Syllabus

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ET AL. v. USERY, SECRETARY OF LABOR

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 74-878. Argued April 16, 1975-Reargued March 2, 1976Decided June 24, 1976*

The Fair Labor Standards Act was amended in 1974 so as to extend the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all employees of States and their political subdivisions. Appellants (including a number of cities and States) in these cases brought an action against appellee Secretary of Labor challenging the validity of these 1974 amendments and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. Held:

1. Insofar as the 1974 amendments operate directly to displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in areas of traditional governmental functions, such as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation, they are not within the authority granted Congress by the Commerce Clause. In attempting to exercise its Commerce Clause power to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their sovereign capacities, Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States' "ability to function effectively in a federal system," Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7, and this exercise of congressional authority does not comport with the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution. Pp. 840-852.

2. Congress may not exercise its power to regulate commerce so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made. Fry v. United States, supra, distinguished; Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, overruled. Pp. 852855.

406 F. Supp. 826, reversed and remanded.

*Together with No. 74-879, California v. Usery, Secretary of Labor, also on appeal from the same court.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 856. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 856. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 880.

Charles S. Rhyne and Calvin L. Rampton argued the cause for appellants in both cases on reargument. Mr. Rhyne argued the cause for appellants in No. 74-878, and Talmadge R. Jones, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellant in No. 74-879 on the original argument. With Mr. Rhyne on the briefs in the original argument were Milton H. Sitton, Alan Davidson, Richard Gebelein, State Solicitor of Delaware, and the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce E. Babbitt of Arizona, Theodore L. Sendak of Indiana, Richard C. Turner of Iowa, Francis B. Burch of Maryland, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, A. F. Summer of Mississippi, John C. Danforth of Missouri, Robert L. Woodahl of Montana, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, Robert List of Nevada, Warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire, Larry D. Derryberry of Oklahoma, R. Lee Johnson of Oregon, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, William Janklow of South Dakota, John L. Hill of Texas, Vernon B. Romney of Utah, and David B. Kennedy of Wyoming. With Mr. Jones on the brief in the original argument were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, and Willard A. Shank, Assistant Attorney General. With Mr. Rhyne on the brief on reargument in both cases were all of the above-named counsel. Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, Henry R. Lord, Deputy Attorney General, and Glenn E. Bushel, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for appellant in No. 74-878.

Solicitor General Bork reargued the cause for appellee in both cases. With him on the briefs on reargu

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ment was Jacob I. Karro. With him on the brief on the original argument were Allan Abbot Tuttle and Mr. Karro.t

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Nearly 40 years ago Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act,' and required employers covered by the Act to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular

2

+Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, Anthony F. Troy, Deputy Attorney General, D. Patrick Lacy, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, and C. Flippo Hicks for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al.; by Aloysius J. Suchy, P. Eugene Price, Jr., William F. Edwards, Norman A. Palermo, F. Lee Ruck, and David E. Engdahl for the National Association of Counties et al.; and by Eugene N. Collins, Conard B. Mattox, Jr., Thomas Emmet Walsh, Henry W. Underhill, Jr., N. Alex Bickley, Samuel Gorlick, Aaron A. Wilson, John Dekker, James B. Brennan, W. Bernard Richland, William R. Quinlan, S. G. Johndroe, Jr., J. LaMar Shelley, and Robert G. Dixon, Jr., for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers; and by Sylvester Petro for the Public Service Research Council.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by William J. Baxley, Attorney General of Alabama, John D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, and Warren R. Spannous, Attorney General of Minnesota, for the State of Alabama et al.; by Robert E. Nagle for Harrison A. Williams, Jr., et al.; by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, Robert H. Chanin, and George Kaufmann for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; by Mr. Kaufmann for the Coalition of American Public Employees; by Jerome K. Tankel for the International Conference of Police Assns.; and by Harry Lewis Michaels for the Florida Police Benevolent Assn.

1 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. (1940 ed.).

2 § 206 (a) (1940 ed.).

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rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 during a workweek. By this Act covered employers were required to keep certain records to aid in the enforcement of the Act, and to comply with specified child labor standards. This Court unanimously upheld the Act as a valid exercise of congressional authority under the commerce power in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), observing:

"Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." Id., at 115. The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 specifically excluded the States and their political subdivisions from its coverage. In 1974, however, Congress enacted the most recent of a series of broadening amendments to the Act. By these amendments Congress has extended the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all public employees employed by the States and by their various political subdivisions. Appellants in these cases include individual cities and States, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors' Conference; they brought an action in the District

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3 § 207 (a) (3) (1940 ed.).

§ 211 (c) (1940 ed.).

5 § 212 (1940 ed.).

Title 29 U. S. C. § 203 (d) (1940 ed.):

"'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State...."

7 Appellants in No. 74-878 are the National League of Cities, the National Governors' Conference, the States of Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,

1

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Court for the District of Columbia which challenged the validity of the 1974 amendments. They asserted in effect that when Congress sought to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions virtually across the board to employees of state and municipal governments it "infringed a constitutional prohibition" running in favor of the States as States. The gist of their complaint was not that the conditions of employment of such public employees were beyond the scope of the commerce power had those employees been employed in the private sector but that the established constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity consistently recognized in a long series of our cases affirmatively prevented the exercise of this authority in the manner which Congress chose in the 1974 amendments.

I

In a series of amendments beginning in 1961 Congress began to extend the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to some types of public employees. The 1961 amendments to the Act extended its coverage to persons who were employed in "enterprises" engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." And in 1966, with the amendment of the definition of employers under the Act, the exemption heretofore extended to the States and their political subdivisions was

Tenn., and the cities of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Lompoc, Cal., and Salt Lake City, Utah. The appellant in No. 74-879 is the State of California.

In view of the fact that the appellants include sovereign States and their political subdivisions to which application of the 1974 amendments is claimed to be unconstitutional, we need not consider whether the organizational appellants had standing to challenge the Act. See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 44-45 (1974).

8 Pub. L. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65.

29 U. S. C. §§ 203 (r), 203 (s), 206 (b), 207 (a) (2) (1964 ed.).