It is customary to speak of the framers of our Constitution as having separated the judicial, the legislative, and the executive functions of the government. The separation, however, is not in all respects sharply defined. The President has certainly most important legislative functions, and the upper branch of the national legislature shares with the President one of the most important of his executive functions; that is, the President can either sign or veto the bills passed by Congress, while on the other hand the Senate confirms or rejects his nominations. Of course the President cannot initiate legislation, although he can recommend it. But unless two-thirds of Congress in both branches are hostile to him, he can stop any measure from becoming a law. This power is varyingly used by different Presidents, but it always exists, and must always be reckoned with by Congress.

While Congress is in session, if the

President neither signs nor vetoes a bill which is passed, the bill becomes a law without his signature. The effect is precisely the same as if he had signed it. Presidents who disapproved of details in a bill, but felt that on the whole it was advisable it should become a law, have at times used this method to emphasize the fact that they were not satisfied with the measure which they were yet unwilling to veto. A notable instance was afforded in President Cleveland's term, when he thus treated the Wilson-Gorman tariff bill.

It

The immense federal service, including all the postal employés, all the customs employés, all the Indian agents, marshals, district attorneys, navy-yard employés, and so forth, is under the President. would of course be a physical impossibility for him to appoint all the individuals in the service. His direct power lies over the heads of the departments, bureaus, and more important offices.

But he does not appoint these by himself. His is only the nominating power. It rests with the Senate to confirm or reject the nominations.

The Senators are the constitutional advisers of the President, for it must be remembered that his Cabinet is not in the least like the cabinet of which the prime minister is head in the English Parliament. Under our government the Secretaries who form the Cabinet are in the strictest sense the President's own ministerial appointees; the men, chosen out of all the nation, to whom he thinks he can best depute the most important and laborious of his executive duties. Of course they all advise him on matters of general policy when he so desires it, and in practice each Cabinet officer has a very free hand in managing his own department, and must have it if he is to do good work. But all this advice and consultation is at the will of the President. With the Senate, on the other hand, the

advice and consultation are obligatory under the Constitution.

The President and Congress are mutually necessary to one another in matters of legislation, and the President and the Senate are mutually necessary in matters of appointment. Every now and then men who understand our Constitution but imperfectly raise an outcry against the President for consulting the Senators in matters of appointment, and even talk about the Senators" usurping" his functions. These men labor under a misapprehension. The Senate has no right to dictate to the President who shall be appointed, but they have an entire right to say who shall not be appointed, for under the Constitution this has been made their duty. In practice, under our party system, it has come to be recognized that each Senator has a special right to be consulted about the appointments in his own State, if he is of the President's political party. Often the

opponents of the Senator in his State do not agree with him in the matter of appointments, and sometimes the President in the exercise of his judgment finds it right and desirable to disregard the Senator. But the President and the Senators must work together if they desire to secure the best results. But although many men must share with the President the responsibility for different individual actions, and although Congress must of course also very largely condition his usefulness, yet the fact remains that in his hands is infinitely more power than in the hands of any other man in our country during the time that he holds the office; that there is upon him always a heavy burden of responsibility; and that in certain crises this burden may become so great as to bear down any but the strongest and bravest man.

In the aggregate, quite as much wrong is committed by improper denunciation