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Opinion of the Court.

337 U.S.

with immunity, gave the information that is detailed above at pp. 141 to 143, inclusive. Without restating the entire substance of the testimony, we think the statements concerning the necessity of Daisart to acquire fabrics for manufacturing, together with information as to the names of the suppliers, the name of Daisart's bank and as to the manner of Daisart's receipts, disbursements and sales prices, were sufficient to give petitioner the immunity claimed.

Third. Finally the Government presses upon us the argument that, as to the indictment, the testimony petitioner gave at the examination under the Price Control Act was wholly self-exonerating and therefore did not secure immunity from prosecution by the indictment. The contention is that since the immunity granted by § 202 (g) of the Emergency Price Control Act was an exchange for the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and since this evidence is not incriminating, it therefore cannot be used to secure immunity from prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Price Control Act. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2282.

The indictment was for conspiracy to sell finished piece goods in excess of prices fixed under the Price Control Act. The position of the Government is that the only testimony relating to the charge of the indictment is that petitioner testified that he sold the goods at prices within the allowable limits." But the indictment also

14 The testimony referred to is as follows:

"Question: Can you tell me how Daisart Sportswear Inc., arrived at its selling price with respect to the items that it sold?

"Answer: Since it was surplus, it was sold at the price billed to me plus freight and haulage and less discount allowed to me.

"Question: In other words, Daisart Sportswear Inc., sold at cost plus freight less any discounts, cash or otherwise, received by Daisart Sportswear Inc.?

"Answer: Correct.".

137

Opinion of the Court.

charged as a part of the conspiracy a plan through false invoices to secure payments for the goods by checks to fictitious persons which the conspirators cashed.

A glance at the details of the testimony set out at pp. 142 through 145, supra, will demonstrate that petitioner's testimony at the examination went beyond the exculpatory language concerning the sale price. Petitioner testified as to the business organization of Daisart, its acquisition of materials through the priorities furnished by Metals Disintegrating from named firms on their invoices and its payment for these goods at all times by check. Daisart's bank was named. Since the argument on this point relates only to exculpatory statements and not to waivers, it is also to be noted that all testimony contained in the answer printed on p. 144, above, is to be taken into consideration. Certainly many of these disclosures furnished leads that could have uncovered evidence of the unlawful conspiracy charged in the indictment. Petitioner testified concerning transactions, matters and things substantially connected with parts of the conspiracy for which he was indicted-for example, the testimony that he bought material under invoice from a named supplier and paid for it by check on a named bank. This evidence, being substantially connected with the conspiracy, was ample to give immunity from the conspiracy prosecution. The Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893, gives immunity from prosecution on account "of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which" the witness is compelled to testify in return for such evidence. Consequently, we need not decide whether, if only exculpatory evidence was given concerning matters pertinent to the criminal charge, the statute would grant immunity.

Reversed.

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EMPRESA SIDERURGICA, S. A., ET AL. v. COUNTY OF MERCED ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 327. Argued February 9, 1949. Decided May 31, 1949.

A cement plant in California was sold to a foreign purchaser for export. An export license was obtained and a letter of credit in favor of the seller deposited here. Title passed and possession was taken for the purchaser. A common carrier was employed to dismantle the plant and prepare it for shipment. As the dismantling proceeded, shipments were labeled with the purchaser's name as consignee and delivered to a rail carrier. When 12% had been shipped, 10% had been prepared for shipment, 34% had been dismantled but not prepared for shipment and 44% had not been dismantled, a municipality, acting under a California statute, levied a personal property tax on the portion which had not actually been shipped. Held: This was not a tax on an export contrary to Art. I, § 10, Cl. 2 of the Constitution. Pp. 155-157.

(a) The process of exportation begins upon entrance of the articles into the export stream. P. 157.

(b) It is not enough that on the tax date there was a purpose and plan to export the property; nor that in due course the plan was fully executed. P. 157.

(c) The fact that the dismantler was a licensed carrier for interstate and foreign commerce and that its employment included the loading of the property on railroad cars for shipment to the seaboard does not here require a different result. P. 157. 32 Cal. 2d 68, 194 P. 2d 527, affirmed.

In a suit for refund of a municipal personal property tax paid under protest, a state court granted judgment for the plaintiff. The State Supreme Court reversed. 32 Cal. 2d 68, 194 P. 2d 527. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 157.

Scott D. Kellogg argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.

154

Opinion of the Court.

James E. Sabine, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Gregory P. Maushart.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

There was a cement plant in Merced County, California, which was sold to petitioner-a corporation of Colombia for export to South America. An export license was obtained and a letter of credit in favor of the seller deposited here. Title passed and possession was taken for the purchaser. A company, which was a common carrier, was employed to do the dismantling and packaging for shipment. As the dismantling proceeded, shipments were labeled with appellant's name as consignee and delivered to a rail carrier.

Respondent, acting under a California statute,' levied a personal property tax on the property for the tax year 1945-1946. The tax date was March 5, 1945. On that date 12 per cent of the plant had been shipped out of the county. That portion was relieved of the tax. The balance was taxed. That included the 10 per cent which had been dismantled and crated or prepared for shipment, 34 per cent which had been dismantled but not crated or prepared for shipment, and 44 per cent which had not been dismantled. But before the end of January, 1946, all the property had been shipped by rail to a port and was en route to South America by ocean carrier.

Article I, § 10, Cl. 2 of the Constitution provides in part that, "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws . . . Appellant claimed

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1 Rev. and Tax. Code (Deering, 1939), Div. I, §§ 103, 106, 201, 202 (e), 405.

Opinion of the Court.

337 U.S.

that this tax was laid on an export and was therefore unconstitutional. It paid the tax under protest and brought this suit to recover it. The trial court, holding that the entire plant was an export on the tax assessment day, granted judgment for appellant. The Supreme Court of California reversed. 32 Cal. 2d 68, 194 P. 2d 527. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). ".. goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey." Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 527. That test was fashioned to determine the validity under the Commerce Clause of a nondiscriminatory state tax. But as we noted in Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69, 79, it is equally applicable to cases arising either under Art. I, § 10, Cl. 2 (the Import-Export Clause) or under Art. I, § 9, Cl. 5, which prohibits Congress from laying any tax on "Articles exported from any State." 2

Under that test it is not enough that there is an intent to export, or a plan which contemplates exportation, or an integrated series of events which will end with it. See Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418. The tax immunity runs to the process of 'exportation and the transactions and documents embraced in it. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283; United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1; Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19. Delivery of packages to an exporting carrier for shipment abroad (Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66) and the delivery of oil into the hold of the ship furnished by the foreign purchaser to carry the oil abroad (Richfield Oil Corp. v.

2 The meaning of "export" is the same under the two Clauses. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69, 83 and cases cited.

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