346 Opinion of the Court. The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia found that the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act was not applicable to the United States and ordered possession of premises owned by it in a defense-housing project in the District of Columbia given to the United States. The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. 75 Wash. Law Rep. 982, 54 A. 2d 747. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 83 U. S. App. D. C. 377, 171 F. 2d 8. This Court granted certiorari. 336 U. S. 931. Reversed, p. 368. Assistant Attorney General Vanech argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Philip Elman, Roger P. Marquis, Fred W. Smith and Floyd L. France. Ward B. McCarthy argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether the United States, as the owner of Bellevue Houses, a defense-housing project in the District of Columbia, is a "landlord" within the meaning of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act,' with particular reference to rights of occupancy and rates of rental. For the reasons to be stated, we hold that it is not. 1 The District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act was approved December 2, 1941, 55 Stat. 788, D. C. Code (1940, Supp. VI) §§ 451601 to 45-1611. It took effect January 1, 1942, and was to terminate December 31, 1945. Id. §§ 2 (1), 1 (b); § 45-1602 (1); and see § 45-1601 (b). Its life, however, was extended to December 31, 1946, 59 Stat. 592; to December 31, 1947, 60 Stat. 340; to March 31, 1948, 61 Stat. 713; to April 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 100; to March 31, 1949, 62 Stat. 205; to April 30, 1949, 63 Stat. 30; to June 30, 1950,, 63 Stat. 48. It has been amended in a few other provisions, none of which are material here. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. The United States of America, petitioner herein, filed its amended complaint in the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia against Wittek, the respondent, seeking possession of the premises occupied by him in the defense-housing project in the District of Columbia known as Bellevue Houses. The complaint alleged that the premises were owned by the United States and that the housing accommodations had been constructed by the Navy Department under authority of § 201 of the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act. 1941.2 This summary proceeding was brought under § 20, 31 Stat. 1193, 41 Stat. 555, D. C. Code (1940) § 11-735. The respondent's tenancy had been terminated by notice to quit, served upon him February 28, 1946, as required by § 1219, 31 Stat. 1382, D. C. Code (1940) § 45-902, and the United States claimed that he no longer had any right to possession. The respondent's defense, now be 3 2 Approved September 9, 1940, 54 Stat. 883-884. The management and administration of Bellevue Houses were transferred by the Navy Department to the National Housing Administration under authorization of this section and also under § 7 of the Lanham Act. approved October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, 1127, 42 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 1544, and Executive Order No. 9070, 3 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. 1095, 50 U. S. C. App. (1946 ed.) § 601 note, p. 5711. The authority to operate and manage Bellevue Houses later was delegated, by lease, to the National Capital Housing Authority, which was responsible for the rental of the premises involved in the instant case at the time of this proceeding. In making this delegation, the United States relied upon the same Acts, together with § 5 of the Act of June 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 363, and amendments made to the Lanham Act by the Act of January 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 11, et seq. 3 The amended complaint, the proceedings and the opinions below refer also to allegations, stipulations and evidence to the effect that the United States had rented the premises in question to the respondent for $38.20 a month, including gas heating and other utility services, but that it had increased such rental to $43 a month, beginning February 1, 1946. The United States claimed that this increase was essential in order for it to meet a substantial rise in operating expenses, due to the necessary substitution of commercial gas to 346 Opinion of the Court. fore us, is that the United States did not establish any of the additional facts which the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act required a landlord to establish as a condition of such landlord's recovery of possession of housing accommodations to which the Act applied. The. be used for space heating purposes in place of surplus sludge gas supplied by the District of Columbia free or at nominal cost. The United States also alleged that the respondent refused to execute a new lease and refused to pay rent at the increased rate, with the result that, on February 28, 1946, it served its 30-day notice terminating the respondent's tenancy. It further alleged that this increase in rent had been made under its previously cited authority to operate the project and without reference to the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act. This increase in rent presents (under §§ 2 to 4 of that Act, D. C. Code (1940, Supp. VI) §§ 45-1602 to 45-1604) the same issue, based upon the applicability of the Act to the United States as a landlord, as is presented (under § 5 (b), D. C. Code (1940, Supp. VI) § 45-1605 (b)) by the maintenance of this proceeding for possession of the premises in question without making any of the additional allegations called for by that Act. We deal with the issue as presented under § 5 (b) because it is there less involved in factual controversy than it is under §§ 2 to 4. "SEC. 5. PROHIBITIONS.-. . . "(b) No action or proceeding to recover possession of housing accommodations shall be maintainable by any landlord against any tenant, notwithstanding that the tenant has no lease or that his lease has expired, so long as the tenant continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled, unless— "(1) The tenant is (a) violating an obligation of his tenancy (other than an obligation to pay rent higher than rent permitted under this Act or any regulation or order thereunder applicable to the housing accommodations involved or an obligation to surrender possession of such accommodations) or (b) is committing a nuisance or using the housing accommodations for an immoral or illegal purpose or for other than living or dwelling purposes, or "(2) The landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the property for his immediate and personal use and occupancy as a dwelling, or "(3) The landlord has in good faith contracted in writing to sell the property for immediate and personal use and occu Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. parties agreed that the cause be disposed of by the Municipal Court upon the pleadings, pretrial stipulations and certain exhibits. That court found that it had jurisdiction, that the Emergency Rent Act did not apply to the United States as the landlord of the premises in question and it ordered possession of the premises to be given to the United States. The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit allowed an appeal, limited to two questions. It disposed of one by sustaining the juris pancy as a dwelling by the purchaser and that the contract of sale contains a representation by the purchaser that the property is being purchased by him for such immediate and personal use and occupancy, or "(4) The landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession for the immediate purpose of substantially altering, remodeling, or demolishing the property and replacing it with new construction, the plans for which altered, remodeled, or new construction having been filed with and approved by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, or "(5) The housing accommodations are nonhousekeeping, furnished, accommodations located within a single dwelling unit not used as a rooming or boarding house as defined by this Act and the remaining portion of which dwelling unit is occupied by the lessor or his immediate family, or "(6) The landlord, being a recognized school or an accredited nonprofit university, has a bona fide need for the premises for educational, research, administrative, or dormitory use." 55 Stat. 791, 56 Stat. 759, 61 Stat. 721, D. C. Code (1940, Supp. VI) § 45-1605 (b). 5 Wittek v. United States, 54 A. 2d 747. For an earlier proceeding in the same case, see United States v. Wittek, 48 A. 2d 805. 6 Appeal was taken under 56 Stat. 196, D. C. Code (1940, Supp. VI) § 11-773. The question now before us was stated as follows: "Whether the conditions imposed by the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act on suits for possession apply where such a suit is brought by the United States as landlord." Wittek v. United States, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 377, 378, 171 F.2d 8, 9. 346 Opinion of the Court. diction of the Municipal Court. It answered the other by holding that the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act did apply to the United States as the landlord in this proceeding. It ordered the judgment reversed and the cause remanded to the Municipal Court of Appeals. 83 U.S. App. D. C. 377, 171 F. 2d 8. We granted certiorari because of the substantial importance of the decision. to the administration of Government-owned, low-rent housing, as well as to Government-owned, defense housing, in the District of Columbia. 336 U. S. 931. I. If the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act is now applied to Government-owned, defense housing in the District, such as Bellevue Houses, we are warned that we soon may be compelled to hold the same interpretation applicable to Government-owned, low-rent housing in the District. When the circumstances are appreciated, it is practically inconceivable that Congress would have subjected its Government-owned, low-rent housing program in the District of Columbia to the additional control prescribed by the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act. Yet the interpretation by which the court below held that Act applicable to the United States as a landlord of defense housing might make the Act equally applicable to the United States as a landlord of all other housing accommodations, including its low-rent housing. The District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act came before Congress, late in 1941, through and with the support of the Congressional Committees on the District of Columbia in the House of Representatives and the Senate. It was designed as a model, prewar, temporary, emergency measure to forestall the skyrocketing of rentals of housing accommodations for defense workers then concentrating in the District of Columbia. Obviously, it was directed, at least |