revolution, were only parts of the British nation. And, in like manner, the States of this union are not nations, because they have parted with many of the attributes of independent self-government, but only parts of that one and entire nation, known and recognized by other nations as the United States, and comprehending the people of all the States and territories bound together under one supreme federal government. Accordingly, we are relieved from the necessity of inquiring into the various and complex forms under which nations may exist, internally considered; since their external relations are not thereby affected. In fact, the simplest method of arriving at the general nature of these relations, is to consider each nation as a kind of complex human being, and then to compare nations to individuals existing in a state of nature. In this way, we readily arrive at those fundamental principles upon which the system of international law is constructed.

The first of these principles is a perfect equality of rights. We have seen that individuals, before entering into the social compact, are absolutely equal in their rights, however unequal in other respects. In like manner, and for the same reason, nations, however unequal in numbers or resources, and however diverse in their forms of government, are altogether equal in their rights. This equality among nations might be deduced from the consideration, that no one nation can have derived originally from nature any rights which all other nations have not also derived from the same common source. But it results directly from the idea of sovereignty, the very essence of which is, that it acknowledges no earthly superior. Rights and obligations are reciprocal between nations as between individuals. What one nation has a right to demand, all other nations are bound to concede. If, therefore, one nation could claim rights which another could not, the latter would be subordinate to the former; or, in other words, would cease to be sovereign. In short, sovereigns can only be conceived of as equals. This original equality may, indeed, be forcibly disturbed by superior might, or voluntarily modified by compact; but still it must form the basis of all reasoning upon national rights. Attempts have been sometimes made to classify nations with respect to dignity, and thus give to some precedence over others. But this relates only to ceremonial observances, and does not in the least affect the doctrine of a perfect equality of rights.

Another principle, nearly allied to the preceding, is that of absolute independence. This, as we have seen, enters into the very definition of a nation. The doctrine is, that every nation has a perfect right to do what it pleases; provided it does not interfere with the same right in all other nations. Subject to this single qualification, every nation has supreme and exclusive control within its own limits, and other nations have no right whatever to interfere with its internal concerns. Thus national independence is the result of equality and sovereignty combined, and the rightful power

of each nation is qualified and measured by corresponding rights in all other nations.

But equality and independence, though recognized in theory, would be practically of no avail without the right of self-defence. This, therefore, is the paramount right of nations, as of individuals; serving as the shield and protection of all other rights. We must be careful, however, to distinguish between the right of selfdefence and the right of retaliation. Self-defence, by the very import of the terms, is purely preventive in its operation. It authorizes any measures necessary to prevent the violation-of any rights; but it goes no further. Whereas retaliation avenges wrongs actually committed, with a view to prevent their repetition. On this ground, and this alone, can retaliation be justified between nations, though not allowed between individuals. Nations are compelled to take vengeance into their own hands, because there is no criminal tribunal to punish for them; and aggressors must be taught that they cannot do wrong with impunity.

Next follows the right of redress. This, like retaliation, presupposes a wrong actually committed; but its aim is indemnity, and not punishment. And here, again, nations are under the necessity of taking the matter into their own hands. Of the mode as well as measure of redress, they are obliged to be the exclusive judges, there being no superior power to determine for them.

Finally, on these three fundamental rights, self-defence, retaliation, and redress, depends the justifiableness of war. Without some one or all of these grounds, war is in itself the greatest possible wrong. But when they exist, it is permitted as a necessary evil. Accordingly, in the law of nations, the rights and usages of war occupy a place as important as those of peace, since without the former, the latter would have no effectual sanction. I proceed, therefore, to consider, first, the rights of nations in time of peace, and next, those which result from war. For the sake of convenience, I shall endeavor to arrange them under the several heads of jurisdictional, proprietary, diplomatic, commercial, belligerent, and neutral rights.

§ 248. Jurisdictional Rights. We have just seen that each nation has the fundamental right of regulating its internal concerns according to its own pleasure, this being the very essence of Sovereignty. Efforts have, indeed, been made among some of the leading powers of Europe to qualify this right to some extent, by asserting what they call the right of intervention. They base this right of intervention upon the principle of self-defence, and claim to interfere with the internal transactions of other nations, whenever such interference appears to be necessary for their own security. To this end, the most formidable alliances have been formed, and the most destructive wars carried on. Nor can it be doubted that, to the extent here claimed, the right of intervention exists; because self-defence is the first and highest of all rights. And if nations would confine their interference to extreme cases,

manifestly endangering their own security, the right of intervention might safely be admitted, as a qualification of the right of sovereignty. But the serious danger is, that under this pretext, the stronger will make aggressions upon the weaker, and that selfdefence will thus be made to authorize uncalled-for intermeddling. At any rate, subject to this rare exception, the right of supreme internal jurisdiction is absolute and unqualified. And this includes, of course, the right of revolution, which, as we have already seen, must exist as an ultimate right among all people. Of the emergency which may call for a change of government, the subjects of each nation are the exclusive judges. But it is important to observe that such a change does not affect existing rights and obligations with respect to other nations. These rights and obligations survive in full force, in favor of and against the succeeding government. This is true even when a nation has been divided into distinct governments; in which case, unless apportioned by special agreement, pre-existing rights and obligations attach to all the parts in common, so far as other nations are concerned. But here the question arises, how far may foreign aid be given to either of the contending factions in a civil contest? It is very clear that one nation may not invite or induce the subjects of another to rebel against the constituted authorities. But when a state of revolution or insurrection actually exists, it is held that foreign interposition may lawfully take place. Writers usually annex to the granting of aid to the insurgent party, the condition that the revolution must be for a justifiable cause; and no doubt this consideration would furnish the strongest ground for appeal to foreign sympathy. But in practice, nations usually view the question as one of mere expediency. The end of a successful revolution being to establish a new government, the right to aid the struggling party, in anticipation of this event, is merely a consequence of the right to form alliances. And on the same ground rests the right to acknowledge the independence of the new government. either case, the question is one of expediency only. If the revolution be in progress, or the new government established, other nations may grant or refuse assistance or recognition, as they deem proper, without inquiring into the justifiableness of the revolution. Acting upon this principle, France did not hesitate to lend her aid to our early struggles, and we did not hesitate to recognize the independence of the South American States and of Texas. (a)

In

With these qualifications of the general right of jurisdiction, it may be laid down as a broad proposition, that each government has complete and absolute control over all persons and things within its territorial limits, exclusive of every other government. How far the accommodating principle of national comity has been admitted to modify the strict exercise of this imperative power, will

(a) The European nations claimed that these principles applied to the so-called Confederate States, and some of them recognized that government as a de facto government for the time being, and as belligerents.

be seen in the next lecture. It is sufficient here to say, that with the single exception of immunities conceded to diplomatic agents, to be mentioned hereafter, this absolute control over all persons and things within its dominions, is universally acknowledged to appertain to every government. As to persons, the jurisdiction embraces foreigners as much as natives; and as to things, it makes no difference whose property they are. Every nation has a right, either to prohibit altogether the entrance of foreigners or their property into its dominions, or to prescribe the conditions upon which they shall be admitted; and one of these conditions, always implied if not expressed, is a full and entire submission to the laws, while they remain. Nor does this jurisdiction terminate with the territorial limits of each nation. It follows the persons and property of its subjects over the ocean, on which, as common ground, every government may regulate and protect its own citizens and their effects. In short, it follows them until they come within the jurisdiction of some other government; and is resumed again, the moment they are free from such foreign jurisdiction. It hardly needs to be added, that on the same broad principle of power, each nation may prohibit the persons or property once within its jurisdiction from being removed out of it, or prescribe the conditions of such removal. With respect to property, all nations freely exercise this right. But with respect to persons, it is seldom exercised, except upon citizens. In fact, the right of admission and detention, as well of persons as things, has been so far modified by the commercial spirit of modern times, that the ancient doctrines above announced, exist only in theory. And even the right of regulating foreign persons and things, while within our own limits, is now seldom exerted in its original rigor. The convenience of national intercourse, ever increasing with the progress of civilization, has almost revolutionized this part of international law.

§ 249. Proprietary Rights. Every nation has a perfect right of property, to the exclusion of all other nations, in every thing within its territorial limits, including not only the public property of the nation, but also the private property of individuals. With respect to public property, it is the right of ownership strictly so called, of which our public lands furnish an example. With respect to private property, it is called the right of eminent domain, and includes the right of regulating, taxing, appropriating to public use, taking by escheat, and the like. We have seen, that, according to the ancient feudal theory, the absolute ownership of all real property was vested in the lord paramount, or supreme governor, of whom it was held on certain conditions of tenure. This right, whether of absolute ownership or eminent domain, is equally exclusive with respect to other nations; and it not only embraces those possessions which a nation may now have, but also such new possessions as may be afterwards acquired. Such acquisitions may be made in three ways; namely, by discovery of vacant territory, which we

have seen to be the source of European title to the American continent; and by purchase or conquest of territory not vacant. Thus we have seen that the United States acquired Louisiana and Florida by purchase from France and Spain, and the rest of their dominions by conquest from Great Britain. It would seem, however, according to strict ethics, that purchase is the only rightful source of title to occupied territory; and accordingly, we profess to extinguish the Indian title to our territory by purchase only, and never by conquest. The truth is, that the right of conquest being only the right of the stronger, can never comport with natural justice, as against the conquered. But in the law of nations, this is held to be a question between victors and vanquished only, with which other nations have no concern; and therefore, with respect to them, conquest is regarded as a valid source of title. Prescription is sometimes mentioned as another source of title; but it is only the presumption of right arising from long possession, and is not so much a source of title as an evidence of it. Among civilized nations at this day, there is little occasion to resort to this kind of evidence, because the limits of nations are usually ascertained by treaty. As a general rule, there is no limit to the right of acquiring new possessions in either of the ways before mentioned. The only qualification grows out of the right of selfdefence in other nations. If the enlargement of its possessions by one nation would injuriously affect the rights, or endanger the existence of another, the latter may lawfully interpose to prevent such enlargement. But this pretext for interposition is always a doubtful and dangerous one. It presupposes that a nation will cease to be just, in proportion as it becomes able to practise injustice. It is, therefore, only to be resorted to in those extreme cases where there is a moral certainty that new acquisitions will be made the means of injuring other nations. Vague fears respecting a change in the balance of power can never justify such interposition.

What has now been said relates to property lying wholly within the territorial limits of a nation. It would, therefore, embrace lakes and navigable rivers thus situated. But when a lake or river lies between two nations, instead of being the exclusive property of either, each nation is owner to the middle of the stream or channel, subject to a common use for fishing and navigation. This, at least, is the general rule of public law, though there are said to be cases in which prescription has given to one of the bordering proprietors an exclusive right to the whole. But suppose a navigable river to flow through more nations than one. In this case, may one of the nations prohibit the other from using that part of the river lying within the dominions of the former? This question arose in this country, when the lower part of the Mississippi was under the control of Spain; and it was then claimed to be our right, under the law of nations, to use that part of the river for navigation, and, consequently, its banks for mooring our boats,