responsibility, and the reason of it, are the same as in the case of Tower v. Utica, &c. R. R. Co. 7 Hill, 47; Wilson v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio State, 722; Steamer Crystal Palace v. Vanderpool, 16 B. Monr. 302. Nor is the carrier liable for money kept in the sole custody of a passenger, and carried without notice to the defendant for a purpose unconnected with the object of his journey, though such loss was caused by the negligence of the carrier's servants. First National Bank of Greenfield v. Marietta & Cincinnati R. R. Co. 20 Ohio State, 260. The liability of the carrier terminates with delivery to the owner or consignee, or his authorized agent, the place of which may be determined by an express contract or one implied from usage, or the course of business between the parties. Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wendell, 305; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 16 Vt. 52; s. c. 18 id. 131; 23 id. 186. Where goods are carried in a ship, delivery on the usual wharf is sufficient to discharge the carrier. Hyde v. Trent & Mersey Navigation, 5 T. R. 397; Cope v. Cordova, 1 Rawle, 203. But delivery to a drayman or cartman on the landing not authorized by the consignee to receive the goods, is at the risk of the carrier, and he cannot justify such delivery by proof of a custom. Dean v. Vaccars, 2 Head, 488. There must be a landing of the goods, notice to the consignee, and a reasonable time to take them away. The Mary Washington, 1 Abb. U. S. 1; Shenk v. Phil. Steam Prop. Co. 60 Penn. St. 109. Personal delivery is also dispensed with in the case of railroads, the proprietors of which, after the goods have been transported and placed in a warehouse. are only liable as warehousemen for want of ordinary care. Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Alexander, 20 Ill. 23; Smith v. N. & L. R. R. Co., 7 Foster (N. H.), 86; Mich. South & North R. R. Co. v. Schurtz, 7 Mich. 515; Thomas v. Boston & Providence Railroad Corp. 10 Met. 472; Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 1 Gray (Mass.), 263; and it seems from this last case that notice to the consignees of the ar rival of the goods is not necessary to exonerate them from the liability of common carriers. See Rome R. R. Co. v. Šullivan, 14 Geo. 277; Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Hall, 6 Mich. 243; Michigan, &c. R. R. Co. v Bivens, 13 Ind. 263; Morris, &c. R. R. Co. v. Ayers, 4 Dutcher, 393; Francis v. Dubuque, &c. R. R. Co. 25 Iowa, 60. In New Hampshire, the liability of the company as a common carrier is not changed into that of warehouseman until the consignee has had a reasonable time after the arrival of the goods to take them away. Moses v. Boston & Maine R. R. 32 N. H. 523. Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Cleveland, 2 Bush (Ky.), 468; Winslow v. Vermont, &c. R. R. Co. 42 Vt. 700. See Pierce on American Railroad Law, pp. 425-54. In Illinois, such notice is not necessary. Richards v. Mich. Southern & Northern Indiana R. R. Co. 20 Ill. 404; Porter v. Chicago & Rock Island R. R. Co. 20 id. 407; Davis v. Mich. South. & North. Ind. R. R. Co. 20 id. 412. Nor in North Carolina. Neal v. Wilmington R. R. Co. 8 Jones Law, 482. As to notice in case of common carriers by water, see Price v. Powell, 3 Const. 322; Barclay v. Clyde, 2 E. D. Smith, 95. In the case of an express company, actual delivery is necessary. Witbeck v. Holland, 45 N. Y. 13. If the delivery be made to the wrong person, the carrier is liable. Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co. v. White, 6 Bush (Ky.), 251.

It has been held in England, that when a railway company take into their care a parcel directed to a particular place, and do not by positive agreement limit their responsibility to a part only of the distance, that is primâ facie evidence of an undertaking to carry the parcel to the place to which it is directed, although that place be beyond the limits of its line. Muschamp v. Lancaster, &c. Railway, 8 M. & W. 421; Watson v. Ambergate, &c. Railway, 3 Eng. L. &. Eq. 497; Fowles v. Great Western Railway Co. 16 id. 531; s. c. 7 Exch. 696. This doctrine was affirmed in New York. St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wendell, 660; and Iowa, Angel v. Miss. &c. R. R. Co. 9 Iowa, 487. But, contra, the decision of the court of errors, 6 Hill, 157; and decisions in Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 18 Vt. 140; s. c. 23 id. 209; Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. 22 Conn. 1; Nutting v. Conn. River R. R. Co. 1 Gray (Mass.), 502; Barclay v. Clyde, 2 E. D. Smith, 95; Noyes v. Rut. & Bur. R. R. Co. 27 Vt. 110; Elmore ». Naugatuck R. R. Co. 23 Conn. 457; Naugatuck R. R. Co. v. Waterbury Button Co. 24 id. 408; Hart ». R. & S. R. R. Co. 4 Selden, 37; Kyle v. L. R. R. Co. 10 Rich. 382. Darling v. Worcester R. R. Co. 11 Allen, 295; Perkins v. Portland, &c. R. R. Co. 47 Maine, 573. But see Russell v. Livingston, 16 N. Y. 515. And see Brown & Co. v. Mott & Bros. 22 Ohio St. 149. Where a company is liable as forwarder only beyond its own route, its liability ceases when the goods have arrived safely at the end of its route, and have been delivered safely with proper instructions to the next car rier. Reed v. United States Ex. Co. 48 N. Y. 462; Ili. Central R. R. Co. v. Frankenburg, 54 Ill. 88; Wahl v. Holt, 26 Wis. 713. But a failure to transmit special instructions will make the first company liable. Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Washburn, 22 Ohio St. 324.

innkeepers. It is usual for them to sign a bill of lading, (a) acknowledging the receipt of the goods, specifying the price of carriage, and agreeing to deliver them in good condition, at the end of their transit; but this does not vary the liability from that of the implied contract. If the articles are not in good condition at the end of the transit, the carrier is responsible, unless he can prove that the injury was done before he received them; for the whole burden of proof falls on him. Nor can he vary his liability by any notice that he will only be responsible in a certain way. The policy of the law will not give effect to such a notice. (b)

(a) A bill of lading, so far as it is a contract, is conclusive; so far as it is a receipt, it may be explained. So it may be shown that the freight mentioned in the bill was never actually delivered. The Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 325; Dean v. King, Pennock & King, 22 Ohio St. 118. B. & O. Ř. R. Co. v. Wilkins, 44 Md. 11.

(b) It is now well settled that a common carrier may limit his common-law liability by special contract with the owner. N. J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 381-5; Reno v. Hogan, 12 B. Monr. 63; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 23 Vt. 186; Parsons v. Monteath, 13 Barb. 353; Moore v. Evans, 14 id. 524; Dorr v. N. J. Steam Navigation Co. 4 Sandf. 136; Stoddard v. Long Island R. R. Co. 5 id. 180; Davison v. Graham 2 Ohio State, 131; Austin v. Manchester, &c. R. R. Co. 11 Eng. Law & Eq. 506, and notes; Carr v. Lancashire & Yorkshire R. R. Co. 14 id. 340, and notes; Pierce on American Railroad Law, pp. 415-25; Mich. Central R. R. Co. v. Hale, 6 Mich. 243; Thayer v. St. Louis R. R. Co. 22 Ind. 26. But the carrier is not exempted by such special contract from liability in cases of misfeasance or gross negligence. See cases cited, supra. Sager v. Portsmouth, &c. R. R. Co. 31 Maine, 228; Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Morrison, 19 Ill. 136; Ashmore v. Penn. &c. R. R. Co. 4 Dutcher, 180; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co. 23 Vt. 186; Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543. But in New York, it has recently been held that he may lawfully contract with a passenger, in consideration of an abatement of fare for exoneration from liability from negligence. Bissell v. N. Y. &c. R. R. Co. 25 N. Y. 442; Lee v. March, 43 Barb. 102; Kinney v. Cent. R. R. Co. 3 Vroom (N. J.), 407. Contra, Cleveland P. & A. R. R. Co. v. Curran, 19 Ohio St. 1; C. H. & D. R. R. v. Pontius, 19 Ohio St. 221; Knowlton v. Erie R. R. Co. 19 Ohio St. 260. And according to the weight of authorities, he is liable, notwithstanding such contract, for the want of ordinary care. Goldey v. Penn. R. R. Co. 30 Penn. State, 242; Pierce on American Railroad Law, pp. 420, 421; Farnham v. Camden & Amboy Co. 55 Penn. State, 43; American Ex. Co. v. Sands, 55 Penn. State, 140; School District v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. 102 Mass. 552; Christenson v. Am. Ex. Co. 15 Minn. 270; Southern Ex. Co. v. Crook, 44 Ala. 468. In Ohio, he is still liable for losses arising from a neglect of that high degree of diligence enjoined upon him by his public employment, which still remains greater than that required of an ordinary bailee for hire. Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio State, 131; Graham v. Davis, 4 id. 362. Evansville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Young, 28 Ind. 516; Intlianapolis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Allen, 31 Ind. 394; Michigan, &c. R. R. Co. v. Heaton, 31 Ind. 397. An exception of "losses by fire" will not excuse the carrier for fire caused by his own negligence; but the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that it was so caused. Lamb v. Camden, &c. R. R. Co. 46 N. Y. 271; Caldwell v. N. J. St. Co 47 N. Y. 282; Bankard v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. 34 Md. 197. He cannot, even by express contract, exempt himself from liability for accidents arising from the improper and unsafe condition of his conveyance. Welch v. Pittsburgh, &c. R. R. Co. 10 Ohio State, 64. A general notice, as, all baggage at the risk of the owners," is generally held not to exempt the common carrier from his liability as insurer, on the ground that he is bound to accept goods such as he usually carries, and transport them under the responsibility which the law imposes on him, and the owner is not to be presumed to assent to a notice which relieves him of it. Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wendell, 234; Cole v. Goodwin, id. 251; Clark v. Faxton, 21 id. 153; Dorr v. N. J. Steam Navigation Co. 4 Sandf. 142; Fish v. Chapman, 2 Kelly (Geo.), 349; Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145; Judson v. West R. R. Corp. 6 Allen, 486; Steele v. Townsend, 1 Ala (S. C.) 201. Such general notice is, however, held in Pennsylvania to exempt the common carrier from his stringent liability. Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr, 484; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Penn. State, 67. But it is held that the carrier may, by notice brought home to the owner, limit his responsibility for carrying goods beyond the line of his general busi

The owners of stage-coaches, steamboats, and railroad cars, are common carriers with respect to baggage, and subject to the general rules. (a) As to the persons of passengers, they are not insurers of safety, but are liable for the slightest negligence of themselves or their servants. But when an injury happens from upsetting, explosion, or the like, the presumption is negligence, and the carrier has the burden of proving due care. (b)

ness, or make it dependent on certain conditions, as having notice of the kind and quantity of the goods, and an increased rate paid. Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wendell, 85; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 23 Vt. 206. In Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145, and Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio State, 131, the distinction between a general and qualified notice does not seem to have been noted. See Graham v. Davis, 4 id. 376. But such a notice must be brought home to the owner's knowledge. Brown v. Eastern R. R. Co. 11 Cush. 97; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Penn. State, 67; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Penn. State, 208. In Illinois, a general notice, though brought home to the owner, is not sufficient. Western, &c. R. R. Co. v. Newball. 24 Ill. 466; Mann v. Birchard, 40 Vt. 326. Such notices and contracts are strictly construed; thus a limitation of liability to one hundred dollars for any article, means for any article in the trunk. Earle v. Cadmus, 2 Daly, 237; Hopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatch. 64.

(a) Notwithstanding no distinct price be paid for the transportation of the baggage. Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wendell, 85. But this liability does not extend to merchandise or any articles not properly included in baggage, or necessary for the personal convenience of the traveller. Pardee v. Drew, 25 Wendell, 459; Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill, 586; Bomar v. Maxwell, 9 Humph. 621; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Geo. 217; Bell v. Drew, 4 E. D. Smith, 59; McCormick v. Hudson River R. R. id. 181; Collins v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co. 10 Cush. 506; Smith v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. 44 N. H. 325; Richards v. Westcott, 2 Bosw. 589. In Porter ». Hildebrand, 14 Penn. State, 129, a carpenter recovered for a reasonable number of tools as a part of his baggage. The wife's jewelry was held properly included, in M'Gill v. Rowand, 3 Barr, 451. But not jewelry for presents to friends. Nevins v. Bay State, &c. Co. 4 Bosw. 225. A watch, in Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145. Contra, Bomar v. Maxwell, supra. Pocket pistols: Woods v. Devin, 13 Ill. 746; Davis v. Mich. &c. R. R. Co. 22 Ill. 278. Manuscripts carried by a student, author, or professional man, for study, or use, or business. Hopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatch. 64. An opera glass: Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hammond, 33 Ind. 379. So money necessary to defray travelling expenses, but not money intended for trade or investment or transportation. Johnson v. Stone, 11 Humph. 419; Weed v. S. & S. R. R. Co. 19 Wendell, 534; Jordan v. Fall River R. R. Co. 5 Cush. 69; Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wendell, 85; Illinois, &c. R. R. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332; Hickock v. Naugatuck R. R. Co. 31 Conn. 281; Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y. 594. But see Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill, 586. In Ohio, as well as in several other States, the owner of a trunk as well as his wife are competent witnesses to prove its contents in a suit against a common carrier; but this evidence is not admitted to prove articles which are not properly baggage. Mad River & Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. Fulton, 20 Ohio, 318.

(b) Talmadge v. Zanesville & Maysville Road Co. 11 Ohio, 218; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Met. 1; Maury v. Talmadge, 2 M'Lean, 157; Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr, 482, 483; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer, 233; Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245; Fuller v. Naugatuck R. R. Co. id. 557; Farish v. Reigle, 11 Grattan (Va.), 697; Hegeman v. Western R. R. Co. 16 Barb. 353; Fuller v. Talbot, 23 Ill. 357; Willis v. Long Is. R. R. Co. 32 Barb. 398; Bowan v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 18 N. Y. 408; Edwards v. Lord, 49 Maine, 274. A carrier is liable for a defect in the axle of a car, though it could not have been detected without taking the car to pieces. Alden v. New York, &c. R. R. Co. 26 N. Y. 102; Boyce v. Cal. Stage Co. 25 Cal. 460. The carrier is not liable where the passenger, by the want of ordinary care, has contributed to the injury. Pierce on American Railroad Law, 476. The plaintiff need not prove that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. That is a defence that is to be proved by the other side. R. R. Co. v. Gladmore, 15 Wall. 401. He is bound to furnish reasonably safe and convenient means of travel, and to exercise the utmost skill in the use of the means he employs, but he is not bound to adopt every new improvement that may be better than the means he is using, regardless of cost. He may consider the nature and amount of his business, and the cost of such improvement may be of itself a sufficient reason for not adopting it. Le Barron

§ 183. Contract of Principal and Surety or Guaranty. (a) The contract of principal and surety or guaranty takes place when

v. East Boston Ferry Co. 11 Allen, 813. See also Hegeman v. Western R. R. Co. 3 Kernan, 9. The responsibility of the carrier for the carriage of slaves is to be measured by the law applicable to passengers. Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Peters, 150; McClenaghan v. Brock, 5 Rich. 17. As to the burden of proof, see Holbrook v. Utica & Schenectady R. R. Co. 2 Kernan, 236; Lucas v. Taunton & New Bedford R. R. Co. 6 Gray, 70. Pierce on American Railroad Law, p. 490; Curtis v. Rochester & Syracuse R. R. Co. 18 N. Y. 534. The fact that a train was several hours behind time is proof of gross negligence. Chicago B. & C. R. R. Co. v. George, 19 Ill. 510. Carriers of passengers are liable to a passenger carried gratuitously for injury done to him by the gross negligence of themselves or their servants; and it was said that when carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency of steam, any negligence may well deserve the epithet of "gross." Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 486; see Carroll v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. 1 Duer, 571; Steamboat New World v. King, 16 id. 471; Pierce on American Railroad Law, pp. 476-83; Todd v. Old Colony &c., R. R. Co. 3 Allen, 18; Ind. &c. R. R. Co. v. Munday, 21 Ind. 48. Contra, when the pass is on that condition. Wells v. N. Y. &c. R. R. Co. 24 N. Y. 181. Common carriers of passengers are bound to take all passengers who apply, so long as they have convenient accommodation for their safe carriage, and there is no sufficient excuse for their refusal. Jenckes v. Coleman, 2 Sumner, 221; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481; Crouch v. L. & N. W. R. Co. 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 287. Common carriers must carry all who apply, without distinction of color, religious belief, or political relations or prejudices, but they may separate their passengers by other distinctions than those of sex, if doing so is a sound regulation to preserve peace, promote comfort, secure order, or maintain the rights of both carriers and passengers. Westchester & Phila. R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn. State, 210. Neither entry into the cars, nor payment of fare, is necessary to constitute one a passenger. Being in the waiting-room of a company, waiting for a train, is sufficient. Gordon v. Grand S. &c. R. R. Co. 40 Barb. 546; Ohio, &c. R. R. Co. v. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9. They are not liable for injury to a passenger caused by a mob along the line of the road, unless negligent in regard to it. Pittsburg, &c., R. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Penn. St. 512. Telegraph Companies were held in the earlier cases in the United States to be common carriers of messages, and were held to the responsibility of common carriers. They are now held responsible only for diligence. A good discussion of the ground and measure of responsibility is found in Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co. 13 Allen, 226; and in Grinnell v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 113 Mass. 299. The company is liable to the sender of a message for failure to forward, and for mistakes in the transmission. The company is not liable to the person to whom a message is directed for failure to forward it, unless such person had contracted with the company for its transmission. In the United States, the company is liable to the receiver of a message for mistake in transmission. N. Y. & Wash. Print. Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 157; Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co. 13 Allen, 226; Elwood v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 45 N. Y. 459; Lowry v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 60 N. Y. 198; Aiken v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 5 So. Ca. 358; and is liable to the receiver for a message forged and sent by one of its employees. Bank of Cal. v. West. Un. Tel. Co. Supreme Court of Cal. July 1877. In the United States the sender of the message also has been held liable to the receiver for mistake in transmission made by the company. Durkee v. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co. 29 Vt. 127; Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431. In England it is held that the company is not the agent of the sender, and hence the sender is not liable to the receiver for mistake in transmission. Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6 Ex. 7. And also that a tort, which consists in the imperfect performance of a contract, does not give a right of action to one who is not a party to the contract, and hence the receiver has no action against the company for mistake in transmission. Playford v. Un. King. El. Tel. Co. L. R. 4 Q. B. 706; Dickson v. Reuter's Tel. Co. L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 62, affirmed on appeal, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. C. A. 1. Where a cypher despatch, which the company's agents had no means of understanding, was by negligence sent incorrectly, the company

(a) See 3 Kent, Com. 121; Theobald on Principal and Surety; Pitman on Principal and Surety; Fell on Guaranty; Reed v. Evans, 17 Ohio, 128; Selser v. Brock, 3 Ohio State, 302; Halle. Williams, 9 id. 17. A surety against whom judgment has been rendered may, without making payment himself, proceed in equity against his principal, to subject the estate of the latter to the payment of the debt. Hale v. Wetmore, 4 Ohio State, 600.

ever one person to procure credit for another, undertakes to be answerable for him. The original debtor is called principal, and the collateral debtor, surety or guarantor. The criterion of the contract is, that there is an original debt or duty, for the payment or performance of which a third person intervenes, by way of additional security. The surety does not take the place of the principal, and make the debt absolutely his own; but merely undertakes to pay in case the principal does not. We have seen that the fifth section of the statute of frauds requires the contract of the surety to be in writing, because it is for the debt of another, and not his own debt. Like other contracts, too, there must be a consideration; but whether this must be expressed in writing, we have seen is doubtful. It is not necessary that the fact of being surety should appear on the face of the writing; for it may be proved by parol. From what has been said of indorsers of negotiable paper, you will perceive that they become sureties for the parties before them on the paper, and differ in no respect from common guarantors, except that by becoming parties to the paper successively, each becomes a distinct and not a joint surety, and is entitled to notice. The most common cases of sureties, strictly so called, are those of bail in civil and criminal proceedings, to be described hereafter, and of sureties in bonds for the performance of official duty. It follows from the nature of the obligation, that it cannot exceed that of the principal, though it may be less that it must be for the same identical thing as that of the principal; and that it must be extinguished by the extinction of the principal obligation. Any compromise, therefore, with the principal by which he is discharged, discharges the surety; and any alteration in the terms of the original liability, without the consent of the surety, discharges him; for it is no longer the same thing for which he undertook. The most common instance under this head, is that of giving time to the principal. (a) If the creditor,

was held liable only in nominal damages. Saunders v. Stewart, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 326. For failing to send such message, the company is held liable only in nominal damages. Candee v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 34 Wis. 471. A condition that the company will not be liable for damages unless claim therefor be presented in writing within sixty days after sending the message, held valid and binding. Young v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 65 N. Y. 163. The condition on the printed blanks that the company will not be liable beyond the cost of the message, unless the message is repeated and an additional charge paid therefor, held in Indiana unreasonable, and invalid. West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52 Ind. 1. Held valid in Passmore v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 78 Penn. St. 238; Grinnell v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 113 Mass. 299, in which last case, the cases previous to it are collated. But such condition is valid only against the sender; it is not valid against the receiver, whose right of action is based not on contract, but on tort. La Grange v. Kelly, 25 La. Ann. 383.

(a) Smith's Mercantile Law (Holcombe & Gholson), 465, 466. If a surety voluntarily pays money on a void obligation, his co-surety is not liable to contribution. Russell v. Failor, 1 Ohio State, 327. An alteration to discharge a surety must be made by a binding contract, and therefore upon a new consideration. Woodworth v. Brinker, 11 Ohio State, 593; Jones v. Brown, 11 Ohio State, 601; Ide v. Church, 14 Ohio State, 372; People's Bank v. Parsons, 30 Vt. 711. In Ohio, it has been held that the payment of usurious interest, or even a promise to pay it, is a sufficient consideration for a promise to extend the time of payment, to discharge the surety. Blazer v. Bundy, 15 Ohio State, 57; Wood v. Newkirk, 15 Ohio State, 295.