325 Opinion of the Court. In September, 1941, the Coast Guard advertised it for sale to the highest bidder. Respondent was the highest bidder, purchasing the tug in Maine on March 19, 1942, for $2,875. Thereafter he expended $5,699.78 on labor and materials in repairing and improving the vessel, an amount which would have been substantially greater had he not performed part of the work himself. In April, 1942, respondent received from the Department of Commerce a certificate designating the vessel as a towing steam vessel and authorizing him to employ it in the coastal trade for one year. Respondent then brought the tug to Staten Island, New York, where it remained until requisitioned by the War Shipping Administration on October 15, 1942. A survey by the Navy had indicated it was suitable as a steam-heating plant for heating and pumping fuel oil from oil barges into naval combat vessels. Its condition was said to be "fair to good"; and its original cost was estimated to be $45,000; its replacement cost, $56,000; and its present value $9,000. It was used as a steam plant to heat oil for use in combat ships. The War Shipping Administration determined that $9,000 was "just compensation" for the tug and offered that amount to respondent. Respondent accepted 75 per cent of the award, as he was permitted to do by § 902 (d) of the Act, and brought suit to recover the balance of the $20,000 which he alleged was the "just compensation" to which he was entitled, plus interest. Section 902 (a) of the Act,' after providing that the owner of any vessel requisitioned by the Commission shall 1 Section 902 (a) provides: "Whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by proclamation of the President, it shall be lawful for the Commission to requisition or purchase any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens of the United States, or under construction within the United States, or for any period during such emergency, Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. be paid "just compensation for the property taken or for the use of such property," goes on to state "but in no case I shall the value of the property taken or used be deemed enhanced by the causes necessitating the taking or use." It is around this latter clause that the present controversy turns. The Court of Claims found that the fair market value at the time of the taking was $15,500 and that respondent was entitled to receive that amount, less the sum already paid, plus interest. 110 Ct. Cl. 66, 75 F. Supp. 235. The importance of that decision in the settlement of claims arising as a result of the requisitioning program during the period of recent hostilities led us to grant the petition for certiorari. The United States admitted liability for only $10,500, claiming that $5,000 of the market value was due to an enhancement brought about by its need for vessels which necessitated their taking. The Court of Claims found that at the time of the requisitioning there existed in and about the Port of New York "a rising market and a strong demand for tugs of all types" due in part at least to the government's requisitioning program. It found that the to requisition or charter the use of any such property. The termination of any emergency so declared shall be announced by a further proclamation by the President. When any such property or the use thereof is 'so requisitioned, the owner thereof shall be paid just compensation for the property taken or for the use of such property, but in no case shall the value of the property taken or used be deemed enhanced by the causes necessitating the taking or use. If any property is taken and used under authority of this section, but the ownership thereof is not required by the United States, such property shall be restored to the owner in a condition at least as good as when taken, less ordinary wear and tear, or the owner shall be paid an amount for reconditioning sufficient to place the property in such condition. The owner shall not be paid for any consequential damages arising from a taking or use of property under authority of this section." (Italics added.) 325 Opinion of the Court. market value of the tug had been enhanced $5,000 by October 15, 1942, due (1) to the great increase in shipping and harbor traffic because of the war and (2) to the government's need for vessels in the prosecution of the war. But the Court of Claims held that an owner of property taken by the government was entitled to no 2 The findings on these issues were as follows: "At the time of the requisition, there existed in and about the Port of New York a rising market and a strong demand for tugs of all types, including the MacArthur. This situation was due to the greatly increased traffic in the harbor during the period of the war, to the fact that the Government had been requisitioning tugs and to the resulting shortage of tugs. Tugs were operated day and night in an effort to handle the increased business and, under those conditions most tug owners were reluctant to sell. However, from August 1941 to February 1943, six tugboats were sold on the open market in or near the Port of New York. None of these sales involved a vessel closely comparable to the MacArthur in design, power, and equipment. . . .” "Beginning on September 8, 1939, the date on which the President proclaimed the existence of a limited national emergency, and continuing up to the date that plaintiff's vessel was requisitioned, there was a general rise in the market values of nearly all vessels in and about the Port of New York. This increase in values between September 8, 1939 and May 27, 1941, the date on which the President proclaimed the existence of a general national emergency, was due to the demand for vessels which followed the outbreak of war in Europe. After May 27, 1941 and particularly after December 7, 1941, the date of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the rise in market values was due to the Government's need for vessels, which necessitated the taking of many vessels, and to the great increase in shipping and in harbor traffic which occurred during the period of the war. These conditions combined to create a demand for and a shortage of tugs. As a result, the market value of the MacArthur had been enhanced by the sum of $5,000.00 by October 15, 1942. "Prior to the time the defendant requisitioned the MacArthur there was no reasonable prospect that she would be requisitioned, and no part of the enhancement in her value was due to such a prospect." Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. less than he could have received on the market from others, which in the present case was $15,500. The Comptroller General has ruled that § 902 (a) prohibits the payment of compensation to the extent that it may be based on values in excess of those existing on the date of the President's proclamation of a limited national emergency (September 8, 1939), provided that such excess be determined as due to economic conditions directly caused by the national emergency.* 5 The Advisory Board on Just Compensation formulated various rules for the guidance of the War Shipping Administration in its requisitioning program, including the following: "From the value at the time of taking, there should be deducted any enhancement due, to the Government's need of vessels which has necessitated the taking, to the previous taking of vessels of similar type, or to a prospective taking, reasonably probable, whether such need, taking, or prospect, occurred be 3 See 3 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. 114. * 22 Comp. Gen. 497, 608. 5 See Exec. Order 9387, Oct. 15, 1943, 8 Fed. Reg. 14105, 3 C. F. R., 1943 Supp. 48-49. The Executive Order provided in part: "The Board, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, shall establish fair and equitable standards, rules and formulae of general applicability for the guidance of the War Shipping Administration in determining the just compensation to be paid for all vessels requisitioned, purchased, chartered or insured by the Administration. The Board may prescribe such rules, regulations and procedures as it deems necessary or advisable in carrying out its functions. "In determining the amount of just compensation which should be paid for each vessel, the War Shipping Administration will be guided by the general standards, rules and formulae established by the Board." This Board was composed of Learned Hand, John J. Parker, and Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. 325 Opinion of the Court. fore or after the declaration of the national emergency of May 27, 1941. Enhancement due to a general rise in prices or earnings, whenever occurring, should not be deducted. In the application of this rule neither the proclamation of limited emergency of September 8, 1939, nor the facts existing at. that time, are in themselves of significance. The Board does not determine whether any enhancement after May 27, 1941, other than as enumerated above as deductible, should be excluded; since the Board is advised that the value of oceangoing vessels was higher on May 27, 1941, than at the time of taking, and that any enhancement since May 27, 1941, in vessels of other types, not deductible under the foregoing, is attributable to a general rise in prices or earnings, and should therefore not be deducted." The Department of Justice agrees with both the Comptroller General and the Advisory Board that the enhancement which is excluded is not limited to that accruing in the period after the declaration of a national emergency on May 27, 1941 and contends for a construction which would eliminate any enhancement on values due to the war. It argues that the Act as so construed, though different from hitherto announced judicial rules of construction of "just compensation" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, is nevertheless constitutional. Respondent, relying largely on Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, argues that if that construction is adopted it makes the enhancement clause unconstitutional because it conflicts with the judicial construction of "just compensation" and is therefore beyond the competence of Congress to prescribe. First. We need not reach the question whether the measure of compensation which Congress wrote into the 63 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. 234. |