801 Opinion of the Court. ticket, which is set out in the margin, bears the express notation that the steamboat line was "Operated by United States of America, War Shipping Administration," and that respondent was serving in the capacity of an agent. Respondent's duties were to service the ships and to "arrange for the transportation" of passengers on them. The duty of a common carrier, on the other hand, is to transport for hire whoever employs it. Here the contract called for the actual transportation to be carried out by the War Shipping Administration. The respondent's duties ended at the shore linę. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, supra. The cases cited by petitioner holding a transportation agent liable as a common car "Issued by "Washington-Hampton Roads Line "Operated by United States of America, War Shipping Administration "One First Class Passage "Norfolk, or Old Point Comfort Va. to Washington, D. C. "Subject to the Following contract: "This ticket is void unless officially stamped and dated. "Baggage valuation is limited to $100 for and adult and $50 for a child, unless purchaser hereof declares a greater valuation at time baggage is presented for transportation and pays excess valuation charges according to tariff rates, rules and regulations. "The company will under no circumstances be responsible for any moneys or valuables unless deposited with the Purser on Steamer, nor will they be responsible for any baggage unless properly checked. "This ticket is limited for passage within thirty days from date of sale stamped on back. "Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., Agent. "I. S. Walker, Gen. Passenger Agent." 5 Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 7, 22; Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U. S. 207, 211; United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 249 U. S. 296, 305-306. Cf. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 444; I. C. C. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 220 U. S. 235. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. rier involve situations where the actual movement of goods or passengers was carried out by the agent. Under the contract respondent here was not in any way engaged in the carriage of passengers between Norfolk and Washington and had never held itself out to the public as ready to engage in such traffic. As a mere arranger of transportation it does not incur the liability of a common carrier. Apart from their reliance upon respondent's control of the vessel on voyage under the agency contract, petitioners further argue that respondent as an agent is independently liable for its negligence in procuring unsuitable crew members. This theory of liability was not relied upon at the trial. Instructions upon the point were not given or requested. The court did charge that as principal and operator of the vessel the respondent was responsible for any tort committed by the steamship personnel and as a common carrier was under the duty to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of the passengers including the selection of personnel. It was upon the basis of respondent's liability as common carrier that petitioners developed their causes of action, and upon that theory the jury, under the instructions discussed above, returned a verdict in their favor. At the conclusion of the trial judge's charge, counsel for petitioners stated, "If your Honor please, we have no exceptions." Under these circumstances, error cannot be urged as to this point. See Rule 8 (1), Supreme Court of the United States; Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157. By the decision below, the trial court was directed to enter a judgment for respondent, which had filed a • United States v. Brooklyn Terminal, 249 U. S. 296; Union Stock "ard Co. v. United States, 308 U. S. 213. 801 Opinion of the Court. motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As there were suggestions in the complaint and evidence of alleged liability of respondent to petitioners for respondent's own negligence while acting as general agent, this direction should not have been given. See Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575. The decision is modified so as to eliminate the direction to enter judgment. We express no opinion as to what circumstances might fix liability upon the respondent for its own actions as general agent. Affirmed as modified. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JusTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE dissent. 'See 2 Restatement, Agency § 358. & Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U. S. 571; Cone v. West Virginia Paper Co., 330 U. S. 212. Syllabus. 337 U.S. NO. 360. FINK v. SHEPARD STEAMSHIP CO. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OREGON.* Argued February 2, 1949. Decided June 27, 1949. 1. A general agent employed by the United States under the terms of the war-time standard form of general agency agreement to manage certain phases of the business of a ship owned by the United States and operated by the War Shipping Administration is not liable under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, known as the Jones Act, to a member of the crew of the ship who suffered physical injury through the negligence of its master and officers, when the injury occurred after March 24, 1943, the date of enactment of the War Shipping Administration Act, known as the Clarification Act. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, ante, p. 783. Pp. 811–813. 2. Nor is such a general agent liable to a member of the crew for wages and maintenance and cure, which are incidents of the employer-employee relationship. Pp. 813-815. 3. A delivery certificate reciting that a ship was "delivered" to a general agent "under terms and conditions of" the standard general agency agreement adds nothing of significance to that agreement and does not show that the general agent was in possession and control of the ship. Pp. 815-816. 183 Ore. 373, 192 P. 2d 258, affirmed. 169 F. 2d 612, affirmed. No. 360. A member of the crew of a ship owned by the United States and operated by the War Shipping Administration obtained a judgment in an Oregon Circuit Court against a general agent employed by the United States to manage certain phases of the ship's business, for injuries sustained through the negligence of its master and officers. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed, 183 Ore. 373, 192 P. 2d 258, and denied a rehearing, 183 Ore. 373, 193 P. 2d 537. This Court granted certiorari. 335 U. S. 870. Affirmed, p. 816. *Together with No. 430, Gaynor v. Agwilines, Inc., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 810 Opinion of the Court. No. 430. A Federal District Court dismissed an action for wages and maintenance and cure by a member of the crew of a ship owned by the United States and operated by the War Shipping Administration against a general agent employed by the United States to manage certain phases of the ship's business, 76 F. Supp. 617. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 169 F. 2d 612. This Court granted certiorari. 335 U. S. 870. Affirmed, p. 816. James Landye argued the cause for petitioner in No. 360. With him on the brief were B. A. Green and Edwin D. Hicks. Abraham E. Freedman argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 430. Leavenworth Colby argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison and Paul A. Sweeney. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. These two cases raise issues which, as the facts set out below indicate, are controlled by our decision in Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, ante, p. 783, decided this day. The petitioner, Fink, signed on the S. S. George Davidson on June 8, 1943, as an able seaman. The shipping articles showed as the "Registered Managing Owner or Manager" the "War Shipping Administration (Owner) Shepard Steamship Co. (Gen. Agents)." The contract pursuant to which respondent, Shepard Steamship Co., handled certain phases of the ship's business was the standard form General Agency Agreement, GAA 44 42. Petitioner was procured by respondent from a union hiring hall for employment by the master of the vessel. In August, 1943, while the ship was at sea, Fink was ordered by the master and boatswain to empty a garbage |