held retroactive, in the absence of any language declaring it so, merely
because it was the intention of its supporters to have it passed in time
to apply to taxation for the current year.

-Dodge v. Nevada Nat. Bank, 109 Fed. 726........48 C. C. A. 626
The amendment to Pol. Code Cal. § 3608, providing for the taxation of
national bank shares (St. 1899, p. 96), which went into effect March 14,
1899, was not retroactive, and did not authorize the assessment of such
shares for the fiscal year beginning in 1899.

-Dodge v. Nevada Nat. Bank, 109 Fed. 726........48 C. C. A. 626

§ 3336

.....

UNITED STATES.
STATUTES AT LARGE.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

1851, March 3, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631.. 642
1864, July 1, ch. 194, 13 Stat. 332.. 642
1866, July 25, ch. 242, 14 Stat. 239.. 520
1870, May 4, ch. 69, 16 Stat. 94. 520 $8 1240-1247
1871, March 3, ch. 122, § 23, 16

Stat. 573

.712, 713

1875, March 3, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 677 $ 3
1875, March 3, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 331$ 360S
1877. March 3, ch. 113, § 2, 19 Stat.
392

1878, June 3, ch. 150, 20 Stat. 88.

626

413

.... 517

POLITICAL CODE.

626

627

§ 3628 et seq..

626

524

LAWS.
1870, April 4, p. 801
1899, March 14, p. 96, ch. 80.

642

627

COLORADO.

MILLS ANNOTATED CODE.

345

331, 332
1878, June 3, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89.. 331
1887, March 3, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 677
1888. Aug. 13, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433 677
1889, March 2, ch. 392, 25 Stat. 873 574
1890, Aug. 19, ch. 862, 26 Stat. 320 128
1891. March 3, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat.
828
.160, 521 $ 60
1892, Aug. 4, ch. 375, 27 Stat. 348 331
1894, Aug. 13, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 677
1895, Feb. 18, ch. 96. 28 Stat. 666.. 160
1897, March 3, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 68
1897. July 24, ch. 11, § 1, Schedule
I, par. 302, 30 Stat. 175..
1898, July 1, ch. 541, § 3, subd. 1,
30 Stat. 546.

With Russia. 1832, art. 9.............. 971898, July 14, p. 312, No. 159, § 2.. 254

As defense to action on insurance policy, see "Insurance," § 5.

Const. Cal. art. 13, § 8, provides that the legislature shall by law re-
quire each taxpayer to make and deliver to the county assessor annually
a statement, under oath, setting forth all the real and personal property
owned by him, or in his possession or under his control, at 12 o'clock m.
on the first Monday of March. Pol. Code, § 3628 et seq., requires assess-
ors to list and assess all property between the first Mondays in March
and July to the person by whom it was owned at 12 o'clock m. on the
first Monday in March, and also makes the tax so assessed a lien upon
the real estate of the taxpayer from such date. Held, that under such
provisions the taxable status of property was determined by its condi-
tion on the first Monday in March, at 12 m., and that property which
on that date was not taxable under the statutes of the state was not
required to be returned by the owner, and could not be assessed for
taxation for that year, notwithstanding the passage of an act after that
date, but before the time for the closing of the assessments, making it
taxable, where such act operated only prospectively.

-Dodge v. Nevada Nat. Bank, 109 Fed. 726........48 C. C. A. 626

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.

1. Regulation and operation.

A telegraph company is liable to a bank for the loss occasioned to the
latter by its payment of money, without negligence, on a message pur-
48 C.C.A.-54

porting to have been sent by another bank, but which was in fact
concocted and forged by an operator employed by the telegraph com-
pany, whose duty it was to send messages, and who sent such message
in the usual manner over the company's line, and through its regular
agents. In such case the act of the operator in sending the false mes-
sage, although criminal, and unauthorized by the company, was within
the apparent scope of his employment, and if the message had been
genuine would have been within his actual authority, and it was only
by reason of such authority that he was enabled to consummate the
fraud. His act was also a violation of a duty which the company owed
to the public and third persons to transmit only genuine messages.

-Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Bank of Palo Alto, 109 Fed. 369....
48 C. C. A. 413
Civ. Code Cal. § 3336, providing that the damages recoverable for
wrongful conversion shall include "a fair compensation for the time
and money properly expended in pursuit of the property," does not ap-
ply to an action against a telegraph company to recover the amount of a
loss sustained through the fraudulent act of its agent, by which plaintiff
was induced to pay money to a third person, and does not authorize the
recovery in such action, as an element of damages, of attorney's fees
expended by the plaintiff in recovering a portion of the money from the
person to whom it was paid.

-Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Bank of Palo Alto, 109 Fed. 369....
48 C. C. A. 413

TIME.

As essence of contract, see "Vendor and Purchaser," § 1.
For payment of interest, see "Interest," § 2.
When property is taxable, see "Taxation," § 1.

TITLE.

Color of title, see "Adverse Possession."

Particular species of property or rights.
See "Patents," § 4; "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names," § 2.

Maritime torts, see "Collision."

TORTS.

TOWAGE.

See "Salvage," § 2.

Collisions with tugs and vessels in tow, see "Collision." § 3.

A tug cannot be charged with fault because of the breaking of a haw-
ser used for towing a ship, which was of sufficient size, made expressly
for its use, thoroughly tested, and guarantied to be of a strength greater
than was necessary, and had been in use but three months, and which
apparently broke because of the improper steering of the tow, which
placed it under a sudden and unusual strain.

-The Columbia, 109 Fed. 660; The Ravenscourt, Id.; The Tyee,
Id. ...
...48 C. C. A. 596

A tug had two tows on separate lines of different lengths. The shorter
line parted, and the tug at once reversed, and slackened the longer line.
but the tows came into collision. Held, that the tug could not be held
in fault for its failure to cut the hawser of the rear tow, where its action
in reversing accomplished the same result as promptly and effectually.
-The Columbia, 109 Fed. 660; The Ravenscourt, Id.; The Tyee,
.48 C. C. A. 596

Id.

A ship which consents to being towed with another vessel to avoid
delay, and without any advantage having been taken by the tug, assumes
the extra risk of the double tow, and cannot hold the tug liable for an
injury she sustains as a result, except on the ground of negligence in
the performance of the contract.

-The Columbia, 109 Fed. 660; The Ravenscourt, Id.; The Tyee.
Id. .....
...48 C. C. A. 596

A ship in tow cannot hold the tug responsible for her own failure to
follow the tug's course where the latter gave the proper signals to indi-
cate changes of course, the duty of proper steering devolving upon the
tow; nor does the fact that her sheering from the proper course could
have been seen from the tug impose upon the latter the duty of warn-
ing her, where there was no danger not as well known to the ship as to
the tug.

-The Columbia, 109 Fed. 660; The Ravenscourt, Id.; The Tyee,
Id.
.48 C. C. A. 596

TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES.

§ 1. Marks and names subjects of ownership.

Geographical terms and words descriptive of the character, quality,
or places of manufacture or of sale of articles cannot be monopolized
as trade-marks.

-Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821.........48 C. C. A. 48

§ 2. Title, conveyances, and contracts.

Abandonment of the right to the exclusive use of a distinctive package
or other dress for his goods by its originator, who has used it generally
and continuously for many years, is not shown by the fact that it has
been also used, not only by defendant, but by others, unless it further
appears that there has been such acquiescence by complainant as to in-
dicate, not only a practical abandonment, but also an intention to
abandon.

-Actiengesellschaft Vereinigte Ultramarin-Fabriken v. Amberg, 109
Fed. 151
....48 C. C. A. 264

83. Infringement and unfair competition.

One who offers the goods of one manufacturer under the well-known
names and established reputation of articles of another manufacturer
for the purpose of deceiving the public and defrauding the latter aggra-
vates, rather than justifies, his wrong by placing his own name upon
the packages.

-Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821.........48 C. C. A. 48
A manufacturer had applied to certain articles which it made the
names "American Ball Blue" and "American Wash Blue" until they be-
came well known to the trade and the public by these names, and com-
manded a large and lucrative trade. A firm of merchants applied these
names to goods of other manufacturers, and offered them for sale under
these names for the purpose of diverting complainant's trade to them-
selves. Held, the use of these names and of the word "American" there-
in by the defendants was properly enjoined.

-Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821.........48 C. C. A. 48
The sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of an-
other is unfair competition, and constitutes a fraud which a court of
equity may lawfully prevent by injunction.

-Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821.........48 C. C. A. 48
But the use of such geographical or descriptive terms to palm off
the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another, and to
carry on unfair competition, may be lawfully enjoined, by a court of
equity to the same extent as the use of any other terms or symbols.

-Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821.........48 C. C. A. 48

A proprietary interest in the terms or symbols used to palm off the
goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another, or to commit
any other fraud, is not essential to the maintenance of a suit to enjoin
the perpetration of the wrong, but an interest in the good will of the
business or in the other property threatened is sufficient.

-Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821..........48 C. C. A. 48
Defendants were formerly agents for the sale of phonographs which
are the invention of the complainant, Edison, and commonly known as
the "Edison Phonograph." While such agents they placed over their
place of business a sign reading "The Edison Phonograph Agency,"
which sign they allowed to remain after the termination of their agency,
although they continued to sell phonographs. Complainant neither man-
ufactured nor sold phonographs, but was a stockholder in the corpora
tions which manufactured and sold the same. Held, that the sign did
not imply that defendants were agents for complainant, but only that
they were agents for the sale of the machine known as the "Edison
Phonograph," and that complainant had no pecuniary interest in the
matter, either as an individual or as a stockholder, which entitled him
to maintain a bill to enjoin such use of his name.

-Edison v. Hawthorne, 108 Fed. 839..

TREATIES.

.48 C. C. A. 67

Construction of treaty relating to surrender of deserting seamen, see "Sea-
men."

TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE.

Pleading limitations to action, see "Limitation of Actions," § 1.

See "Witnesses."

TRIAL.

Criminal prosecutions, see "Criminal Law," § 1.
Of particular civil actions, see "Replevin," § 1.

§ 1. Course and conduct of trial in general.

Under the settled rule of the federal courts that the determination
of the right to open and close a case rests largely in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court, it is not an abuse of such discretion which can
be assigned as error that a court accorded the right to open and close
to plaintiff in an action to recover the price of machinery to which de-
fendant pleaded a partial defense, where the answer did not contain an
unequivocal admission of the sale and delivery of the machinery.
-Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Farrar, 109 Fed. 254..

§ 2. Taking case or question from jury.

48 C. C. A. 345

Where facts, as well as their bearing upon the injury of an employé,
were in issue in an action to recover from the master for such injury,
and the evidence was conflicting, the court properly declined to direct
a verdict.

-Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Conway, 108 Fed. 932....48 C. C. A. 147

§ 3. Instructions to jury.

Where the judge of a federal court undertakes to discuss in his
charge the evidence upon a question of fact which is submitted to the
jury, he should carefully separate the law from the facts, and submit
the latter unequivocally to the jury, in such form that the jury will
understand that as to the facts the instruction expresses merely his
opinion, by which they are not bound.

-Nyback v. Champagne Lumber Co., 109 Fed. 732..48 C. C. A. 632