STEVENS, J., dissenting 426 U.S. petitioner Doyle did not even remain silent.' The case is not one in which a description of the actual conversation between the defendants and the police would give rise to any inference of guilt if it were not so flagrantly inconsistent with their trial testimony. Rather than a claim of privilege, we simply have a failure to advise the police of a "frame" at a time when it most surely would have been mentioned if petitioners' trial testimony were true. That failure gave rise to an inference of guilt only because it belied their trial testimony. Second, the dictum in the footnote in Miranda relies primarily upon Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, which held that the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth, prohibited the prosecution's use of the defendant's silence in its case in chief. But as long ago as Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494, this Court recognized the distinction between the prosecution's affirmative use of the defendant's prior silence and the use of prior silence for impeachment purposes. Raffel expressly held that the defendant's silence at a prior trial was admissible for purposes of impeachment despite the application in federal prosecutions of the prohibition that Griffin found in the Fifth Amendment. Raffel, supra, at 496 497. Moreover, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the author of the Court's opinion in Miranda, joined the opinion in Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, which squarely held that a valid constitutional objection to the admissibility of evidence as part of the Government's case in chief did not bar the use of that evidence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony. The availability of an objection to the affirmative use of improper evidence does not provide the defendant "with a shield against contradiction of his untruths." Id., at 65. The need to ensure the integrity 7 See n. 4, supra. 610 STEVENS, J., dissenting of the truth-determining function of the adversary trial process has provided the predicate for an unbroken line of decisions so holding. As the Court recently recognized in a most carefully considered opinion, an adversary system can maintain neither the reality nor the appearance of efficacy without the assurance that its judgments rest upon a complete illumination of a case rather than upon "a partial or speculative presentation of the facts." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709. The necessity of insuring a complete presentation of all relevant evidence has led to the rule that a criminal defendant who voluntarily forgoes his privilege not to testify, and presents exculpatory or mitigating evidence, thereby subjects himself to relevant cross-examination without the right to reclaim Fifth Amendment protection on a selective basis. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, 315. "If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. '[H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.'" Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-155 (citation omitted). One need not impute perjury to an entire class to acknowledge that a testifying defendant has more to gain and less to lose than an ordinary witness from fabrications upon the witness stand. Cf. Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301, 304-311; Taylor v. United States, 390 F. 2d 278, 284-285 (CA8 1968) (Blackmun, J.). As the Court notes today: "Unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by presenting tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge." Ante, at 617 n. 7. In recognition of this fact, this Court has allowed evidence to be used for impeachment purposes that would be inadmissible as evidence of guilt. In Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, evidence of narcotics unlawfully seized in connection with an aborted earlier case against a defendant was held admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony that he never had been associated with narcotics, although such evidence clearly was inadmissible for any purpose in the prosecution's case in chief. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, the Court held admis STEVENS, J., dissenting 426 U.S. Although I have no doubt concerning the propriety of the cross-examination about petitioners' failure to mention the purported "frame" at the time of their arrest, a more difficult question is presented by their objection to the questioning about their failure to testify at the preliminary hearing and their failure generally to mention the "frame" before trial. Unlike the failure 9 sible for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's testimony certain partially inconsistent post-arrest statements which, although voluntary, were unavailable for the prosecution's case because they had been given by the defendant without benefit of Miranda warnings. And last Term, in a decision closely analogous to Harris, the Court held admissible for impeachment purposes post-arrest statements of a defendant made after he had received Miranda warnings and exercised his right to request a lawyer, but before he had been furnished with counsel as Miranda requires in such circumstances. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714. In each of these cases involving impeachment cross-examination, the need to insure the integrity of the trial by the "traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process," Harris v. New York, supra, at 225, was deemed to outweigh the policies underlying the relevant exclusionary rules. • Petitioner Doyle was cross-examined as follows at his trial: "Q. [By the prosecutor.] All right. Do you remember the Preliminary Hearing in this case? "A. [By Doyle.] Yes Sir. I remember it. "Q. And that was prior to your indictment for this offense, was it not? "A. Yes sir. I believe,-Yes Sir, it was before I was indicted. "Q. Arraignment. Is that what you mean? "A. Yes. The next day after the arrest. "Q. Yes, when evidence was presented and you had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses against you. Remember that? "A. Yes Sir. "Q. Mr. Bonnell testified; Captain Griffin testified; DeputyChief Deputy White testified? "A. Yes Sir. "Q. Kenneth Beamer testified? "A. Yes Sir. 610 STEVENS, J., dissenting to make the kind of spontaneous comment that discovery of a "frame" would be expected to prompt, there is no significant inconsistency between petitioners' trial testi "Q. And your lawyer was there,-Mr. James? "A. Yes Sir. "Q. Tape recording was made of the transcript? "A. Yes Sir. "Q. Did you protest your innocence at that proceeding? "A. I didn't everything that was done with that was done with my attorney. My attorney did it. "Q. All right. The first time that you gave this version of the fact was in the trial of Richard Wood,-was it not? "A. Yes Sir. It was the first time I was asked. "Q. All the time, you being innocent? "A. Yes Sir." Doyle Tr. 507-508. Petitioner Wood was subjected to similar cross-examination at his trial: "Q. [By the prosecutor.] As a matter of fact you never told anyone that you had been set up until today? "A. [By Wood.] Yes, I believe I did, sir. "Q. I assume you discussed it with your lawyer? "A. Yes, I discussed it with my lawyer. "Q. And you heard the testimony and witnesses against you? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. And were you aware Mr. James was able to obtain a tape transcript of the proceedings? "A. Yes. "Q. And you no doubt listened to those? "A. Parts and portions of them-some of it. "Q. But you never communicated your innocence? "A. I believe I did one time to Mr. Beamer. "Q. When might that have been? "A. When in the jail house. "Q. So you protested your innocence? "A. In a little room. I believe he asked us how do you let STEVENS, J., dissenting 426 U.S. mony and their adherence to counsel's advice not to take the stand at the preliminary hearing; moreover, the decision not to divulge their defense prior to trial is probably attributable to counsel rather than to petitioners.10 Nevertheless, unless and until this Court overrules Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494," I think a state court is people get away with people setting up friends like this. He said Bill Bonnell is not your friend and I said no, but I figured he was a good enough acquaintance he would do that. "Q. Where was that? "A. Little room there. "Q. Ever been there before? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. When? "Q. Did you see me there? "A. I didn't know who you were at the time. I believe you were in and out of there. "Q. You didn't say anything to me, did you? "A. No, I didn't know who you were then." Wood Tr. 470-472. 10 Under Ohio law, the preliminary hearing determines only whether the defendant should be held for trial. The prosecution need establish, at most, that a crime has been committed and that there is "probable and reasonable cause" to hold the defendant for trial, and the court need only find "substantial credible evidence" of the charge against the defendant. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2937.12, 2937.13 (Supp. 1973). Indeed, if a defendant has been indicted, no hearing need be held. State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St. 2d 307, 326, 329 N. E. 2d 85, 97 (1975). Defense counsel thus will have no incentive to divulge the defendant's case at the preliminary hearing if the prosecution has presented substantial evidence of guilt. Since that was the case here, no significant impeaching inference may be drawn from petitioners' silence at that proceeding. Petitioners' failure to refer to the "frame" at any time between arrest and trial is somewhat more probative; for if the "frame" story were true, one would have expected counsel to try to persuade the prosecution to dismiss the charges in advance of trial. 11 Raffel was the last decision of this Court to address the constitutionality of admitting evidence of a defendant's prior silence |