CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS We believe that the following factors contributed to the delays, cost increases, and other problems associated with the development of the Janus complex. 1. Because Argonne's Reactor Engineering Division, which usually designed reactors, was fully committed to higher priority projects, ROD was assigned responsibility for the Janus reactor. ROD made only limited use of the many scientific and technical disciplines in the various engineering, physics, and other divisions in designing and constructing the reactor. 2. The project was consistently assigned a low priority by the various organizations responsible for granting safety approvals. 3. After it was determined that the complex could not be fully utilized for biological research, AEC and Argonne conducted five separate studies over a 3-year period to determine whether and how to modify the complex. DBM approved the programmatic justification for Janus and the use of biomedical research funds for its development. During our review, we found no evidence that DBM took an active role in attempting to expedite completion of the Janus reactor during the period it was under construction, even though DBM had the primary responsibility for directing the overall biomedical research program. In view of its responsibilities, DBM was the AEC Headquarters division with the most direct interest in seeing that the objectives of the project were met, and we believe that DBM should have given greater management attention to the project during the period the reactor was being developed. We were advised that, at the time of the development of the Janus complex, Argonne did not have a formal quality assurance program to assist in ensuring that research and development projects involving the development of complex facilities were properly designed and developed. Argonne adised us, however, that in May 1969 a formal quality assurance program was established and that quality assurance procedures were being ployed in connection with the modification of the Janus complex. Although we have not evaluated Argonne's quality assurance program, we believe that such a program, if properly conceived and implemented, should assist in preventing the recurrence of problems similar to those encountered in developing the Janus complex. To provide additional assurance in this regard, however, we proposed that, prior to initiating developmental projects involving the construction of costly new facilities with operating funds, Argonne develop and provide AEC with (1) a proposed schedule for completing the major steps involved in project development, such as detailed design, construction, and preparation of safety reports, (2) a description of the organization to be used in managing the project, including the scientific and technical disciplines to be involved, and (3) the effects anticipated, from other work, on the laboratory's ability to keep the project on schedule. We proposed also that Argonne revise its internal accounting practices to better identify the total costs of future projects of this type. AEC informed us that Argonne had agreed to accept our proposals. Under current procedures, the Division of Reactor Development and Technology establishes project coordinators for its reactor projects who are responsible for supervising their development. In the past, such project coordinators have also been appointed by RDT for reactor projects developed for other AEC divisions under agreements reached with such divisions. We proposed that, to provide greater control over the development of all such projects by AEC officials with appropriate expertise, such a procedure as that followed by RDT be established by AEC as a formal requirement where reactors are constructed for use in programs of AEC's research divisions. In response to our proposal, AEC informed us that procedures would be established providing that each new reactor project of AEC divisions reporting to the Assistant General Manager for Research and Development would be assigned to RDT for project execution. CHAPTER 6 SCOPE OF REVIEW We conducted our review at AEC Headquarters in Germantown, Maryland, and at the Chicago Operations Office and the Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. Primarily, we examined into the manner in which the development, design, and construction of the Janus radiation complex were managed by AEC and by Argonne. We did not evaluate the need for or the quality of the biomedical research conducted under the program. As a part of our examination, we reviewed pertinent legislative history and inquired into AEC's and Argonne's policies and procedures for developing research facilities. We also obtained the views of various laboratory and AEC officials knowledgeable of and responsible for the design and development of the radiation complex. We reviewed the history and the purposes of the project to learn whether the original project objectives had been achieved, or were to be achieved upon modification of the research complex, which is expected to be completed in fiscal year 1970. We also reviewed the initial cost estimates and the actual project costs and examined into the reasons for the cost increases and delays incurred during the development of the research complex. APPENDIX 7 CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE FEDERAL RADIATION DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Chairman, Subcommitte on Air and Water Pollution, Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR MUSKIE: This is in reply to your letter of December 1 pertaining to the testimony of Drs. Gofman and Tamplin for the hearings of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution on November 18. Gofman and Tamplin, in reaching their conclusion that the Federal Radiation Council guidelines should be “reduced now to 0.017 rads or even less," used an approach similar in principle to that used by expert advisory groups (e.g. ICRP, NCRP, FRC) in developing radiation protection standards and guidelines. This approach is based on the assumption of a direct linear and non-threshold relationship between dose and biological effect. In contrast to Drs. Gofman and Tamplin, however, these expert groups generally agree that this approach probably overestimates the risks, but is the prudent one to use in the formulation of radiation protection guides. While we concur with this basic approach, we do not agree with all the premises, conditions and extrapolations used by Gofman and Tamplin in their testimony. In general, we believe that their calculations result in overestimates rather than, as they indicate, "minimum values" of cancer risk. Nevertheless, we believe that there is a need to establish more definitive estimates of the radiation risks that are associated with assumed, or observed, exposure conditions: otherwise, there is inadequate basis to evaluate benefit versus risk. We also agree with the concept that the radiation standards should be developed on the assumption that any increase in radiation exposure will be accompanied by commensurate increase in the risk of cancer. Drs. Gofman and Tamplin have raised the question of whether the present FRC guidelines are still acceptable. In the past ten years, since the formulation of the FRC basic guides, sufficient additional information has developed from epidemiologic studies and animal experiments so that a reevaluation of such guidelines is believed to be warranted. In view of our concern with the potential hazard of ionizing radiation in the environment, and as Chairman of the FRC, I am recommending that the Council institute a careful review and evaluation of the relevant scientific information that has become available in the past decade. I am recommending that this reevaluation provide, as definitely as possible, estimates of the risks associated with low levels of environmental radiation as a basis for review of the adequacy of current FRC guidelines as applicable to projected radiation levels. Based on projected exposure levels, the need for possible dose apportionment among the more important classes of radiation sources, such as nuclear power reactors, other peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and radiation from consumer products would also be considered. I hope that these comments are useful to your subcommittee. Please call on us if we can be of any assistance. Sincerely, ROBERT H. FINCH, Secretary. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, HON. ROBERT H. FINCH, Chairman, Federal Radiation Council, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On January 28, 1970, you had occasion to write to Senator Muskie, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Public Works Committee, relative to testimony of Dr. Gofman and Dr. Tamplin before that Subcommittee. Also on January 28, 1970, Dr. John Gofman appeared |