Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. occasion to make clear its contrary view, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra; United States v. B. & O. R. Co., supra at 458-459. In the Napier case the question for decision was the validity of Wisconsin and Georgia regulations requiring locomotives to be equipped with, respectively, cab curtains and an automatic fire door. Each state regulation was challenged as an invasion of power over interstate commerce which Congress, through enactment and amendment of the Boiler Inspection Act, had seen fit to exercise. Each regulation was defended as being directed to protection of the health, rather than the safety, of railroad employees. The unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, struck down both regulations "because the Boiler Inspection Act, as we construe it, was intended to occupy the field. The broad scope of the authority conferred upon the Commission leads to that conclusion. Because the standard set by the Commission must prevail, requirements by the States are precluded, however commendable or however different their purpose." 272 U. S. at 613. This last-quoted sentence merely recognized that theretofore the Interstate Commerce Commission had not regulated with an eye to employee health; it did not and does not support the view that employee health was thought not to be within the compass of the Act, as other language in Napier, 272 U. S. at 611-613, makes amply clear: "The requirements here in question are, in their nature, within the scope of the authority delegated to the Commission. An automatic firedoor and an effective cab curtain may promote safety. Keeping firemen and engineers in good health, like preventing excessive fatigue through limiting the hours of service, clearly does so, although indirectly ... 163 Opinion of the Court "If the protection now afforded by the Commission's rules is deemed inadequate, application for relief must be made to it. The Commission's power is ample." Thus the Boiler Inspection Act vests in the Interstate Commerce Commission rule-making power adequate to protect employees against disease as well as against accident; and the power to make rules for employee health has been exercised.32 In view of these considerations, it cannot be said that the Commission's rule-making power is confined to safe 32 E. g., the requirement for closing "unnecessary or excessive openings in locomotive cabs," imposed by I. C. C. Rule 116 (g), 49 C. F. R. § 91.116 (g), after the Napier decision, was, as the opinion announcing the rule makes plain, designed to protect the health of firemen and engineers from wind, snow and rain. Wisconsin R. R. Comm'n v. A. & R. R. Co., 142 I. C. C. 199. The rule, not squarely applicable to the present case since limited to the winter months, was formulated after extended hearings in a proceeding in which the Missouri Pacific, like almost every other major American railroad, was a named party defendant. Wisconsin R. R. Comm'n v. A. & R. R. Co., supra, Transcript of Record, Complaint of Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, p. 17. In the light of the instant case, it is of interest to note that the Engineers' Brotherhood and the Firemen's Brotherhood, interveners in support of the proposed rule, alleged need for protection from, inter alia, "excessive . . sand and dust storms." Transcript of Record, supra, Joint Petition of Intervention of Alvanley Johnston and D. B. Robertson, p. 3; Amended Joint Petition of Intervention of Alvanley Johnston and D. B. Robertson, p. 3. No substantial evidence seems to have been adduced to support the allegation, Transcript of Record, supra, Brief for Intervening Brothérhoods, pp. 14-15, although there was evidence of severe winter wind in Missouri, Transcript of Record, supra, at 2056, and in other parts of the country, id. at 2136, 2369, 4541, 5005, 6088, 6350. The Interstate Commerce Commission noted in its opinion that "The amendments to rule 116 should be regarded as minimum requirements which are not intended to take care of the most extreme conditions." 142 I. C. C. 199, 210 Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. guarding against accidental injury; nor are we free to lay down a rule of law which would so restrict the Commission's authority. Since we are unable to find in the Boiler Inspection Act's terms, purposes or legislative history either explicit provision or any sufficient basis for inferring one cutting down the scope of recovery allowed under § 1 of the Employers' Liability Act, we conclude that the injury for which recovery may be had for violation of the Boiler Inspection Act is no narrower in scope than the injury for which recovery is authorized under § 1 of the Employers' Liability Act. We hold that petitioner's injury is one compensable under the Boiler Inspection Act. We hold further, in the light of the trial instructions and such evidence as appears in the record before us," that the jury was justified in finding (1) that respondent breached the Boiler 33 The only evidence before us is the partial summary of petitioner's case by the Missouri Supreme Court on the second appeal: "Bruce Brill, a witness for plaintiff, testified he had worked at the Missouri Pacific roundhouse at Joplin for about 18 years and until November 4, 1942; that the 'engines that came in . . . I would say most of them, at least three out of five, would have the sanders reported in bad order. . . maybe it was a broken nipple, something in the dome, or a loose connection.' A broken nipple would cause the sand to dribble on to the rails under the drivers, and the 'speed would suck it up into the cab after it was ground under the wheels.' The dust would be sucked in 'through the deck and around the boiler head or openings in the grate shakers.' When the witness cleaned out the cabs he found sand particles and roadbed dust. . . . Plaintiff testified the (sand) dust would 'come up through the openings in the cab floors, around the grate shaker riggings and the stoker head in the deck of the, engine on each side of the fire door against the boiler head. . . . Sometimes there would be wide cracks between the boiler head and the deck floor where the bolts were broken off and it was worn and loose. The deck boards would be cracked and sometimes slivered out, and it would come through any openings like that; . . . would collect on the lights; . . . would get our clothing very dusty; . . . make your mouth and nose very dry.'" 357 Mo. at 744-745. 163 Opinion of the Court. 34 Inspection Act (as more specifically articulated in I. C. C. Rule 120, governing sanders) and (2) that such breach was a proximate cause of petitioner's injury. 34 I. C. C. Rule 120, 49 C. F. R. § 91.120, applicable to steam locomotives, provides: "Locomotives shall be equipped with proper sanding apparatus, which shall be maintained in safe and suitable condition for service, and tested before each trip. Sand pipes must be securely fastened in line with the rails." It is of no consequence that Rule 120 may not have been specifically called to the jury's attention. Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U. S. 481, 488-489. It is urged upon us that Rule 120 was designed to insure an adequate auxiliary braking system rather than to protect employees against silicosis, and hence that, notwithstanding respondent's breach of the rule and the governing statute, petitioner cannot complain of an injury flowing from the breach which was not the injury the Interstate Commerce Commission sought to guard against. We do not dispute the narrow scope of Rule 120; nor do we doubt that conventional tort doctrine imposes absolute liability for violation of a statutory duty only where the injury is one the statute was designed to prevent. See, e. g., DiCaprio v. New York Central R. Co., 231 N. Y. 94; but cf. the remarks of Mr. Justice Brewer in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Reesman, 60 F. 370, 373. But we think the liability imposed by the Boiler Inspection Act is of broader character and that the correct rule is the one laid down in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 621, which this Court has had repeated occasion to apply in connection with the Safety Appliance Acts: "The language of the acts and the authorities we have cited make it entirely clear that the liability in damages to employees for failure to comply with the law springs from its being made unlawful to use cars not equipped as required, not from the position the employee may be in or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured. This effect can be given to the acts and their wise and humane purpose can be accomplished only by holding, as we do, that carriers are liable to employees in damages whenever the failure to obey these safety appliance laws is the proximate cause of injury to them when engaged in the discharge of duty." See Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239, 243; Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520, 522-523; Brady v. Terminal R. Assn., 303 U. S. 10, 16; Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 294 U. S. 529, 531; Fairport, P. & E. R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589. Cf. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U. S. 243. FRANKFURTER, J., concurring in part. 337 U.S. We conclude that petitioner stated a valid claim for negligent injury under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on his first appeal and that petitioner stated on both appeals and proved on his second a valid claim for injury flowing from violation of the Boiler Inspection Act. The record before us reveals no error in the jury's verdict for petitioner, which was based on the second theory of the case; the damages awarded are consistent with either theory. We have considered and disposed of the various grounds of affirmance urged by respondent; grounds not urged, whether on the record before us or on such supplemental portions of the state court record as respondent might have asked us to review, are waived. Accordingly the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment on the verdict for petitioner. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, Concurring in part. At the risk of wearisome reiteration it is relevant to say again that the common-law concept of negligence is an antiquated and uncivilized basis for working out rights and duties for disabilities and deaths inevitably due to the conduct of modern industry. In the conscious or unconscious endeavor not to have the human cost of industry fall with cruel injustice upon workers and their families, the law of negligence gives rise to endless casuistry. So long as the gamble of an occasional heavy verdict is not replaced by the security of a modern system of insurance, courts must continue to apply the notion of negligence in situations for which it was never intended. Therefore, if a claim is made that an injury is causally related to a carrier's failure to maintain standards of care appropriate for employment on a railroad, the Federal Employers' Liability Act entitles an employee to establish that claim to a jury's satisfaction. Damages are re |