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Opinion of the Court.

immediately precede § 1404 (a), and all are within the Venue Chapter (§§ 1391-1406, inclusive) of the Code. To accept this contention, we would be required completely to disregard the Congressional admonition that "No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28 . . . in which any any [sic] section is placed . . . Furthermore, petitioner's argument proves too much: §§ 1391-1393, which also are in the Venue Chapter and also refer to "any civil action," would be read as applying only to actions for which special venue requirements are established in neighboring sections of the Code, although they were obviously intended by Congress to be the general venue sections applicable to ordinary actions. It seeins more reasonable to hold that § 1404 (a) in terms applies generally, i. e., to "any civil action."

Second. Although petitioner wishes to restrict the literal meaning of "any civil action," he would expand the sense of "may transfer. . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought" beyond the exact scope of those words. Obviously, the express language gives no clue as to where the action "might have been brought." Yet the essence of petitioner's position is that the order below, transferring his suit, effects a repeal of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which granted him the right to sue in any district "in which the defend

action for the collection of internal revenue taxes"; § 1397, "of interpleader”; § 1398, "any civil action to enforce, suspend or set aside in whole or in part an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission"; § 1399, "for the partition of lands, where the United States is one of the tenants in common or joint tenants"; § 1400, actions "relating to copyrights" or "for patent infringement"; § 1401, "by a stockholder on behalf of his corporation"; § 1402, "against the United States"; and § 1403, "to condemn real estate for the use of the United States."

Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 991, § 33.

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337 U.S.

ant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.""

Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper forum; § 1404 (a) of the Code deals with the right to transfer an action properly brought. The two sections deal with two separate and distinct problems.10 Section 1404 (a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously.

The Code, therefore, does not repeal § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We agree with petitioner that Congress had no such intention, as demonstrated by its failure to list the section in the meticulously prepared schedule of statutes repealed." We cannot agree that the order before us effectuates an implied repeal. The inapplicability of forum non conveniens to Liability Act

"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action...." 45 U. S. C. § 56. For a brief historical sketch, see Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 49-50 (1941).

10 In almost every state, the requirements for venue and for transfer are treated in different statutory sections. Brief for New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. as amicus curiae, pp. 11-12, Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., post, p. 75. See, e. g., N. Y. Civil Practice Act, §§ 182, 187.

11 Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 992, § 39. Congress did list the pertinent statutes, when Code provisions in fact changed the basic venue requirements. For example, §§ 1394, 1395, 1396 and 1400, respectively, prescribe a new definition of appropriate forums for actions against the Comptroller of the Currency, involving fines and forfeitures, internal revenue taxes and patent and copyright suits; and the following statutes are therefore listed as repealed: 28 U. S. C. § 110; 28 U. S. C. §§ 104, 107, 108; 28 U. S. C. § 105; 28 U. S. C. § 109 and 17 U. S. C. § 35.

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suits derives from the Kepner decision. And there this Court expressly stated that "If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative . . . ." 314 U. S. at 54. That opinion discusses § 6 of the Liability Act, to be sure, but this Court did not and could not suggest that the legislative answer had necessarily to be addressed to that section. Since the words selected by Congress for § 6 denote nothing, one way or the other, respecting forum non conveniens, there was no occasion to repeal that section, expressly or impliedly; Congress chose to remove its judicial gloss via another statute. Discussion of the law of implied repeals is, therefore, irrelevant.

Third. Petitioner's chief argument proceeds not from one side or the other of the literal boundaries of § 1404 (a), but from its legislative history. The short answer is that there is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear. "The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction." Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 260 (1945). This canon of construction has received consistent adherence in our decisions."

Nevertheless, we need not rest our decision on it solely. For the legislative history does not support petitioner's position. Petitioner's argument is based on these twin premises: Congress intended no "controversial change" to be incorporated in the Code; and § 1404 (a) is such a change.

12 E. g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947); United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940) and cases there cited.

The rule as to statutory revisions is the same. Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U. S. 527, 530 (1942); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 45 (1895); United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 513 (1880).

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To establish the former premise, petitioner cites a number of statements by legislative leaders in charge of the Code revision. For example, Representative Keogh, Chairman of the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws which initiated the work, said at the hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, “The policy that we adopted . . . was to avoid wherever possible and whenever possible the adoption in our revision of what might be described as controversial substantive changes of law." 13 And Senator Donnell, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee considering the Code, said on the floor that "... the purpose of this bill is primarily to revise and codify and to enact into positive law, with such corrections as were deemed by the committee to be of substantial and noncontroversial nature." 14 But these statements clearly are not unequivocal promises that no changes would be made. The legislation was announced to be a revision as well as a codification. It is obvious that the changes in law retained in the Code were not considered as "controversial" by these Congressional spokesmen.

Petitioner does not offer any definition of "controversial," but he does point to one concrete example of what he regards as a "controversial" measure. This is the

13

Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947). He also testified as follows: ". . . we proceeded upon the hypothesis that since that was primarily a restatement of existing law, we should not endanger its accomplishment by the inclusion in the work of any highly controversial changes in law." And, in response to the Chairman's question, "And this bill does not include controversial matters?" Rep. Keogh replied that "We have sought to avoid as far as possible . . . any substantive changes that did not meet with unanimity of opinion." Ibid., 11.

14 94 Cong. Rec. 7928 (1948). The Senator had just given an illustration of "various changes that have been made."

35

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Opinion of the Court.

Jennings Bill,15 which was under consideration in the House in the spring of 1947, as was the Code revision." The Jennings Bill and § 1404 (a) of the Code meet the same problem, the alleged abuses in the selection of

15 H. R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.: "A Bill To amend the Employers' Liability Act so as to limit venue ." As ultimately reported to the House, it repealed all of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, except the last sentence prohibiting removal of actions brought in state courts to federal courts; and added the following paragraph to the then general venue statute, § 51 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 112: "A civil suit for damages for wrongful death or personal injuries against any interstate common carrier by railroad may be brought only in a district court of the United States or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, in the district or county (parish), respectively, in which the cause of action arose, or where the person suffering death or injury resided at the time it arose: Provided, That if the defendant cannot be served with process issuing out of any of the courts aforementioned, then and only then, the action may be brought in a district court of the United States, or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, at any place where the defendant shall be doing business at the time of the institution of said action." H. R. Rep. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 9-10 (1947).

16 The House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the Code, before Subcommittee No. 1, on Mar. 7, 1947, and four hearings on the Jennings Bill, before Subcommittee No. 4, from Mar. 28 to April 18, 1947. Congressman Jennings himself was a member of Subcominittee No. 1, considering the Code. Congressman Devitt, a member of Subcommittee No. 4, considering the Jennings Bill, testified in favor of the Code; Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055 (Code), 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1947); Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 3214 (Code), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948).

The unanimous Judiciary Committee Report favoring the Code was published in April, 1947. H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. The divided Report on the Jennings Bill was submitted in June. H. R. Rep. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (in three parts),

On July 7, 1947, the House passed the proposed revision by a vote of 342 to 23. 93 Cong. Rec. 8392. Ten days later, the Jennings Bill was passed by 203 to 188. 93 Cong. Rec. 9193-4.