5. Foreign Judgments. With respect to foreign judgments, we have already seen that the States, by a compact in the federal constitution, have ceased to be foreign to each other. The general rule is, that foreign judgments, except in courts of admiralty, are not elsewhere held conclusive even upon the merits; (a) but the original cause of action may again be investigated. As between the States, however, the rule is changed, and a judgment rendered in one State, when duly authenticated according to the act of Congress, must be held conclusive upon the merits in every other State. It does not, however, have the full efficacy of a domestic judgment; for execution cannot issue upon it until it has been converted into a domestic judgment by an action of debt. And the statute of limitations will operate upon this action as upon any other. (b)

LECTURE XLIII.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.

§ 259. Present Condition of our Jurisprudence. We have now reached the end of this course of lectures; but before we part, let us indulge in a few reflections, which arise naturally from a retrospect of our past labors. And in the first place, you can now form some faint conception of the vast compass of the law; for without any very important omissions that I am aware of, I have called your attention to all the prominent subjects about which the law is conversant; and pointed out their general bearings, relations, and dependencies. In no instance, however, have I attempted to descend to particulars; but while I have necessarily confined my sketches to the most general outline, I have at the same time referred you to the sources of more detailed information. These sources you will hereafter consult; and you will find volumes written upon topics for which my plan would scarcely allow pages. As yet, therefore, you have only caught transient glimmerings of the light which is to beam upon you hereafter. You have been preparing for the study of the law, but you have not yet fairly commenced it. You will devote months and perhaps years to subjects for which I could not spare hours; and if I have left no other durable impression upon your minds, I shall assuredly leave this, that a general course of lectures, like those to which you have been now listening, will not make you lawyers. In fact, these lectures have had no such pretension. If they serve you for a guide-book,

(a) Where the record of a foreign judgment shows no service of process on him, nor any notice of the suit other than a personal one given in another country than that where the judgment was rendered, it is not even primâ facie evidence, but is simply null. Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 813.

(b) This subject has been fully discussed in the case of McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Peters, 312.

they will have fulfilled their design. I stated in the outset, that I should only undertake to introduce you to the study of the law; and while I trust I have done thus much, I am sure that I have done no more. The acquaintance which is to result from this introduction, you must make for yourselves; and it will be the work of no short time. If any of you have selected this profession, under the expectation that the learning required for it is of easy acquisition, it is well to have the error corrected now, while you are yet upon the threshold; for be assured that nothing but days and nights of patient toil, unremittingly persevered in for years, can make any man, whatever may be his natural capacity, a consummate lawyer; and they who cannot or will not undergo such toil, will do wisely to betake themselves forthwith to some other vocation. To skim over the surface as we have now done, is comparatively nothing; you are to penetrate far into the depths; and even then still lower deeps will remain to be explored. But in our rapid sketch of the structure of the federal and State governments, we have found the two so nicely adjusted to each other, as to form beautifully harmonious parts of one stupendous whole. I cannot use language too strong on this subject. When you come to examine with more leisure and attention, as you assuredly will, the department of constitutional law, I am persuaded you will do so with a growing sentiment of inexpressible admiration at the almost unerring wisdom and sagacity which framed a system at once so complicated and so complete, without the aid of pre-existing models. From the commencement of civilization, the grand problem in politics has been, to attain the exact medium between anarchy on the one hand and despotism on the other; and a convincing proof of the matchless excellence achieved by our American sages at a single effort, may be found in the fact that, after half a century of trial, it is even now a debated question, whether the tendency of our system be more toward the one or the other of these two extremes of political evil. Of course the fair conclusion is, that we enjoy that golden mean so long looked for, but never before discovered. In fact, the wondrous fable of Minerva's birth here finds almost an actual parallel. There is no doubt that the most sanguine anticipations of those who framed this system have been more than realized. They expected that time and trial would disclose deficiencies, and demand amendments; and they wisely made provision therefor. It is one of the transcendent beauties of the work they have left us that it admits of reform, without revolution. We can amend it at any time, without first demolishing it. As the light of experience accumulates, we can take the full advantage of it, without even a temporary inconvenience. The stately machine continues to move on, though its parts be undergoing repairs; and this crowning excellence of our organic law belongs equally to the subordinate departments; for while our people can peacefully convene and amend their constitutions, our annual legislatures stand ever ready

to supply defects in the rest of the system. Time has but to make known an error or deficiency in either, and abundant provision is made to correct or supply it. Let us then glance for a moment, by way of recapitulation, at some of the more prominent changes suggested by our past observations.

$260. Proposed Constitutional Amendments. Of these I shall indicate but three, (a) about which I presume there cannot be much difference of opinion.

1. The exact relations between the federal and State governments ought to be definitely ascertained. The nature of our Union ought not to be matter of controversy. The deeply agitating questions of State rights, secession, nullification, and the like, ought to be put forever at rest. If the States be in fact bound together effectually, as with an adamantine chain, we ought to know it, that we may enjoy the confidence thereby inspired; if with a mere rope of sand, still we ought to know it, that we may be prepared for the worst. One way or the other, these high questions should be settled, by the most solemn and explicit declarations of the people, in the form of a constitutional amendment. I may indeed be told, as I in fact believe, that no reasonable doubt ought to exist upon these points, as the constitution now stands; but the truth is, that a wide and radical difference of opinion does exist; and whether reasonably or not, is of no consequence to the proposition; for such topics are too momentous even for plausible cavil. (b)

2. The extent of incidental powers ought to be more exactly ascertained by the constitution itself. Many indeed may think with me, that there is room for doubt at present; but as a matter of fact, we know that there is doubt. These powers have been a fruitful theme of contention ever since the first organization of the government; and there is no prospect that the controversy will cease until the people shall speak their will definitively, through the constitution itself. I would particularly mention three of the incidental powers, which pre-eminently deserve attention, on account of their vast importance; namely, the power of acquiring new territory, of making internal improvements, and of protecting domestic industry. Powers of such magnitude as these ought not to be left to inference. They should be declared to exist, or not to exist, to be granted or withheld, in a manner which cannot be misunderstood. Certainly, either way would be better than the present uncertainty.

3. The vast patronage of government ought to be placed under

(a) At the last election of president, attention was forcibly called to the dangers, in case of contested elections, growing out of our present mode of electing a president. Various modes have been suggested to remedy it, and the matter is now under consideration by a committee of the senate. It is to be hoped that some feasible change may be suggested by them and adopted, as it is an evil which certainly calls loudly for a remedy.

(b) The late war has settled this question, though at the expense of vast amounts of treasure, money, and blood.

the most jealous control. On this point it would seem as if there could not be two opinions. Surely corruption will find its way into our politics rapidly enough, without the resistless allurements of bribery, under the name of patronage. On this subject the lessons of history are not to be mistaken. It may indeed be said, that Congress already has the power so to regulate appointments and salaries, as to prevent all danger from this quarter. No doubt much might be done under the existing provisions of the constitution, by a different course of legislation. But unquestionably the most effectual corrective of the present evil would be so to amend the constitution as to make the president eligible for one term only. Under any possible arrangement, a tremendous patronage must be at his disposal; and by this amendment, all temptation to employ this patronage during the first term, in securing suffrages for the second, would be taken away. Having once reached the highest eminence to which political ambition can aspire, and having nothing more to gain, but every thing to lose, by disgrace or dishonor, we may reasonably presume that his sole study, even on selfish principles, would be to fill and leave with honor a place he could not fill again. But time will not permit me to dwell on these topics; and I pass to the other departments of law. (a)

§ 261. Proposed Extension of the Civil Code. The important subject of legal reform has been frequently alluded to, both in general and in detail. I now propose merely to recapitulate and bring together some of the more important suggestions heretofore made. And, at the outset, there is one primary measure of reform which is capable of being so conducted as to include all others. I refer to the project of enlarging our civil code, which has already been discussed under the head of codification: and lest I may be misapprehended in the views before expressed, let me here say, that I do not suppose a perfect code can at once, if ever, be produced; but I cannot be mistaken in believing that a gradual approximation to a complete code may be effected; and that every effort towards such a result must produce great good. Our criminal law has been codified, though with not much systematic skill: but the other divisions of law, except here and there an isolated provision, have never received a legislative sanction. And let us suppose that a philosophic stranger from a distant land, having read and admired the theory of our social system, should visit us for the purpose of becoming a citizen, if he should find our theory realized in practice. He would naturally apply to some eminent jurist for a reference to the books in which he might find the law regulating his personal and proprietary rights. And what would this jurist be obliged to tell him? Instead of pointing to an American code, the result of American legislation, and in harmony with the rest of

(a) It is the aim of the civil service bill, which has lately been discussed in Congress, to effect this object.

the system, he must refer the stranger to an immense law library, composed, more than two-thirds, of English books, which it would require years to read; and must tell him to search through that • library for the knowledge he wanted. But how could he satisfactorily account to such a stranger for the fact, that with the most ample provision for all needful legislation, our statute-book as yet contained only a few disconnected provisions, scattered here and there over the wide surface of the law, to fill up chasms, but furnishing no complete view of our law on any single subject? This illustration of the importance of enlarging our civil code has always struck my mind with great force. The limits of written law ought certainly to be much extended, even though unwritten law should not be wholly superseded. The great point is to introduce positive enactments in place of judicial decisions. At present judicial discretion is of two kinds: the one consists in applying fixed principles to new cases; the other in overruling former principles, and substituting new ones. Now this latter kind of discretion always produces evil; this is what a code would supersede, so far as it should extend. Judges who do not scruple to overrule precedents, would not think of questioning positive enactments. As to the other kind of discretion which applies settled principles to new cases, it must always exist, whether we have a code or not; but it would be diminished in exact proportion to the completeness of the code. At all events, it could not be increased; for the common law might still prevail, where the code should be silent. But I cannot pursue the argument, though I feel deeply impressed with the importance of the subject. Unless I greatly mistake the tendency of the times, this great enterprise is destined to occupy a wide space in the minds of the generation in which you are to be the actors; (a) and as the extension of our civil code will furnish the most favorable opportunity for reforming the existing law, I will now recapitulate some of the changes which our past inquiries have suggested as expedient.

§ 262. Proposed Changes in the Law of Persons. In the law of persons we have found some evils which undoubtedly admit of remedy, and some which may justly excite apprehension, without much hope of remedy.

1. As to Slaves. The wide prevalence of slavery is a subject upon which conjecture is utterly at fault. Like the national debt of Great Britain, its extinction baffles all calculation. One thing is certain, that the federal government cannot interfere with it, in the States where it exists, without violating a compact of peculiar sacredness, without which the Union could not have been formed, and cannot now be preserved; but all else is doubtful. Whichever way we turn, shadows, clouds, and darkness rest upon the prospect. Can the Union survive the strife which threatens to be

(a) We have seen how much of this anticipation has already become reality; and the work still advances.