346

Opinion of the Court.

Later, when Congress enacted the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 193-201, 50 U. S. C. App. (1946 ed., Supp. I) SS 1881-1901, it expressly excluded the District of Columbia from the Act and struck out the previous express inclusion of the United States as a "person" subject to the Act.20

The effect of the National Emergency Price Control Act, therefore, is to emphasize, both in its form and its practical operation, that Congress did not seek by the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act to place Government-owned housing under a local rent administrator.

ments, for which the rent is fixed by the national rent schedule of the War or Navy Department, the rents established by such rent schedule." 10 Fed. Reg. 13529–13530.

For the exception of housing accommodations rented to Army or Navy personnel, including civilian employees of the War and Navy Departments, from provisions restricting removal of tenants, see § 6 (c) (2), 10 Fed. Reg. 13534.

26 The Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 193, 197, superseded the National Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. It provided: "SEC. 202. As used in this title [MAXIMUM RENTS]—

"(a) The term 'person' includes an individual, corporation, partnership, association, or any other organized group of persons, or a legal successor or representative of any of the foregoing." 61 Stat. 196, 50 U. S. C. App. (1946 ed., Supp. I) §-1892 (a).

"SEC. 209. . . .

"(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the United States or any State or local public agency may maintain an action or proceeding to recover possession of any housing accommodations operated by it where such action or proceeding is authorized by the statute or regulations under which such accommodations are administered: .. 61 Stat. 200-201, 50 U. S. C. App. (1946 ed., Supp. I) § 1899 (b).

"SEC. 211. The provisions of this title [MAXIMUM RENTS] shall be applicable to the several States and to the Territories and possessions of the United States but shall not be applicable to the District of Columbia." 61 Stat. 201, 50 U. S. C. App. (1946 ed., Supp. I) $ 1901.

337 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

IV. The District Administrator of Rent Control has not taken part in this proceeding and there is no evidence before us that at any time he has sought to exercise jurisdiction over the United States as a landlord of either low-rent housing or defense housing.

The District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act has been in effect since 1941 and the United States as landlord has owned and operated several thousand housing units in the District. There is nothing in the Rules and Regulations or the General Orders of the Office of the Administrator of Rent Control suggesting the application of the Act to the United States as a landlord of Government-owned housing. The absence of evidence of asserted control by the District official, coupled with the absence of complaint by the National Price Administrator during the life of the National Emergency Price Control Act, is thoroughly consistent with a widely accepted interpretation of the local Act in accordance with the conclusion which we have found to be fully justified by the language of Congress.

The judgment accordingly is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Syllabus.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. WODEHOUSE.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 84. Argued December 10, 13, 1948.-Decided June 13, 1949.

Respondent, a nonresident alien not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein, received in 1938 and 1941 from magazine and book publishers in the United States lump sum payments, in advance and in full, for the American serial and book rights to certain literary works of which he was the author and which were ready to be copyrighted. Held:

1. Under the Revenue Act of 1938 and the Internal Revenue Code as amended, the sums so received were includible in "gross income from sources within the United States," as "rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States... copyrights . . . and other like property," and were thus taxable to respondent. Pp. 371-374, 377-392.

(a) Had the sums here involved been received in the taxable year 1934, they unquestionably would have been taxable to respondent under the Revenue Act of 1934; and they were not relieved from taxation by the amendments which were made by the Revenue Act of 1936 and which were still in effect in 1938 and 1941. Pp. 380-392.

(b) The Revenue Act of 1936 preserved the taxability of the several kinds of income of nonresident alien individuals which had been the subject of withholding at their respective sources, including receipts in the nature of royalties for the use of copyrights in the United States. Pp. 386–392.

(c) To have exempted nonresident aliens from these readily collectible taxes derived from sources within the United States would have discriminated in their favor against resident citizens of the United States who would be required to pay their regular income tax on such income, if treated as royalties within the meaning of the gross income provisions, or at least to pay a tax upon them as capital gains, if treated as income from sales of capital within the meaning of the capital gains provisions. No such purpose to discriminate can be implied. P. 391.

(d) None of the provisions of the 1936 Act here involved were changed by the 1938 Act or the Internal Revenue Code, except as to the rates of tax; and the principal changes even in the rates were to provide higher taxes in the higher brackets, rather than to reduce the taxes on nonresident aliens. P. 392.

2. The fact that the amounts received for the use of or for the privilege of using the copyrights were lump sum payments, in advance and in full, did not exempt such income from taxation. Pp. 393-395.

(a) Once it has been determined that the receipts of the respondent would have been required to be included in his gross income for federal income tax purposes if they had been received in annual payments, or from time to time, during the life of the respective copyrights, it is clear that the receipt of those same sums by him in single lump sums as payments in full, in advance, for the same rights to be enjoyed throughout the entire life of the respective copyrights cannot, solely by reason of the consolidation of the payment into one sum, render it tax exempt. P. 393.

(b) The words "annual" and "periodical" in §§ 211 (a) and 143 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1938 and of the Internal Revenue Code, when taken in their context, and in the light of the legislative history of the Act and Code, and the interpretation of them by the Treasury Department and the lower courts, do not require a different result from that here reached. Pp. 393-394. 166 F. 2d 986, reversed.

The Commissioner's determination of deficiencies in a taxpayer's income tax for 1938 and 1941 was sustained by the Tax Court. 8 T. C. 637. The Court of Appeals reversed. 166 F. 2d 986. This Court granted certiorari. 335 U. S. 807. Reversed and remanded, p. 395.

166 F. 2d 986.

Melva M. Graney argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack and Lee A. Jackson.

Watson Washburn argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

369

Opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us is whether certain sums received in 1938 and 1941, by the respondent, as a nonresident alien author not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein, were required by the Revenue Acts of the United States to be included in his gross income for federal tax purposes. Each of these sums had been paid to him in advance and respectively for an exclusive serial or book right throughout the United States in relation to a specified original story written by him and ready to be copyrighted. The answer turns upon the meaning of "gross income from sources within the United States" as that term was used, limited and defined in §§ 212 (a), 211 and 119 of the Revenue Act of 1938, and the Internal Revenue Code, as amended in 1940 and 1941. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that these sums each came within those kinds of gross income from sources within the United States that were referred to in those Acts as "rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States... . . copyrights, . . . and other like property," and that, accordingly, each of these sums was taxable under one or the other of those Acts.

2

The respondent, Pelham G. Wodehouse, at the times material to this case, was a British subject residing in

1 The material provisions were identical in the Revenue Act of 1938, enacted May 28, 1938, c. 289, 52 Stat. 447, et seq., and in the Internal Revenue Code, enacted February 10, 1939, 53 Stat. 1, et seq. Amendments to these provisions in 1940 and 1941 changed only the rates of the taxes. For text of the material provisions, see Appendix A, infra, pp. 395, 397, following this opinion.

2 § 119 (a) (4), 52 Stat. 504, 53 Stat. 54, 26 U. S. C. § 119 (a) (4). For full text of the material provisions of § 119, see Appendix A, infra, p. 397.