WHITE, J., concurring 426 U.S. tion whether petitioner had introduced sufficient evidence to sustain his claim. We remand the case for consideration of that question and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.19 MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. It is so ordered. I join the Court's opinion with these additional words. It may be that under its rulemaking authority the Board would have power to order airline overbooking and to pre-empt recoveries under state law for undisclosed overbooking or for overselling. But it has not done so, at least as yet. It is also unnecessary to stay proceedings on the present state-law claim pending Board action under § 411. Neither an order denying nor one granting relief under that section would foreclose claims based on state law; and there is not present here the additional consideration that a § 411 proceeding would be helpful in resolving, or affecting in some manner, the state-law claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Cf. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U. S. 289 (1973); Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deak 19 The Court of Appeals specifically remanded for reconsideration of the award of punitive damages on petitioner's claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. The propriety of that ruling was not challenged in this Court. As the issues of ultimate liability and damages are not before us, we express no opinion as to their merits. We conclude above that mere compliance with agency regulations is not sufficient in itself under the Act to exempt a carrier from common-law liability. We make clear, however, that this conclusion is not intended to foreclose the courts on remand from considering, in relation to other issues in the case, evidence that the Board was fully advised of the practice complained of, and that the carrier had cooperated with the Board. 290 WHITE, J., concurring tor, 414 U. S. 113 (1973). I seriously doubt that any pending or future § 411 case would reveal anything relevant to this case about the Board's view of the propriety of overbooking and of overselling that is not already apparent from prior proceedings concerning those subjects. OMAHA NATIONAL BANK v. NEBRASKANS FOR INDEPENDENT BANKING, INC., ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 75-1382. Decided June 7, 1976 Court of Appeals' judgment that petitioner national bank's drivein/walk-in facility was a branch petitioner was not permitted to operate because a state bank would not be permitted to operate a like facility is vacated, and the case is remanded for reconsideration in light of an intervening amendment to the statute redefining the "auxiliary teller" facilities that state banks may operate. Certiorari granted; 530 F. 2d 755, vacated and remanded. PER CURIAM. From the time petitioner Omaha National Bank sought approval from the Regional Administrator of National Banks of its drive-in/walk-in facility until after the en banc decision of the Court of Appeals, Nebraska law permitted a state-chartered bank to operate one "attached auxiliary teller office" and not more than two "detached auxiliary teller offices." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 8-157 (2) (1974). The two types of "auxiliary teller offices" were defined in Nebraska Department of Banking Reg. § 8157-01 (1970). The Court of Appeals found it “abundantly clear" that a state bank situated like Omaha National would not be permitted to operate the added facility, and ruled that under 12 U. S. C. § 36, see First Nat. Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U. S. 122, 135 (1969), the facility was a branch which the bank was not permitted to operate. 530 F. 2d 755, 762 (CA8 1976). Since the en banc decision, § 8-157 (2) has been amended by Legislative Bill 763, approved by the Governor on March 11, 1976, to redefine "auxiliary teller" facilities which state banks may operate. It appearing that this amendment, which will become effective in July 1976, may have a substantial bearing on the outcome of this case, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Legislative Bill 763. So ordered. 426 U.S. Opinion of the Court TENNESSEE ET AL. v. DUNLAP CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 75-95. Argued March 22, 1976-Decided June 10, 1976 The National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 provides that a National Guard technician, who is a full-time civilian employee of the Guard, must be a member of the Guard. 32 U. S. C. § 709 (b). Employment as a technician may be terminated upon separation from the Guard, § 709 (e) (1); for failure to meet military security requirements, § 709 (e) (2); or "for cause," § 709 (e) (3). Held: Where respondent's employment as a technician was terminated under § 709 (e) (1) when he was separated from the Guard upon expiration of his enlistment, § 709 (e) (3)'s requirement of "cause" has no application, and hence § 709 (e) (3) cannot provide the foundation for a claim that the termination of respondent's employment and the allegedly arbitrary refusal to re-enlist him violated due process. Pp. 315–316. 514 F. 2d 130, reversed. MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alex B. Shipley, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was R. A. Ashley, Jr., Attorney General. William Terry Denton argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, challenging the termination of his employment as a tech *Solicitor General Bork, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and John F. Cooney filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. |