For consistence with the goals proposed by the oil shale Board on page 6, I suggest the following general provision:

(a) A royalty, sliding scale royalty, periodically renegotiated royalties, or some combination to insure adequate revenue return to the Government, without destroying the economic feasibility of the oil shale industry.

(b) Putting up known deposits of oil shale for competitive lease upon either nomination by applications, or upon Government initiative.

(c) Fix the areas of each lease at 5,120 acres, or such lesser amount as is found to be an economic unit to support the investment involved. (There are many ways to determine an economic unit. One, which I do not necessarily recommend, but which shows a method, is the pattern in many States of competitive bidding for tax land, where the amount is fixed, but the winner is the one who bids that amount for the least acreage).

(d) Require certain developments for each unit on increasingly stringent terms so as to minimize speculative holdings. Each unit should be considered separately.

(c) Establish conservation goals and standards and provide contractually for them in leases, but recognize that oil shale production is itself a public interest factor and that when a lease is issued, it should not load the lessee with "conservation" costs so as to make production uneconomic.

The above states my essential views. I regret that time pressure makes more pointed and complete presentation impossible. Insofar as the Report is consistent therewith, I concur.

Dissent of Milo Perkins for the final section of this report

It has been clear since our first meeting seven months ago, that there was only one fundamental area of disagreement. This has run like a thread through all the many drafts of suggested reports submitted to the Board.

Some of us believe that our great shale oil resources should be developed by private industry, much along the lines which the Interior Department has supported in the case of our off-shore oil resources.

Others, with equal sincerity, believe that our Federal Government should play a dominant rule in shale oil development, reserving to itself the full powers of policy formation on a continuing basis into the indefinite future.

The present draft is, in a relative sense, less objectionable than previous drafts from my point of view. I have therefore agreed to sign it since the privilege has now been granted Board members, in this section of our Report, to publicly express their own dissenting views.

Means of Stimulating Oil Shale Development

I strongly support the second alternative in Section IV of our Report, with one vital dissent. I believe that the word "principally" in the last sentence of alternative No. 2, Section IV should not have been used.

The sentence now reads: "This approach aims to rely principally on private initiative as a means for proceeding with needed research and the development of an oil shale industry."

The introduction of the word "principally" nullifies the agreement by Beard members at our last meeting. We agreed then to disagree on clear-cut alternative means through which oil-shale development might be stimulated. A reservation, therefore, in one of those three alternatives is inappropriate.

Now to continue with what seems to me to be the most effective means of stimulating oil-shale development. Insofar as efficient production is concerned research and development are not separate activities. They are parts of a single process. They interlace constantly in the actual world of work. Any effort to separate them leads to endless confusion-particularly when the effort is made by Government in an essentially private area of our economy. Our second alternative in Section IV avoids this confusion.

I think that research and development to improve the art of shale-oil extraction can most effectively be undertaken by private industry itself-with an eye to future commercial production. The private sector of our economy has done an extraordinary job in the field of research, when that research has been directed into channels looking toward efficient, profitable production for competitive markets.

I see no reason, therefore, why government itself should finance research work to advance the art of shale-oil extraction. By way of illustration, production of off-shore oil and gas certainly had its early research problems. In this fairly

recent instance, our Government did not try to establish a value for these underwater areas by research of its own or by contract research.

Rather, it permitted industry to establish the value of these off-shore areas by competitive bidding and leasing. Government revenues under this procedure have constantly risen as the art advanced-and as successive areas became available for further leasing and production.

Private industry did this off-shore research and development job and did it so efficiently that energy from beneath the sea is now available to all of us in the market place at prices which are competitive. Why shouldn't we turn to industry to develop a competitive shale oil business?

Roughly half of corporate profits are now taken in taxes by the Federal Government; another slice is taken by the States; and stockholders pay additional taxes on dividends they receive as individuals.

As a successful shale-oil industry gets under way, additional revenues will accrue to both Federal and State governments, as they already have done in the case of off-shore oil. The second alternative in Section IV of our Report strengthens this healthy process. Under it, Government will not be required to engage in those costly research and development activities related to production which have been a traditional function of the private sector of our economy.

Inasmuch as our Government controls the major portion of our richest shaleoil reserves, it does have deep public responsibilities stretching many decades ahead. I have always recognized this fact. Therefore, I've urged early but limited moves by Government to encourage industry to advance the art of shale-oil extraction at competitive prices, much as it did in the case of off-shore oil and gas. There are many variations of leasing arrangements on publicly controlled lands by which this can be done. We can make haste slowly and learn as we go along. We just don't know enough at this point to lay out a complete program. Now for three short paragraphs on alternative No. 1 of Section IV. Some of our fellow Board members feel that Government should finance oil shale research indirectly by contract with private research companies. They cite the successful experience in military and space procurement activities.

The development of shale-oil seems to me to be in a completely different category. In the case of missiles or space-craft, only Government can be the final "customer." Therefore, such contracts make sense.

The private sector of our economy would be the customer for most of the shale-oil. Therefore, profit incentives for private research to produce cheaply and effectively for a commercial market is in keeping with what business has always done and done well.

Federally Sponsored Research

First of all, I support both State and Federal research on such matters as: 1. The establishment of health standards and of conservation goals and standards under which industry must operate. Government must fairly establish these ground rules under which competitive business is required to function. It then becomes the job of businessmen to meet these criteria in their day to day operations.

2. Deeper knowledge of the quality, thickness and distribution of oilshale in States where too little is now known.

3. Economic and engineering studies dealing with water requirements, both from surface and underground sources. This is crucially important to the future of a shale-oil industry.

4. Air and water pollution problems.

5. Waste disposal and the conversion of spent shale to soil.

6. Wind and water erosion problems.

This list is meant to be indicative rather than inclusive. It would certainly not rule out such work as broad economic studies by the Federal government on the supply and demand situation for all fuels needed by the entire nation. But it would rule out those narrower Federal research and development activities traditionally regarded as being within the province of industry. These activities deal primarily with the interlacing techniques of research, development and production in a competitive society.

I would now like to quote a few sentences from our Report and to comment on them:

1. At the end of a paragraph in Section III, dealing with "Basic Policy Objectives", this sentence occurs: "In short, the Board agrees that the Federal Government, working in appropriate cooperation with the States, should move

positively but cautiously to encourage private oil-shale development, with full protection of the public interest in the broadest sense, and that it must expect to provide some of the support, directly or indirectely, of the Research required.” I agree with all of this sentence, except the last phrase stating that the Federal government "must expect to provide some of the support, directly or indirectly, of the research required."

What types of Federal research-in which areas of both the public and private sectors of our economy-are intended to be covered by this language? If it covers only such areas as the six points I made at the beginning of this dissent on Federally Sponsored Research, then I support this entire sentence of our Report as written-and I support it without reservation.

Even in Section IV of our Report, however-originally intended to give dissenting Board members the clear-cut alternatives on Means of Stimulating Oil Shale Development-this strange sentence occurs: "Federally sponsored research could be undertaken simultaneously with R. & D. leasing if the responses to the R. & D. lease invitation were either limited in number or narrow is scope.” What a curious place to get in another "plug" for Federal research, without defining it in concrete terms:

I believe there is a vital area for government research and a vital area for private research. Unhappily, the line of demarcation between the two has never been made clear in any suggested draft submitted to Board members-notwithstanding our sharp differences of opinion on the subject. The current draft is no exception.

2. In Section VII, on Federally Sponsored Research, this sentence occurs: "The Government should also sponsor research on those scientific and technologic problems that are of such long-range importance or are of so broad a scope that they are beyond the reach of private industry."

Just what are those specific research problems, in what scientific and technologic areas, that are of such long-range importance, or are so broad in scope, as to be beyond the reach of private industry? Just which government official, under what Congressional authority, is empowered to arrive at such all-encompassing conclusions?

3. In Section VII these two sentences appear: "It is in the public interest to advance the technology not only for oil shale but for competing sources also. What is called for is a diversified research and development effort by both government and private industry, with the several energy sources viewed as part of an inter-related energy industry."

These vague, all-inclusive words can be interpreted at some future date to mean absolutely anything! Until they are interpreted by some responsible government official, I am unable to comment on them.

I wouldn't think they'd bring any cheer to any executive in any of our energy industries, however. Their concrete meaning needs to be clarified. What is the specific "development effort" and what is the specific "research effort" on the part of Government that these words are intended to identify?

4. Toward the end of the last paragraph in Section VII this sentence appears: "Improvements of R. & D. programming within the Department would be desirable."

I have no notion of what this means in specific terms, since it was never discussed at Board meetings.

Conclusion

Nothing in our Board's Report can be very specific on the exact terms of any contract which the Interior Department might offer private industry to develop our shale-oil resources on government controlled lands. Alternative No. 2 in Section IV comes closest to being fairly specific.

Under the body of this Report as it now stands, however, some future administration could impose contract terms for shale-oil development so onerous that private industry would have to decline. Government, under this Report as now written, could then claim that it had to proceed on its own acount due to development being "beyond the reach of private industry".

This is not an imaginary fear in the minds of many businessmen nor in my own mind. Fuzzy, imprecise language encourages these fears, particularly when it appears from time to time in official documents. This is why I have fought so hard, even if unsuccessfully, for an Interim Report that was specific concerning the one major controversy that confronted us.

I can't conceive of any private company making the vast expenditures which would be necessary to extract, refine, transport and sell oil from shale if it

feared that somewhere down the road it might have to compete with a government dominated shale-oil industry. On reading this Report, the Secretary himself may wish we had been more specific in our recommendations to him-especially in connection with the one conflict we Board members have been unable to resolve.

I have tried to be temperate and forthright in my own dissent and I'm sure my Board colleagues will express their genuine dissents in the same spirit. Secretary Udall made his own position clear on this matter, however, at a dinner meeting with our Board on last November 30th.

He was quite aware of differing judgments within the Board. He said that he welcomed them; that they helped to sharpen the issues for his consideration. He then asked us to reconvene in mid-January and see how near we could come to a meeting of minds.

But he also said that if there were some areas where differences could not be resolved that he would expect us to state our varying positions temperately but with frankness. I certainly admired his objective approach. I have tried in this statement to stay within the spirit of his guidelines for all of us as Board members.

JOSEPH L. FISHER, Chairman.
ORLO E. CHILDS, Member.

BENJAMIN V. COHEN, Member.
JOHN KENNETH GAILBRAITH, Member.

H. BYRON MoсK, Member.

MILO PERKINS, Member.

[From the Congressional Record, Mar. 1, 1957]

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I rise to oppose Senate Joint Resolution 19, the so-called Middle Eastern resolution of the President. I do not reluctantly.

In matters of foreign policy, my ordinary inclination is to support the President when he comes to Congress and asks for support. I cannot bring myself to do so on this resolution.

In the first place, I think that the people of Tennessee, when they elected me, knew that, as a Member of Congress, I would vote "yes" or "no," if the time should ever unhappily arise, on the question of whether this Nation should go to war.

In this resolution, despite the changes that have been made in its wording by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, we are delegating the authority to someone else to decide whether or not we shall go to war.

The someone else is not necessarily the President. It is not necessarily Mr. Dulles or any other member of the Cabinet. It may very well be some commander of troops in the field whom we do not even know.

This resolution is ostensibly for the purpose of assisting any nation that requests such assistance from Communist aggression. Try as you may, Mr. President, you cannot find out from the Administration how it will be determined whether it is the aggression of the nations or whether it is Communist aggression. I had long colloquies with Secretary Dulles during the course of the hearings on this resolution. I never could find out. But I did learn that, in his opinion, the most likely testing of this doctrine to determine if we would react-would come in the air. And in that case the decision would be delegated to the commanders of the Air Force in the Middle East.

I want to be perfectly fair and perfectly accurate about this, and therefore I desire to read the exact exchange with Mr. Dulles from the record of the hearings. We had previously discussed how action might come about under the resolution, and Mr. Dulles said it would most likely be through an action in the air. Our colloquy, which I am reading, comes from the record of the hearings, pages 252 and 253, volume I.

"Senator KEFAUVER. Is it contemplated that we will have airbases with planes manned by American airmen, in the Middle East?

"Secretary DULLES. Well, we have bases already in parts of the area, and there are friendly fields available to us in the area, and it might very well be that there

would be an invasion by air of the area of some of our friendly countries there, to see whether we reacted or not.

"Senator KEFAUVER. Would it be the intention to react if there were Soviet planes doing that?

"Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; I would think if a Soviet plane started what looked like an airborne operation, that there would presumably be a reaction. "Senator KEFAUVER. Who would determine whether it was a friendly invasion, I mean just planes flying over or whether it was an armed invasion by air? "Secretary DULLES. That would be determined by the President.

"Senator KEFAUVER. By the President?

"Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

"Senator KEFAUVER. Would that be a determination that the matter would be delegated to the commanders of the Air Force in the Middle East?

"Secretary DULLES. Under safeguards; yes.

"Senator KEFAUVER. In other words, these men out there would have it within their power to substantially determine whether when planes came over, Soviet planes came over, to determine whether it was hostile or whether it was not? "Secretary DULLES. The situation in that respect would be precisely the same as it is in the North Atlantic Treaty areas and as it is in the western Pacific, where that situation already exists.

"Senator KEFAUVER. But in the North Atlantic Treaty, we have French, British, and a lot of others there with us; do we not?

"Secretary DULLES. Well, we have different areas, but if there is an invasion of our area, the people who are there have a limited discretion to act.

"The same way in the case of Japan, Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Indochina.

"Senator KEFAUVER. But in any event, whatever may be the situation, the area commander in the Middle East, the air commander, would have a certain right delegated to him to determine whether it was the type of air invasion that he should use American men and planes to combat?

"Secretary DULLES. You can get more detail on that from Admiral Radford. What I would say is that it would create here precisely the same situation that already exists over a good many thousands of miles around the perimeter of the Soviet-Chinese Communist orbit.

"Senator KEFAUVER. I am not talking about what exists somewhere else. I just want to know what is going to happen here.

"Secretary DULLES. Well, as I say, you can get more detail from Admiral Radford. I do not know just exactly what the command instructions are, but it would be the same here as in the case elsewhere.

"Senator KEFAUVER. All right, thank you, Mr. Secretary."

There is not one word of testimony anywhere in the record to indicate otherwise than that the question of whether we are going to react to something that happens in the Middle East will not be determined directly by the President or by the Secretary of State, but by some commander there, who may not even have been given an appointment at this time.

I know that the amendment offered by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], which was agreed to yesterday, and which I approved, seeks to assure that the Congress eventually will have the authority to vote on a state of war. Whether that will be satisfactory to the Secretary of State or the President I do not know.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. A very curious development took place yesterday with respect to the question which the Senator raises. A letter dated February 28 was addressed to the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, by the State Department, saying that the amendment was objectionable. Later in the afternoon, however, immediately after that letter had been handed to me. the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] reported to the Senate that he had personally communicated with the State Department, and the State Department advised that it had no objection to the amendment. I inserted in the Record yesterday, after the vote was taken, the letter of condemnation from the Department of State. I did so in order to make it clear that the first view of the State Department, in the morning hours of yesterday, had been rejected by the State Department in the afternoon hours, with the hope that when the resolution goes to conference the members of the conference on the part of the Senate will bear in mind that the amendment, with the