Opinion of the Court-Appendix B. 337 U.S. "It cannot be disputed, nor does the respondent deny, that the granting of the wage increase at that time, constituted unilateral action. . . . "While it is evident that the Union was insistent in its demand for some form of union security during its negotiations with the respondent, the preponderance of the credible evidence does not support the respondent's position that the Ur.ion had, in effect, presented an ultimatum that no contract would be consummated which did not afford union security. As has already been indicated, union security was only one of several matters, aside from the wage question, upon which agreement had not yet been reached. If, as the respondent contends, it had left no doubt as to its position on the issue of union security in the conferences of October 17 and 18, and it was convinced that the Union was adamant on this issue, it seems unlikely that the parties would have conferred on November 7 and 8, and again on December 19, when the Union submitted a written wage proposal. "It is clear, therefore, and the undersigned finds, that, although the parties had reached a temporary impasse on December 19 on some issues, principally wages, union security, and check-off, there is no substantial basis for concluding that the Union had abandoned negotiations at this time. Moreover, even if the parties had reached an impasse in their negotiations, this obviously could not affect the Union's status as majority representative. The principle that 'a bargaining relationship once rightly established must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to succeed,' is well-established.20 Equally clear is the proposition that the granting of a unilateral wage increase "20 See Franks Bros. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 702, 705." 217 Opinion of the Court-Appendix B. or other concession by an employer to his employees while the designated union is attempting to bargain concerning the same subject matter, constitutes a violation of the employer's duty to bargain with the union." It is not a question, contrary to the respondent's argument, of giving the Union credit for a wage increase which it did not obtain, but rather of the conduct of the respondent in granting the increase in derogation of the Union's status as statutory representative, by depriving the Union of its right to bargain with respect to such increase. "Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record, the undersigned concludes and further finds that, by failing and refusing to furnish' the Union with essential and pertinent information relating to the respondent's wage structure under its 'point plan,' job specifications, work assignments, and information appertaining thereto, and by granting its employees a unilateral wage increase on January 1, 1946, the respondent has from August 31, 1945, to December 19, 1945, and thereafter to date, including January 1, 1946, failed and refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit above described, and has thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under the Act." (Emphasis in this paragraph is supplied.) 70 N. L. R. B. at pp. 220–221, 222, 223–224. "21 See Aluminum Ore Company v. N. L. R. B., 131 F. (2d) 485, 487, (C. C. A. 7), enf'g. 39 N. L. R. B. 1286, 1295-1299; May Department Stores v. N. L. R. B., 326 U. S. 376. See also, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, by Ruth Weyand, Columbia Law Review, Vol. XLV, 579-583, and footnotes at 581, for an excellent discussion and citation of authority on, The Power of a Statutory Representative to Bar Unilateral Changes by Employer." Opinion of the Court-Appendix B. 337 U.S. The Board left no doubt that it relied solely on the granting of the wage increase, when it issued its decision and order in this case. This appears from the following express statement in the Board's decision and order: "1. The Trial Examiner found that the respondent, in violation of Section 8 (1) and (5) of the Act, failed to bargain collectively with the Union as the statutory representative of the respondent's employees by refusing to furnish the Union with certain detailed information relating to the incentive wage plan and by granting a wage increase to its employees without consulting the Union. ·Although we agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion, we, however, rest our determination solely on the latter ground." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at p. 206. No. 50. Argued November 17, 1948.-Decided June 6, 1949. 1. Convicted in an Illinois circuit court and sentenced to prison, petitioner applied to the same court for habeas corpus, claiming denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. His petition was denied without a hearing on the ground that it was "insufficient in law and substance." On review here, the State Attorney General conceded that the petition raised substantial federal questions; argued that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy under state law when the petition was denied; but admitted that it probably is an appropriate remedy under "announcements" contained in subsequent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, though other Illinois trial courts have continued to deny habeas corpus on procedural grounds. Held: The order denying habeas corpus is vacated and the cause is remanded for consideration of the present applicability of that remedy in the light of the State Supreme Court's "announcement" in People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N. E. 2d 495, and other relevant Illinois decisions. Pp. 236-240. (a) More than a question of state procedure is involved when a state court of last resort closes the door to any consideration of a claim of denial of a federal right. P. 238. (b) The doctrine that federal courts will not grant habeas corpus to prisoners under judgments of state courts until all state remedies have been exhausted, Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 28 U. S. C. §2254, presupposes the existence of some adequate remedy under state law. Pp. 238-239. *Together with No. 47, Misc., Evans v. Nierstheimer, Warden, on petition for certiorari to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois; No. 106, Misc., Willis v. Ragen, Warden, No. 109, Misc., Thompson v. Ragen, Warden, No. 184, Misc., Lewis v. Ragen, Warden, and No. 372, Misc., Sherman v. Ragen, Warden, et al., all on petition for certiorari to the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois; No. 760, Smith v. Ragen, Warden, on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois; and No. 374, Misc., Banks v. Ragen, Warden, on petition for certiorari to the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. 2. The orders in seven other cases in which Illinois courts had denied habeas corpus without hearings are likewise vacated and remanded for similar consideration. P. 240. Orders vacated and causes remanded. In No. 50, an Illinois trial court.denied without a hearing a petition for habeas corpus raising substantial questions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court granted certiorari. 334 U. S. 810. It also granted certiorari in No. 760 (336 U. S. 966), and now grants certiorari in the six other cases. Orders vacated and causes remanded, p. 240. Edward H. Levi argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 50. William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent in No. 50. With him on the brief were George F. Barrett, then Attorney General, Raymond S. Sarnow and James C. Murray, Assistant Attorneys General. Petitioners pro se in Misc. Nos. 47, 106, 109, 184, 372 and 374. Herbert A. Friedlich, by appointment of the Court, for petitioner in No. 760. Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General of Illinois, and William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General, were on the briefs for respondent in Misc. Nos. 106, 109 and 184, and No. 760. With them on the brief in No. 760 were James C. Murray and Raymond S. Sarnow. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. We are once again faced with the recurring problem of determining what, if any, is the appropriate post-trial procedure in Illinois by which claims of infringement of federal rights may be raised. See Woods v. Nierstheimer, |