Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. above, that, concerning the merits of that question, the Fifth Amendment assured to WJR the right of oral argument before the Commission. Accordingly, it refused to consider whether the Commission was right in its legal conclusion that areas of signal intensity lower than 100 microvolts per meter were not within the "normally protected contour" of a Class I-A station, reversed the Commission's denial of WJR's petition, and remanded the case for oral argument before the Commission. 174 F. 2d 226. To consider the questions of importance to the administrative process thus determined, we issued our writ of certiorari. 336 U. S. 917. At the outset we note our complete agreement with the Court of Appeals that the Commission was under no duty to WJR to postpone final action on the Coastal Plains permit until it had disposed of the clear channel proceeding. As the court pointed out, WJR had no vested right in the "supposititious eventualities" that the Commission at some indeterminate time might modify its rules governing clear channel stations. Furthermore, the judicial regulation of an administrative docket sought by WJR "would require [the Court of Appeals] to direct the order in which the Commission shall consider its cases." And this, as the court said, it "cannot do." 174 F. 2d at 231. "Only Congress could confer such a priority." Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 145. Obviously the most important question is the Court of Appeals' ruling that Fifth Amendment due process re The case was first argued before three justices; Chief Justice Groner and Justices Clark and Prettyman. By direction of the court it was reargued before Justices Stephens, Edgerton, Clark, Wilbur K. Miller and Prettyman. The decision was rendered pursuant to an opinion of Justice Stephens, in which Justices Clark and Miller concurred. Justice Prettyman filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Edgerton joined. 265 Opinion of the Court. quired the Commission to afford respondent an opportunity for oral argument upon its petition for reconsideration of Coastal Plains' application, together with its grounding of that ruling in the even broader one that such an opportunity is an inherent element of procedural due process in all judicial or quasi-judicial, i. e., administrative, determinations of questions of law, outside of such questions as may arise upon interlocutory matters involving stays pendente lite, temporary injunctions and the like. That the scope of its decision might not be misunderstood, the court expressly stated: "A ruling upon a demurrer is obviously not interlocutory for if the demurrer is sustained the pleader's cause (or defense) is dismissed upon the merits. " Moreover, except as to the indicated interlocutory matters, the right of oral argument on questions of law ("as well as . . . those of fact" when raised) was said to be "not conditional upon the ex parte view of the tribunal as to whether there is a substantial question as to the sufficiency of the allegations of a complainant." 174 F. 2d at 240. Accordingly, although it was urged both by the Commission and by WJR to consider and determine the "threshold" question of law upon its merits, namely, whether the Commission's decision in denying WJR's petition was wrong, the court refused to consider or decide that question. In its view the question of the Commission's duty to accord a hearing, "i. e., to hear argument 'The statement, taken in its context and the pervading sense of the opinion, related not merely to judicial rulings technically "raised by demurrer" but also to judicial and administrative rulings "as if on demurrer," i. e., as expressly stated later in the opinion, to rulings "raised by demurrer or motion to dismiss or, in an administrative proceeding, by some less formally named instrument of like purpose, or by the tribunal's sua sponte treatment of a petition as if under demurrer. . . ." 174 F. 2d at 236. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. before deciding whether the allegations of WJR's petition were sufficient" in law, was "a procedural question quite separate from the question on the merits whether or not the allegations of the petition, assuming their truth, were sufficient." 174 F. 2d at 240. The statutory scheme of the Communications Act, the court thought, "contemplates, before review in this court, proper exercise of the Commission's primary jurisdiction, i. e., valid first instance hearings properly conducted from the procedural-due process-standpoint." Ibid. Accordingly, the majority felt that the court "must therefore remand the case with directions to the Commission to allow a hearing to WJR. Then if after hearing the Commission decides that the allegations were insufficient and dismisses the petition . . . an appeal to this court will bring properly before us the question of the correctness of the Commission's decision on the merits . . . ." Ibid. I. Taken at its literal and explicit import, the Court's broad constitutional ruling cannot be sustained. So taken, it would require oral argument upon every ques 8 Both from the wording of the immediate reference, quoted above, and from other language in context, it is clear that the court's reference to "the statutory scheme set up in the Communications Act" was not designed as a ruling that the statutory scheme itself, considered wholly as such and apart from any requirement of due process, affords the right of oral argument upon all questions of law, other than the interlocutory exceptions, before the Commission. Rather, the reference was intended to construe the Act as incorporating the court's reiterated conception of due-process requirements in this respect, in effect as a construction required by the Fifth Amendment. It is clear also that in this ruling the court identified "hearing" with "oral argument" insofar as determination of questions of law are concerned. We are thus confronted, so far as the court's decision went, with no question purely of statutory construction but solely, at bottom, with one of constitutional import and effect. 265 Opinion of the Court. tion of law, apart from the excluded interlocutory matters, arising in administrative proceedings of every sort. This would be regardless of whether the legal question were substantial or insubstantial; of the substantive nature of the asserted right or interest involved; of whether Congress had provided a procedure, relating to the particular interest, requiring oral argument or allowing it to be dispensed with; and regardless of the fact that full opportunity for judicial review may be available. We do not stop to consider the effects of such a ruling, if accepted, upon the work of the vast and varied administrative as well as judicial tribunals of the federal system and the equally numerous and diversified interests affected by their functioning; or indeed upon the many and different types of administrative and judicial procedures which Congress has provided for dealing adjudicatively with such interests. It is enough to say that due process of law, as conceived by the Fifth Amendment, has never been cast in so rigid and all-inclusive confinement. On the contrary, due process of law has never been a term of fixed and invariable content. This is as true with reference to oral argument as with respect to other elements of procedural due process. For this Court has held in some situations that such argument is essential to a fair hearing, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, in "The Fifth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights." Labor Board v. Mackay Co., 304 U. S. 333, 351. "The requirements imposed by that guaranty [Fifth Amendment due process] are not technical, nor is any particular form of procedure necessary." Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U. S. 697, 710. See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 519-521; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 152153; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496-497; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 342, 343; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 235; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. others that argument submitted in writing is sufficient. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 481. See also Johnson & Wimsatt v. Hazen, 69 App. D. C. 151; Mitchell v. Reichelderfer, 61 App. D. C. 50. The decisions cited are sufficient to show that the broad generalization made by the Court of Appeals is not the law. Rather it is in conflict with this Court's rulings, in effect, that the right of oral argument as a matter of procedural due process varies from case to case in accordance with differing circumstances, as do other procedural regulations. Certainly the Constitution does not require oral argument in all cases where only insubstantial or frivolous questions of law, or indeed even substantial ones, are raised. Equally certainly it has left wide discretion to Congress in creating the procedures to be followed in both administrative and judicial proceedings, as well as in their conjunction. Without in any sense discounting the value of oral argument wherever it may be appropriate or, by virtue of the particular circumstances, constitutionally required, we cannot accept the broad formula upon which the Court of Appeals rested its ruling. To do so would do violence not only to our own former decisions but also, we think, to the constitutional power of Congress to devise differing administrative and legal procedures appropriate for the disposition of issues affecting interests widely varying in kind.10 10 For example, what may be appropriate or constitutionally required by way of procedure, including opportunity for oral argument, in protection of an alien's claims of right to enter the country, cf. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U. S. 806, may be very different from what is required to determine an alleged citizen's right of entry or reentry, cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 282; Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F. 2d 239, 243-244; a claimed right of naturalization, Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 576-578; a claim of just compensation for land condemned, cf. Roberts v. New York City, 295 U. S. 264, 277-278; or the right to defend against an indictment for crime. |