426 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. but that reviewing device is not applicable to reparation claims; (2) reparation claims are not within § 17 (9) because they have been treated by a different scheme throughout the history of the Act. If review is to be found within the Act, it must be because of provisions other than those in § 17 (9). Second. The only other provision in the Interstate Commerce Act which affords judicial review of an order is § 16. That section, however, comes into force only when an award for damages is made. Rejection by the Commission of a money claim is outside the express terms of that section and not within what can fairly be implied from any language in it. A general argument of fairness is made that since this section provides for court review when an award is made where the carrier loses, the shipper is entitled to review when the carrier wins. Leaving aside, temporarily, the fact that what Congress has written in § 9 forecloses court review, to yield to such an inference in favor of a shipper whose claim is denied raises insuperable difficulties once we leave the text and scheme of the Act and go at large as to court review. Thus there would be no limit on the time in which review of the Commission's dismissal of the reparation claim could be brought, whereas § 16 fixes a time limit for suits against the carrier on awards by the Commission. 43 Stat. 633, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 16 (3) (f). This is just one of the obstructions if we are to imply court review of orders disallowing reparation claims because Congress has seen fit to allow suits on orders granting an award. In other respects the Court would have to legislate for Congress. What effect is to be given to the Commission's finding? If the shipper receives an award of damages and sues the carrier thereon, § 16 (2) provides that the Commission's findings are prima facie evidence. 41 Stat. 491, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 16 (2). Are we to create the same rule judicially, though Congress FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. 337 U.S. has not done so, when the shipper fails before the Commission? May the shipper introduce new evidence in the district court? When the shipper sues the common carrier, the Commission's action in making an award "cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury." Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 430. But if the unsuccessful shipper can save up evidence until he gets in court, the advantages of a Commission hearing are destroyed. What will be the scope of the Court's jurisdiction? Would the district court determine only liability, or also the amount to be recovered, or only that the Commission acted without justification in fact or contrary to law? The answer to none of these questions can be found in § 16. Yet, one would suppose, if review in this situation is to be derived from § 16, some guides for its exercise should also be found in that section, considering the particularities with which it defines review in the instances authorizing court action. Therefore, this Court has held: "Section 16 (2) does not permit suit in the absence of an award, and if the Commission denies him relief, a claimant is remediless." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448, 458. Money damages are part of the regulatory scheme. Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U. S. 247, 258. But while the Commission may determine that rates for the future be reduced, it is not required to award damages for the higher rates in the past. Thus it is not at all strange that its action be not subject to court review where the shipper has failed to persuade the Commission to award damages. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448, 458. Especially is this true when Congress has provided for an alternative procedure whereby the shipper would have been able to go to court. Therefore, even without any explicit provision it would be a reasonable inference that Congress did not intend 426 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. to grant a review where the shipper has decided to seek his damages before the Commission. Even though Congress provided alternate methods of securing damages, and authorized court review when the Commission sustained a money claim, but not when it denied such a claim, Congress did not leave merely to rational inference that upon denial of a money award by the Commission, the shipper could not again try his luck in court. By § 9 Congress gave the shipper his choice of forum: he could ask for damages either from the Commission or a court, but could "not have the right to pursue both of said remedies"; he "must in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure herein provided for he... will adopt." 24 Stat. 382, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 9. If the shipper asks the Commission to award him damages and it goes against him, Congress has barred review of the denial or revision of the amount of the award. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448, 458-59. Since Congress gave the shipper the alternative of administrative or judicial relief, there can be no question but that Congress was constitutionally free to make final the administrative choice. Third. Since access to court review of an order denying reparations was barred by the Interstate Commerce Act, such review is not available under the general jurisdiction of the district courts. 28 U. S. C. § 1337. It has never been suggested, during some sixty years of active litigation over this problem, that for review of such an order resort may be had to a court of equity outside the framework of the Interstate Commerce Act. Even the Government does not now suggest it, and naturally so. Due regard for the explicit provisions of the Act precludes it. And for these reasons: (1) The specific terms of § 17 (9) which alone give reviewing power to the courts, save in cases where the carrier has been held to owe money, do so "under those pro FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. 337 U.S. visions of law applicable in the case of suits to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside orders of the Commission, but not otherwise." 54 Stat. 916, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (9). It is obvious that review would be "otherwise" if the unsuccessful shipper be permitted to bring an action under 28 U. S. C. § 1337. This reason exists independently of the fact that § 9 also prohibits court action after an attempt to recover damages is made before the Commission. It is also independent of the fact that provisions of Title 28 do not make reviewable orders for which the Interstate Commerce Act does not provide review. (2) Because of these provisions, review of reparation claims differs from the situation in Shields v. Utah I. C. R. Co., 305 U. S. 177. There the Court was not confronted with an enactment which said that if a person sought the Commission's aid he could not thereafter go to court. The Shields case is inapposite on another ground. By determining that a certain railroad was subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission placed the railroad under the active hazards of criminal sanctions. Equity was invoked for one of its ancient functions of staying a multiplicity of criminal prosecutions to avoid irreparable harm. See 305 U. S. at 183, and Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 306. Here there is not the remotest ground for appeal to equity. It is merely a matter of dollars and cents-not the hazards of criminal prosecution and an insistence on having two modes of recovering money damages when Congress has given shippers the choice of one or the other. There is a total absence of any of the traditional grounds for equitable relief. Cf. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, 314-5. Nor is review permitted under § 1336 of Title 28 (1948), if it is determined that the type of order involved is not of the nature calling for a three-judge court. The 426 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. Government relied on the special scheme of the Urgent Deficiencies Act as incorporated in the Interstate Com-. merce Act conferring jurisdiction to review orders of the Commission. This scheme requires review by a threejudge court. The Court rejects that claim on the ground that a reparation order is not the type of order so reviewable. Instead the Court finds jurisdiction in the district court to entertain a petition to review an order of the Commission denying reparation in § 41 (28) of Title 28 (1946 ed.), now § 1336. But jurisdiction under § 41 (28) carries also the requirement of a three-judge court. See §§ 41-47, now c. 157 of Title 28 of the Revised Code.. No jurisdiction can be derived from § 41 (28) of Title 28 unless the order is of the type that is reviewable by a three-judge court. To reject the latter is necessarily to hold that no jurisdiction of the district court is derivable from § 41 (28) of Title 28, now § 1336.10 10 In United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, it was held that because the type of order there involved was not the type reviewable by a three-judge court, the phrase the "district courts shall have jurisdiction 'of cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission'," did not confer jurisdiction on the district court. 303 U. S. at 227-228. The quoted words are the provision in the Urgent Deficiencies Act and are precisely the same provision that was carried over to § 41 (28). When we had this general problem here the other day in United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641, it was not suggested that there was jurisdiction to review an order of the Commission under § 41 (28), now 1336 of Title 28. Instead, the Court agreed with the Griffin case that the order there involved was not of a type calling for a three-judge court and therefore that the jurisdictional provisions of § 41 (28), now § 1336 of Title 28, were not applicable. The Court significantly referred to the provisions of § 41 (6), now § 1339 of Title 28, the section giving general jurisdiction over suits arising under the postal laws, as the only possible source of jurisdiction. In the context of this case the comparable provision is § 41 (8), now § 1337. The only reason why the Court now seeks to warp the whole structure of Title 28 rather than to rely on the only section |