VINSON, C. J., dissenting. 337 U.S. started, which has always been considered the decisive factor, Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418 (1904), Empresa Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 337 U. S. 154 (1949), and assumes that a delay of fifteen months conclusively demonstrates that certainty of exportation had been undermined. It is almost always possible in cases of this kind that the owner of the goods may change his mind before exportation is actually carried out, as Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66, 70 (1923). Delay undoubtedly increases the possibility, but it does not work such a change as a matter of law. The question, instead, is that previously pointed out, namely, whether "the journey has already begun in good faith and [whether] temporary interruption of the passage is reasonable and in furtherance of the intended transportation." Hughes Brothers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, supra, at 476. The result is that the Court, without consideration of the fact that the gasoline had been started on its journey with the intent that it be transshipped for immediate export to Canada, holds that fifteen months' unavoidable delay is so productive of uncertainty that the process of exportation ceases as a matter of law. It might be pointed out that in the leading case of Coe v. Errol, supra, logs being floated down a river were held up by low water for about a year, but this Court did not consider that delay enough to break the continuity of the interstate journey. The line now seems to be drawn somewhere between twelve and fifteen months, whatever the other circumstances. Such an arbitrary demarcation is hardly consonant with "the liberal protection that hitherto [exports] have received." Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, supra, at p. 70. I would adhere to the test set out in our previous decisions: whether the delay was reasonable under all the circumstances and in furtherance of the intended transportation. Syllabus. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 279. Argued March 3-4, 1949.-Decided June 13, 1949. 1. Under contracts entered into by an oil company with independent dealers in petroleum products and automobile accessories, the dealer agreed to purchase exclusively from the company all of his requirements of one or more of the products marketed by the company. In 1947 the contracts affected a gross business of $58,000,000, comprising 6.7% of the total in a seven-state area in which the company sold its products. Held: The contracts were violative of § 3 of the Clayton Act and the company was properly enjoined from enforcing or entering into them. Pp. 294-314. 2. The requirement of § 3 of the Clayton Act of a showing that the effect of the contracts "may be to substantially lessen competition" is here satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected. Pp. 299-314. (a) In view of the widespread adoption of such contracts by the company's competitors and the availability of alternative ways of obtaining an assured market, evidence that competitive activity has not actually declined is inconclusive. P. 314. (b) The company's use of the contracts creates just such a potential clog on competition as it was the purpose of § 3 to remove wherever, were it to become actual, it would impede a substantial amount of competitive activity. P. 314. 3. The fact that nearly all the products sold by the company to California dealers are produced in that State does not exempt the company's requirements contracts with California dealers as not substantially affecting interstate commerce, since the effect of those contracts is to prevent the California dealers from dealing with out-of-State as well as local suppliers and thus to lessen competition in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, distinguished. Pp.. 314 315. 78 F. Supp. 850, affirmed. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. In a suit brought by the United States under the antitrust laws, the District Court enjoined an oil company and its wholly owned subsidiary from enforcing or entering into exclusive supply contracts with independent dealers in petroleum products and automobile accessories. 78 F. Supp. 850. The companies appealed directly to this Court. Affirmed, p. 315. John M. Hall argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Marshall P. Madison. Assistant Attorney General Bergson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Walker Smith, Robert G. Seaks and Stanley M. Silverberg. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal to review a decree enjoining the Standard Oil Company of California and its whollyowned subsidiary, Standard Stations, Inc.,' from enforcing or entering into exclusive supply contracts with any independent dealer in petroleum products and automobile accessories. 78 F. Supp. 850. The use of such contracts was successfully assailed by the United States as violative of § 1 of the Sherman Act 2 and § 3 of the Clayton Act.3 1 Standard Stations, Inc., has no independent status in these proceedings; since 1944 its activities have been confined to managing service stations owned by the Standard Oil Co. of California. 2 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: . . . . 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U. S. C. § 1. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the 293 Opinion of the Court. The Standard Oil Company of California, a Delaware corporation, owns petroleum-producing resources and refining plants in California and sells petroleum products in what has been termed in these proceedings the "Western area"-Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Washington. It sells through its own service stations, to the operators of independent service stations, and to industrial users. It is the largest seller of gasoline in the area. In 1946 its combined sales amounted to 23% of the total taxable gallonage sold there in that year: sales by company-owned service stations constituted 6.8% of the total, sales under exclusive dealing contracts with independent service stations, 6.7% of the total; the remainder were sales to industrial users. Retail service-station sales by Standard's six leading competitors absorbed 42.5% of the total taxable gallonage; the remaining retail sales were divided between more than seventy small companies. It is undisputed that Standard's major competitors employ similar exclusive dealing arrangements. In 1948 only 1.6% of retail outlets were what is known as "split-pump" stations, that is, sold the gasoline of more than one supplier. Exclusive supply contracts with Standard had been entered into, as of March 12, 1947, by the operators of 5,937 independent stations, or 16% of the retail gasoline outlets in the Western area, which purchased from Standard in 1947, $57,646,233 worth of gasoline and District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 14. 337 U.S. Opinion of the Court. $8,200,089.21 worth of other products. Some outlets are covered by more than one contract so that in all about 8,000 exclusive supply contracts are here in issue. These are of several types, but a feature common to each is the dealer's undertaking to purchase from Standard all his requirements of one or more products. Two types, covering 2,777 outlets, bind the dealer to purchase of Standard all his requirements of gasoline and other petroleum products as well as tires, tubes, and batteries. The remaining written agreements, 4,368 in number, bind the dealer to purchase of Standard all his requirements of petroleum products only. It was also found that independent dealers had entered 742 oral contracts by which they agreed to sell only Standard's gasoline. In some instances dealers who contracted to purchase from Standard all their requirements of tires, tubes, and batteries, had also orally agreed to purchase of Standard their requirements of other automobile accessories. Of the written agreements, 2,712 were for varying specified terms; the rest were effective from year to year but terminable "at the end of the first 6 months of any contract year, or at the end of any such year, by giving to the other at least 30 days prior thereto written notice ... Before 1934 Standard's sales of petroleum products through independent service stations were made pursuant to agency agreements, but in that year Standard adopted the first of its several requirements-purchase contract forms, and by 1938 requirements contracts had wholly superseded the agency method of distribution. Between 1936 and 1946 Standard's sales of gasoline through independent dealers remained at a practically constant proportion of the area's total sales; its sales of lubricating oil declined slightly during that period from 6.2% to 5% of the total. Its proportionate sales of tires and batteries for 1946 were slightly higher than they were in 1936, though somewhat lower than for some |