Sunday Bulletin (Phila.), Nov. 28, 1965, § 2, p. 1.

114 The history of the Central Investigation Bureau (CIB) in the New York Police Department may be traced back to the turn of the century when an Italian Squad was set up to investigate extortion activities victimizing recently arrived Italian immigrants. In the late 1940's a similar small squad was created in the department in an attempt to put together information on major racketeers of any ethnic background. The current program, however, is best dated from 1956, when under the leadership of former Police Commissioner Stephen P. Kennedy the CIB was organized in its present form.

The CIB has as its objectives maintaining a continuing program to under. stand the structure and operation of organized crime in New York City; providing support for field units in the department and for district attorneys in the prepara. tion of organized crime cases; and educating and advising law enforcement units, other governmental agencies, and citizens concerning the threat posed by or. ganized crime. The work of the bureau is concentrated mainly on organized crime as exemplified by large well-organized operations. In practice this means that most of their efforts are directed against the six organized crime families which operate in the New York metropolitan area.

The bureau seeks to discover the key personnel in each family, their relationships to each other, the criminal and legitimate enterprises they operate, and the chains

have developed continuing State programs that have produced a series of convictions against major figures in organized crime) Coordinated police activity has substantially aided this process. On the local level, Chicago and New York City, where the organized crime problem is the most severe, appear to be the only cities in which large, firmly established police intelligence units continue to develop major cases against members of the criminal. cartels,114)

of control by which they operate. In this way it attempts to define trends, discover emerging leaders, put together a guide for strategy, select targets, and generate new investigations. Since the crime situation it faces is never static, the bureau tries to chart the changes which occur in the families and to map the growth and development of each major area of criminal and legitimate activity of the families. The ultimate objective of this program is to find situations which have prosecutive potential. If useful leads or evidence is obtained which sug gests such a possibility, reports are prepared for followup action by appropriate field units in the department. The work of the bureau is consciously kept nonoperational to avoid unnecessary conflicts with the activities of other units in the department and to permit the bureau to maintain perspective. The bureau does, however, loan its men to other field units to conduct surveillance, to operate electronic surveillance equipment, and to install electronic equipment pursuant to court order. The CIB provides training on the nature of organized crime for new men in the department. It has also worked closely with State and Federal investigating committees. Finally, the bureau maintains a close liaison with each of the five County District Attorneys in New York City. In these offices one or more assistant district attorneys are assigned to organized crime work. They often confer with members of the bureau during investigations, although the prosecutors do not receive regular intelligence reports or participate in the selection of targets. Liaison is also maintained with various local, State, regional, national, and Federal law enforcement agencies concerned with organized crime.

The New York City Police Department has 27,000 officers exclusive of civilian employees. The Bureau has 96 full-time men assigned to it. These include one deputy inspector, one captain, three lieutenants, and seven sergeants. The bureau reports directly to the Chief of Detectives. The average length of service for field investigators is 5 years; supervisors, 4.7. The primary factor which leads to transfers into and out of the unit is promotion to higher rank and the replacement of such personnel.

In its investigations the bureau makes extensive use of physical surveillance. Hotels, night clubs, airports, race tracks, and similar places are watched to detect events of significance in organized crime. Extensive use is made of public sources of information, such as the registry of deeds. The bureau's mainstay, however, has been the use of electronic equipment, both wiretaps and bugs. The bureau has found that the large, well-organized criminal activity, especially that which operates over a large geographical area, must use the telephone as a means of communication. No matter what attempts are made to code messages, the meaning can be determined. Meetings, too, must be held. Careful investi. gation can determine where. The use of electronic equipment, however, is strictly limited. After supervisory approval within the bureau, a court order must be secured. The Legal Bureau of the Police Department processes all applications for such orders. All overhears are recorded, and strict controls govern access to the information secured. This is done both to protect its confidentiality and to insulate the other information the bureau has from legal contamination, since information electronically obtained generally cannot be used by the Federal law enforcement agencies with which the bureau has contacts. The bureau makes the technical installations of equipment for all units of the department other than for the Police Commissioner's Confidential Investigating Unit, which conducts investigations within the department itself.

No paid informant program is maintained by the bureau. While many of its investigators have personal sources of information, experience has shown that the quality, quantity, and reliability of information obtained from informants is not adequate for the CIB to do its job. All too often, for example, this information concerns merely low-level operations. Members of the hierarchy of organized crime rarely become informants, and those on the periphery have little valuable information. Undercover agents are used by the bureau, but their effectiveness is severely limited, since members of organized crime groups seldom trust those not known by them to have committed a major crime.

Of major importance to the operation of the CIB is its file system. Individual working files are maintained by each agent. The general files are subdivided into individuals, types of crimes, geographical areas, and industries. A library of congressional hearings and other similar information is maintained. Indexing and cross-referencing make the files a working tool. Other special files contain. ing, for example, license plate numbers are also maintained. /

Like the CIB, the history of the Chicago Intelligence Division (CID) may be traced back to the turn of the century, when a "Black Hand" squad was set up to investigate extortion activities victimizing the Italian immigrant population. Later a group called the "Scotland Yard Unit" was established. It dealt with everythng from buglary offenses to hoodlum activity. It was disbanded, however, in 1956, and its functions shifted into the commissioner's office. The current program is best dated from 1960, when under the reform leadership of Superintendent O. W. Wilson the CID was set up.

The

Like the CIB the division's main objective is obtaining information concerning high-level criminal activity; its agents are primarily involved in the detection, prevention, and neutralization of crime syndicate activity. The division tends to concentrate its investigations in specific areas of activity rather than on in. dividuals. Its major efforts are directed toward gambling, loan sharking or "juice," criminal participation in legitimate enterprises, labor racketeering, narcotics, and prostitution. Unlike the CIB, it has jurisdiction over other activities. CID, for example, must also concern itself with the activities of subversive groups. Although the CIB is not operational, the CID carries its investigations through to arrest and trial. The division also has training and educational func. tions. Little liaison is maintained with the local district attorney's office, other than when a case is actively in the prosecution stage. No assistant prosecu tors are regularly assigned to the division, although it is possible to obtain their help in securing warrants. The CID does not provide regular intelligence reports to the prosecutor's office. Liaison is maintained with various local, State, national, and Federal law enforcement agencies concerned with organized crime. The Chicago Police Department has 10,000 officers exclusive of civilian employees, of which 95 men are assigned on a full-time basis to the CID. These include a director, 5 lieutenants, and 20 sergeants. The division routinely reports to a deputy superintendent, although it is possible to report directly to

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CRIME COMMISSIONS

Among the most effective vehicles for providing public information on organized crime are the crime investigating commissions, which exist in a number of States. When established without having to rely on continuing governmental financial support and the resulting potential political pressures, the private crime commission has frequently rendered major service in exposing organized crime and corruption and arousing public interest. The Chicago Crime Commission and the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans have played major roles in informing the citizens within their jurisdictions of the menace of organized crime and have fulfilled substantial educational, investigative, and legislative functions.115

A governmentally sponsored nonpartisan crime commission, such as the New York State Temporary Commis sion on Investigation, has significant benefits. Established shortly after the Apalachin meeting,116 it has through a series of public hearings exposed organized crime and corruption. Recent loan-shark hearings 118 prompted legislative action to make prosecution of such offenders less difficult. 119 The Illinois Crime Commission, through public hearings and the efforts of its own investigators, continually exposes organized criminal activity. A governmental commission in California detailed the operations of criminal cartels in that State in the early 1950's and recommended action that subsequently proved effective.120

LIMITATIONS ON CONTROL EFFORTS

Efforts to curb the growth of organized crime in America have not been successful. It is helpful in devising a program for the future to examine the problems encountered in attempting to combat organized crime. Difficulties in Obtaining Proof. As described above, criminal cartels have organized their groups and operations to insulate their higher echelon personnel from law enforcement and regulatory agencies. Every measure has been taken to insure that governmental investigation, no matter how intensive, will be unable to secure live witnesses, the sine qua non of prosecution. Street workers, who are not members of organized crime families, cannot prove the identities of the upper-level personnel. If workers are arrested for gambling or other illicit activities, the fear instilled in them by the code of nondisclosure prevents their telling even the little they may know. The organization provides money and food for families of

the superintendent. Turnover statistics for CID personnel are not meaningful, since the division has not been in existence long enough. The primary factors leading to transfers in and out of the division have been promotions and retirement.

As

In its investigations the CID makes extensive use of physical surveillance. with the CIB, hotels, night clubs, airports. and similar places are routinely covered for significant events in organized crime. Extensive use is made of public sources of information. The use of electronic equipment is illegal under State law. Its personnel believe this has severely handicapped the work of the division. Reliance has been placed on a paid informant program. The money avail. able, although limited by the budget, has been liberal in terms of overall police priorities. Not only have the quantity, quality, and reliability of the informant information gathered by the division differed substantially from that obtained electronically by the CIB, but CID personnel believe the existing informant pro. gram has seriously suffered because of the apparent ability and evident willingness of crime syndicate figures in the Chicago area to take violent action, including, physical torture and brutal murder, against those who cooperate with the police. Undercover agents used by the division are subject to the same limitations found in New York.

Of major importance to the division is its file system. Prior to 1960 no generally reliable, accessible, or comprehensive files on organized crime existed in the Chicago Police Department. The existing files are organized in much the same way as those of the CIB. Blakey, Local Law Enforcement Response to Organized Crime, Jan. 1967 (unpublished report to this Commission).

115 An excellent documentation of organized crime activities in Chicago may be found in the annual reports of the Chicago Crime Commission, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIME, prepared annually since 1953 by Virgil Peterson, Operating

incarcerated workers; this helps to keep the workers loyal. Lawyers provided by the cartels for arrested employees preserve the interests of the organization ahead of those of the particular defendant.

Usually, when a crime is committed, the public calls the police, but the police have to ferret out even the existence of organized crime. The many Americans who are compliant "victims" have no incentive to report the illicit operations. The millions of people who gamble illegally are willing customers who do not wish to see their supplier destroyed. Even the true victims of organized crime, such as those succumbing to extortion, are too afraid to inform law enforcement officials. Some misguided citizens think there is social stigma in the role of "informer," and this tends to prevent reporting and cooperating with police.

Law enforcement may be able to develop informants, but organized crime uses torture and murder to destroy the particular prosecution at hand and to deter others from cooperating with police agencies. Informants who do furnish intelligence to the police often wish to remain anonymous and are unwilling to testify publicly. Other informants are valuable on a long-range basis and cannot be used in public trials. Even when a prosecution witness testifies against family members, the criminal organization often tries, sometimes successfully, to bribe or threaten jury members or judges.

Documentary evidence is equally difficult to obtain. Bookmakers at the street level keep no detailed records. Main offices of gambling enterprises can be moved often enough to keep anyone from getting sufficient evidence for a search warrant for a particular location. Mechanical devices are used that prevent even the telephone company from knowing about telephone calls. And even if an enforcement agent has a search warrant, there are easy ways to destroy written material 121 while the agent fulfills the legal requirements of knocking on the door, announcing his identity and purpose, and waiting a reasonable time for a response before breaking into the

room.

Lack of Resources. No State or local law enforcement agency is adequately staffed to deal successfully with the problems of breaking down criminal organizations. Just one major organized crime case may take 2 to 3 years to develop and then several more years to complete through prosecution and appeal. Cases may require several manyears of investigative resources. The percentage of investigations that result in arrests is quite low. Requests for increased budgets in government are usually granted

Director. Illustrative of a continuing campaign by a crime commission to educate citizens about organized crime is the publication by the New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Comm'n, Survey Report Organized Crime Outlets Jefferson Parish, Louisiana (mimeo. Oct. 1963).

118 The commission of investigation was established on May 1, 1958, by N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7051. 117 See, for example, N.Y. TEMPORARY COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION, AN INVESTIGA TION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN BUFFALO (1961).

118 N.Y. TEMPORARY COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION, THE LOAN SHARK RACKET (1965). 119 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 2401-2403 (1965).

129 See CAL. SPECIAL CRIME STUDY COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, COMBINED REPS. (1950), and CAL. SPECIAL CRIME STUDY COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, FINAL REP. (1953). For a report on organized crime conditions in the late 1950's, see Subcomm. on Rackets of the Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Judiciary, Organized Crime in California, 20 ASSEMBLY INTERIM REPS. 1957-59, No. 10 (1959).

121 "Flash paper" and "rice paper" are both frequently used in gambling operations if written notations are essential. Flash paper is a paper that is chemically treated to convert the cellulose contained in the paper to nitrocel lulose by treatment with a mixture of concentrated sulfuric and nitric acids. "This paper is highly flammable and will burst into flame if a cigarette is placed on it. In less time than it will take a law enforcement officer to cross the room, a bookmaker can turn his records into a pile of ashes of no use as evidence against him." Testimony of Att'y Gen. Robert Kennedy, Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, at 30. Rice paper is water soluble paper treated chemically to cause it to dissolve very quickly when submerged in water. For a more extensive description, see MODERN PLASTICS ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR 1948, at 201.