DECISIONS PER CURIAM AND ORDERS FROM MAY 16 THROUGH JUNE 27, 1949. MAY 16, 1949. Per Curiam Decisions. No. 670. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. PHILADELPHIA COMPANY. On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the petition for review as moot, on joint motion for the parties. Solicitor General Perlman and Roger S. Foster for petitioner. Thomas J. Munsch, Jr. for respondent. Reported below: 84 U. S. App. D. C. 73, 175 F. 2d 808. No. 679. KENNEDY V. WALKER, WARDEN. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Per Curiam: The judgment is affirmed. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE dissent. Clayton L. Klein for appellant. Reported below: 135 Conn. 262, 63 A. 2d 589. No. 584. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION V. BROADCASTING SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC. Certiorari, 336 U. S. 950, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Argued May 9, 1949. Decided May 16, 1949. Per Curiam: The judgment is reversed. Federal Communications Comm'n v. WOKO, 329 U. S. 223. Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause 901 for petitioner. With him on the brief were Benedict P. Cottone, Max Goldman and Richard A. Solomon. Walter M. Bastian argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ben S. Fisher and John P. Southmayd. Reported below: 84 U. S. App. D. C. 152, 171 F. 2d 1007. No. 597, Misc. IN RE FEDERAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. On petition for writs of prohibition and/or mandamus. Argued and decided May 16, 1949. Per Curiam: The rule to show cause is discharged and the petition for writs of prohibition and/or mandamus is denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents. Robert L. Stern argued the cause for petitioners, and Solicitor General Perlman was on the petition. Walter M. Bastian argued the cause and was on the return to the rule to show cause for Clark, Associate Judge, et al., respondents. Charles S. Rhyne argued the cause and was on the answer for Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., intervenor. Miscellaneous Orders. No. 13, Original. UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA; and No. 14, Original. UNITED STATES v. TEXAS. On motions for leave to file complaints. Argued May 9, 1949. Decided May 16, 1949. The motions for leave to file complaints are granted and process is ordered to issue returnable on or before September 1, next. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications. Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for the United States, plaintiff. With him on the brief were Attorney General Clark, Assistant Attorney General Vanech, Arnold Raum, Robert E. Mulroney and Robert M. Vaughan. L. H. Perez and F. Trowbridge vom Baur argued the cause for the defendant in No. 13. With them on the brief were Bolivar E. Kemp, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and John L. Madden, As sistant Attorney General. Price Daniel, Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for the defendant in No. 14. With him on the brief were J. Chrys Dougherty and Jesse P. Luton, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General. No. 692. CASSELL V. TEXAS. Certiorari, 336 U. S. 943, to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. It is ordered that Chris Dixie, Esq., of Houston, Texas, be appointed to serve as counsel for the petitioner in this case. No. 760. SMITH V. RAGEN, WARDEN. Certiorari, 336 U. S. 966, to the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois. It is ordered that Herbert A. Friedlich, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois, be appointed to serve as counsel for the petitioner in this case. No. 449, Misc. MERRILL v. SMITH, SUPERINTENDENT; No. 536, Misc. No. 538, Misc. CANADA v. JONES, WARDEN; No. 545, Misc. No. 556, Misc. No. 579, Misc. MORSE v. LAINSON, WARDEN; FREDERICKSEN v. JONES, WARDEN; and WILLIAMS v. OVERHOLSER, SUPERINTENDENT. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied. No. 437, Misc. TATE v. CALIFORNIA. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 453, Misc. SCHUMAN v. CALIFORNIA; and No. 487, Misc. IN RE STINSON. Applications denied. No. 551, Misc. HOLLOWAY v. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 610, Misc. IN RE ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CORP. ET AL. The petitions for a stay are denied. MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications. Samuel Becker and Nathan B. Kogan for certain committees for common stockholders of the Electric Power & Light Corp., petitioners. Memoranda opposing the petitions were filed by Solicitor General Perlman and Roger S. Foster for the Securities & Exchange Commission; Daniel James for the Electric Power & Light Corp.; John F. MacLane for the Electric Bond & Share Co.; and Percival E. Jackson for a certain preferred stock committee, respondents. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, with whom MR. JUSTICE MURPHY joins, dissenting, This is a motion to stay the execution of a plan of dissolution of Electric Power & Light Corporation as ordered by the Securities and Exchange Commission under § 11 (b) of the Public Utility Act of 1935. The Commission brought proceedings to enforce its order before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and that court, having found the plan "fair and equitable," ordered its enforcement. That court also denied motions for a stay of the execution of the plan. The petitioners took appeals from the order of enforcement to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and asked for a stay of the execution of the plan pending appeal. It is conceded that such appeals would become nugatory if before their disposition the plan be executed. The Commission, naturally enough therefore, in its memorandum in opposition to the motions for stay before this Court, indicates that whether the requested stay should be granted or withheld turns on "the merit or lack of merit in the appeals." But the merits of the appeals before the Court of Appeals should be determined by that court and not here. If, on the motions for stay, that court had concluded that the appeals were frivolous, the motions for stay would fall with the dismissal of the appeals. But the Court of Appeals has not found the appeals frivolous. On the contrary, when the motions for stay came before the Court of Appeals it suggested that the appeals be expedited by setting them for argument on the merits on a "typewritten record and briefs." The Commission and the other parties now opposing these motions resisted that suggestion "because of the serious consequences of delay . . . and the absence of any issues of substance." The Court of Appeals took the matter under advisement and thereafter denied the stay but still did not find the appeals frivolous and as such dismiss them. On the contrary, it indicated that if the appellants wished the court would set the appeals for an early hearing. Even though Congress gives an appeal as a matter of right in a defined class of cases, a Court of Appeals may find that an appeal is wholly without merit and an abusive attempt to invoke its jurisdiction, just as this Court may dismiss an appeal for want of substantiality although on the surface a case may fall in the category of controversies for which Congress has conferred an appeal as of right. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals here has not found the appeals so lacking in merit as to call for their dismissal, but on the contrary is continuing to entertain the appeals, I cannot bring myself to agree that the right of appeal which Congress has conferred upon appellants is to be denied by rendering it wholly ineffectual. This Court ought not to be called upon in the first instance to determine whether an appeal is without substance when the Court of Appeals has refused to do so, when it is that court and not this Court to which the appeal lies. I am duly mindful of the considerations that are urged as to the consequences of further delay. But I should think that a court of equity is not without resources to devise means for avoiding unjust enrichment by the ap |