Opinion of the Court.

337 U.S.

The District Court struck the defense and denied respondent's motion. A trial was had and a verdict rendered for petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed. 170 F. 2d 987. It ruled, after a review of Kansas authorities, that the requirement of service of summons within the statutory period was an integral part of that state's statute of limitations. It accordingly held that Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, governed and that respondent's motion for summary judgment should have been sustained. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question presented. 336 U. S. 917.

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, was premised on the theory that in diversity cases the rights enjoyed under local law should not vary because enforcement of those rights was sought in the federal court rather than in the state court. If recovery could not be had in the state court, it should be denied in the federal court. Otherwise, those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction. would gain advantages over those confined to state courts. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York applied that principle to statutes of limitations on the theory that, where one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal court.

It is conceded that if the present case were in a Kansas court it would be barred. The theory of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York would therefore seem to bar it in the federal court, as the Court of Appeals held. The force of that reasoning is sought to be avoided by the argument that

is proper, the action shall be deemed commenced at the date of the first publication. An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof within the meaning of this article when the party faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must be followed by the first publication or service of the summons within sixty days."

J

530

Opinion of the Court.

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure determine the manner in which an action is commenced in the federal courts a matter of procedure which the principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not control. It is accordingly argued that since the suit was properly commenced in the federal court before the Kansas statute of limitations ran, it tolled the statute.

That was the reasoning and result in Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F. 2d 136, 141. But that case was a suit to enforce rights under a federal statute. Here, as in that case, there can be no doubt that the suit was properly commenced in the federal court. But in the present case we look to local law to find the cause of action on which suit is brought. Since that cause of action is created by local law, the measure of it is to be found only in local law. It carries the same burden and is subject to the same defenses in the federal court as in the state court. See Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208; Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 117. It accrues and comes to an end when local law so declares. West v. American Tel: & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra. Where local law qualifies or abridges it, the federal court must follow suit. Otherwise there is a different measure of the cause of action in one court than in the other, and the principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is transgressed.

We can draw no distinction in this case because local law brought the cause of action to an end after, rather than before, suit was started in the federal court. In both cases local law created the right which the federal court was asked to enforce. In both cases local law undertook to determine the life of the cause of action. We cannot give it longer life in the federal court than it

"Civil Rights Act, 8 U. S. C. § 43.

would have had in the state court without adding something to the cause of action. We may not do that consistently with Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.

It is argued that the Kansas statute in question is not an integral part of the Kansas statute of limitations. But the Court of Appeals on a careful canvass of Kansas law in an opinion written by Judge Huxman, a distinguished member of the Kansas bar, has held to the contrary. We ordinarily accept the determination of local law by the Court of Appeals (see Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237), and we will not disturb it here.

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE dissents. See his dissenting opinion in Nos. 442 and 512, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., post, p. 557.

• Note 4, supra.

Opinion of the Court.

WOODS v. INTERSTATE REALTY CO.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 465. Argued March 30-31, 1949.-Decided June 20, 1949.

In an action brought by a foreign corporation in a Federal District Court solely on grounds of diversity of citizenship to recover a broker's commission for the sale of real estate in the State, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had not qualified to do business in the State under a state statute which the Court of Appeals construed as not making the contract void but only unenforcible in the state courts. Held: The motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64. Pp. 535–538.

170 F.2d 694, reversed.

Having jurisdiction solely on grounds of diversity of citizenship, a Federal District Court granted a defendant's motion for summary judgment in a suit to recover a broker's commission, on the ground that the plaintiff, a foreign corporation, had not qualified to do business in the State as required by state law. The Court of Appeals reversed, 168 F. 2d 701; granted rehearing, 170 F. 2d 74; and reaffirmed its reversal, 170 F. 2d 694. This Court granted certiorari. 336 U. S. 909. Reversed, p. 538.

P. H. Eager, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were William H. Watkins and Thomas H. Watkins.

John A. Osoinach and Phil Stone argued the cause for respondent. Mr. Osoinach also filed a brief.

Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, announced by MR. JUSTICE REED.

This case was brought in the District Court for Mississippi on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Respondent, a Tennessee corporation, sued petitioner, a

Opinion of the Court.

337 U.S.

resident of Mississippi, for a broker's commission alleged to be due for the sale of real estate of petitioner in Mississippi. The District Court found on motion for summary judgment that the contract was void under Mississippi law, since respondent was doing business in Mississippi without qualifying under a Mississippi statute.' It therefore dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Court of Appeals reversed. It reviewed the Mississippi decisions under the Mississippi statute and concluded that the contract was not void but only unenforcible in the Mississippi courts. It held in reliance on David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club, 225 U. S. 489, that the fact that respondent could not sue in the Mississippi courts did not close the doors of the federal court sitting in that State. Accordingly it reversed the judgment of the District Court. 168 F. 2d 701. It granted rehearing, 170 F. 2d 74, and reaffirmed its reversal, 170 F. 2d 694.

The case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted because of the seeming conflict of that holding with our recent ruling in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183.

If the Lupton's Sons case controls, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was right in allowing the action to be maintained in the federal court. In that case, a New York statute provided that no foreign corporation could "maintain any action in this state" without a certificate that it had qualified to do business there. The Court held that a contract on which the corporation could not

1 Miss. Code 1942, § 5319, requires a foreign corporation doing business in the State to file a written power of attorney designating an agent on whom service of process may be had. It also provides, "Any foreign corporation failing to comply with the above provisions shall not be permitted to bring or maintain any action or suit in any of the courts of this state."