of the relaxed discipline and disorder in the conduct of business in the court, and of giving place to a successor who might obtain their confidence and co-operation, which expressed in respectful language that the court had lost the confidence of the public, and suggested his retirement as the means of restoring it, is not a breach of professional fidelity on the part of the attorneys which would authorize the court to strike their names from the roll.-In re Austin, 5 Rawle, 191, 28 Am. Dec. 657.

[g] (Pa. Sup. 1835) In Pennsylvania, an attorney is regarded as holding an office during good behavior, and is not responsible for scrutinizing the conduct of a judge in any way that would not render him liable as a citizen. In re Austin, 5 Rawle, 191, 28 Am. Dec. 657.

[h] (Pa. Sup. 1880) Two attorneys, who also edited a paper, published, concerning a case which had been tried, and in which case the editors had no interest, that the acquittal was secured by "a prostitution of the machinery of justice to serve the exigencies of the Republican party." Held that, though the article may have been libelous, it was not ground for disbarment; as a libel of the court, to amount to a breach of professional duty, must have been designed to acquire an influence over the judge in the exercise of his judicial functions by the instrumentality of popular prejudice.-Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637, reversing 8 Wkly. Notes Cas. 296. [i] (Pa. Com. Pl. 1896) In proceedings to disbar an attorney who was defendant in a certain suit in the common pleas, it appeared that he had been informed that one of the judges had handed down an opinion in the case, and taken it back again for further consideration; that the judge informed him that it was a mistake; that afterwards the attorney wrote him: "Being your friend from the very first day of my introduction to you, it would seem that I might at least claim fair treatment at your hands. More than this I do not want, nor have I ever, from any man, claimed more. It being stated to me that in open court you announced your opinion in the case, * discharging the rule to show cause why the appeal should not be stricken off, and at the request of K. and B., in my absence, you took the opinion back, upon further inquiry this statement was confirmed by other gentlemen who were then present in court. Now, if you once had the case, and once decided it, it does not seem to me to be either just or fair for you to turn the case over to another judge." Held, that the writing of such letter was grossly unprofessional, and that such attorney should be disbarred.-In re Smith, 2 Lack. Leg. N. 152.

[j] (Tex. Sup. 1858) Scurrilous epithets applied to a judge in vacation by an attorney do not constitute a contempt, within the meaning of Act 1854, p. 118, § 2, authorizing disbarment for contempts involving fraudulent or dishonorable conduct or malpractice.-Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668.

[k] (W. Va. App. 1889) The circuit court may, by summary proceedings, according to the common law, strike from its roll the name of an attorney who is guilty of writing and publishing in a newspaper a false and libelous charge against the judge of such court, in respect to his official conduct; and the disclaimer by the attorney of intentional wrong or disrespect to the judge or court will not excuse him, when the contrary appears upon a fair interpretation of the language employed.-State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, 10 S. E. 407.

[1] (Wyo. Sup. 1884) An attorney who, in conversation, has applied to the court vile and opprobrious and indecent epithets, may be deprived of his license to practice, as well under the common law as under a statute allowing it for willful violation of any of the duties of attorney or counselor.-In re Brown, 3 Wyo. 121, 4 Pac. 1085.

18.

Statements and Criticisms in Proceedings in Court.

[a] (U. S. C. C., Cal., 1869) The name of a proctor will be stricken from the rolls of the federal court for contempt in filing a notice of motion to set aside a decree on the ground that the same was rendered without any consideration or deliberation, without examination of the pleadings, proofs, or written arguments, and was the result "of either prejudice or corruption," and in "willful violation of a known duty."-In re Hastings, Fed. Cas. No. 6,199.

[b] (Cal. Sup. 1895) An attorney who, in his brief in the supreme court, without ground, characterizes an associate justice thereof as a corrupt person, and alleges that, if the supreme court decides adversely to his client, the general public will see that it is corrupt, should be suspended from practice. -In re Philbrook, 105 Cal. 471, 38 Pac. 884, 45 Am. St. Rep. 59.

[c] (Colo. Sup. 1887) Assistant counsel, who signed pleadings maliciously charging a judge with corrupt practices, but who appeared to have acted without malice, though with too little caution and circumspection, was merely suspended.-People v. Green, 9 Colo. 506, 13 Pac. 514.

[d] (Colo. Sup. 1887) An attorney maliciously charged in his pleadings, as material facts, and without probable cause, that an attorney in an action offered, and the judge who tried the cause accepted, a bribe for the rendition of an unwarranted judgment; that both induced a witness before a grand jury, by whom these facts were investigated, to commit perjury; and that both corruptly induced the prosecuting attorney to enter a nolle prosequi to the indictments resulting from this investigation. Held, that he should be disbarred; the materiality of the facts being no privilege on a question as to whether his attorney's license should be revoked.-People v. Green, 9 Colo. 506, 13 Pac. 514.

[e] (Colo. Sup. 1892) An attorney at law who falsely and maliciously charges the county judge with falsifying the records of his court, and with acting oppressively and corruptly, and who, on demurrer to the petition. makes a further attack, should be disbarred or suspended.-People v. Brown, 17 Colo. 431, 30 Pac. 338.

[f] (Fla. Sup. 1882) In proceedings to disbar an attorney, it appeared that he had received from the files of the court the papers in a divorce suit against him; that he admitted their loss or destruction by a friend, but failed otherwise to account for them or to give the name of such friend; that during the progress of the divorce case he repeatedly accused the chancellor of being one of an alleged combination against him to control his property, and claimed, in effect, that his wife did not institute the suit for divorce of her free will or desire, but was induced to do so by the persons belonging to such combination; and that he offered no evidence in support of his charge. Held that a judgment disbarring him was proper.-State v. Maxwell, 19 Fla. 31.

[g] (Ky. App. 1874) Where a contempt consists in the use of offensive language by an attorney to a judge, it is immaterial whether it be spoken openly, or presented to the court in a written or printed argument. In re Woolley, 74 Ky. 95.

[h] (Ky. App. 1874) A petition for rehearing is not a pleading, but an argument addressed to the court; and it is contempt for an attorney to incorporate therein contemptuous, scandalous, or insulting matter.-In re Woolley, 74 Ky. 95.

[i] (La. Sup. 1821) An attorney will be suspended from his practice in the supreme court for indecorous language in an application for a rehearing.— In re De Armas, 10 Mart. (O. S.) 123.

[j] (Mich. Sup. 1899) Statements by an attorney, made in an affidavit filed in a case, charging the judge with "outrageous, persistent, continued illegal and unlawful rulings," and also charging that he was guilty of accepting bribes, and had co-operated with attorneys in a "diabolical plot," which was "a malicious, vindictive, corrupt concoction" to place defendant under arrest and get control of his witnesses, are, when unsupported, sufficient grounds for disbarment.--In re Mains, 121 Mich. 603, 80 N. W. 714.

[k] (N. Y. Sup. 1890) An attorney, in an affidavit made by himself, and filed in a surrogate's court, charged the surrogate with corrupt practices, and also charged him, while presiding in open court, with being an infamous, forsworn, and corrupt judge. When arraigned in the supreme court for this misconduct, he reiterated the charges in an affidavit, and insisted upon the truth of them. Held, that he should be disbarred.-In re Murray, 58 Hun, 604, 11 N. Y. Supp. 336.

19. Proceedings for Disbarment.

[a] (Cal. Sup. 1862) The facts in a case being of a nature susceptible of explanation, it was held that the action of the court in striking the attorney

from the rolls for contempt, and adjudging him to be "infamous," without inquiring as to the existence of an explanation, was without precedent and wholly illegal.-Fletcher v. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 427.

[b] (Colo. Sup. 1874) An attorney, guilty of a contempt of court, may be suspended until he pays the fine imposed therefor.-Butler v. People, 2 Colo. 295.

[c] (Ind. Sup. 1867) Proceedings to disbar are regulated by 2 Gav. & H. St. p. 330, § 780; and, though an attorney may have been guilty of a contempt which would have justified the imposition of a fine or imprisonment, he cannot be disbarred for such an offense by a summary order.-Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47.

[d] (Ky. App. 1874) A supposed contempt by an attorney to the court consisting in mere words apparently intended to be scandalous and offensive, but which are susceptible of a different construction, may be explained by the speaker; and, on his sworn disavowal of an intention to commit a contempt, proceedings against him should be discontinued; but, where the matter is of itself necessarily offensive and insulting, the disavowal, though it may tend to excuse, cannot justify, the act.-In re Woolley, 74 Ky. 95.

[e] (Ky. App. 1874) Where an offense in the nature of a contempt is committed in the presence of the court, notice to the offender is not necessary before punishment. In re Woolley, 74 Ky. 95.

[f] (N. C. Sup. 1870) An attorney, who was also editor of a newspaper, wrote and published an article in which, after referring to the judge of a superior court as (in inverted commas) "his honor," "judge," etc., he said that the charge to the grand jury was "almost identically similar with the one delivered here six months since, with this important exception: 'His honor' seems to have somewhat deserted the profane poetical masters, and confined most of his quotations to the Holy Scriptures, a happy omen, if it's possible to believe anything happy in such a character"; whereupon he was called upon, by rule of court, to show cause why he should not be disbarred. He answered, disavowing that he "ever entertained any intention of committing any contempt of the court, or any purpose to destroy or impair its authority or the respect due thereto." Held, that the answer was responsive, denying criminal intent; and therefore the court was not allowed to question its truth, but should have discharged the rule.-Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202. [g] (N. D. Sup. 1896) Certain contempts of court committed by an attorney are grounds for his suspension or disbarment; but an attorney cannot be lawfully suspended or disbarred as a punishment for contempt, inflicted in a summary and quasi criminal proceeding, and conducted in accordance with the statute governing prosecutions for the offense of contempt of court.— State v. Root, 5 N. D. 487, 67 N. W. 590, 57 Am. St. Rep. 568.

(108 Fed. 764.)

NASHUA SAVINGS BANK v. ANGLO-AMERICAN LAND-MORTGAGE & AGENCY CO., Limited.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit. April 24, 1901.)

No. 303.

1. EVIDENCE-AUTHENTICATION OF FOREIGN STATUTES.

In an action by a corporation of Great Britain against a stockholder to enforce liability for unpaid assessments on the stock. the statutes governing such liability are sufficiently authenticated and proved by the testimony of an English solicitor, familiar with company law, and who was also a director in the company, stating under what acts it was organized, and that copies which he produced were copies of such acts, and also that they were published by governmental authority.

2. APPEAL-REVIEW-QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY RECORD.

Where the record on a writ of error from the circuit court does not purport to contain all the evidence, or all the material evidence, the ques

tions whether the court erred in refusing a request to direct a verdict for defendant, or in directing a verdict for plaintiff, cannot be considered.

3. SAME-PRESUMPTIONS-FAILURE OF RECORD TO SHOW THAT IT CONTAINS ALL THE EVIDENCE.

In an action by a foreign corporation against a stockholder to recover an assessment made on his stock, the fact that no evidence was offered by plaintiff to show that it was insolvent when the assessment was made, or that such call or assessment was made for the benefit of creditors or in payment of debts, does not preclude a recovery, where, under the statutes governing the corporation, calls might legally be made for other purposes; and where, on appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, the record does not purport to contain all the evidence, it must be presumed that due proof was made of the regularity of the corporate meetings and of the calls.

4. FOREIGN CORPORATION-ACTION AGAINST STOCKHOLDER TO RECOVER ASSESSMENT-LAW GOVERNING LIABILITY.

In an action by a foreign corporation in a court of the United States against a stockholder to recover a call made upon his stock, which by the statutes under which the corporation was organized is made a debt from the stockholder to the corporation, for which the corporation is also given a lien on the stock, the plaintiff is not restricted to the forfeiture and sale of defendant's stock, because that is the only remedy provided by the laws of the state in which the action is brought, but may enforce defendant's personal liability. Strictly speaking, such action is not based upon the foreign statute, but on the contract voluntarily made by the defendant when he became a stockholder, of which such statute defining the liability of stockholders became a part.

5. ACTION-FORM-ASSUMPSIT.

The English companies act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 16) provides that "all moneys payable by any member to the company in pursuance of the conditions and regulations shall be deemed to be a debt due from such member to the company; and in England and Ireland to be in the nature of a specialty debt." Held, that assumpsit was the proper form of action in a court of the United States to enforce the liability of a stockholder to a company organized under such acts for a call made upon his stock pursuant to the provisions thereof.

Aldrich, District Judge, dissenting.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Hampshire.

John S. H. Frink, for plaintiff in error.

Omar Powell (Gilbert A. Davis and Daniel L. Cady, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before COLT, Circuit Judge, and ALDRICH and BROWN, District Judges.

BROWN, District Judge. This writ of error is to review the rulings of the circuit court in an action of assumpsit by the AngloAmerican Land-Mortgage & Agency Company, Limited, a corporation of Great Britain, to recover from the Nashua Savings Bank, a New Hampshire corporation, a stockholder in the Anglo-American Company, unpaid assessments upon stock. A verdict was directed for the plaintiff below, now defendant in error.

The first exception requiring consideration relates to the sufficiency of proof of the statutes of Great Britain that govern the Anglo-American Company, and also provide that "all moneys payable by any member to the company in pursuance of the conditions

and regulations shall be deemed to be a debt due from such member to the company; and in England and Ireland to be in the nature of a specialty debt." 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 16. We are of the opinion that the statutes were sufficiently authenticated by the deposition of an English solicitor familiar with company law, and a managing director of the Anglo-American Company. He states under what laws the company was organized, referring to them by their titles, and testifies that he produces copies of the acts, and also that "these copies are issued by authority, being printed by her majesty's printer, and are as such by law receivable in evidence without further proof." We have, therefore, evidence from a competent witness not only that the documents are copies of the laws under which the company was organized, but also evidence authenticating printed copies of these laws. The witness does not, as counsel contend, simply produce certain transcripts which he says prove themselves, but states upon his own authority that they are copies of the laws, and also by his oath authenticates the documents as official copies. This proof is ample. Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 238, 2 L. Ed. 249; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 426, 14 L. Ed. 472; Hall v. Costello, 48 N. H. 176; Kennard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303; State v. Davis, 69 N. H. 350, 41 Atl. 267; Barrows v. Downs, 9 R. I. 446; The Pawashick, 2 Low. 142, Fed. Cas. No. 10,851. The plaintiff therefore clearly proved that the defendant, as a stockholder, voluntarily assumed such liability as is set forth in the portion of the statute we have quoted.

The majority of the court are of the opinion that, as the record does not purport to contain all the evidence, or all the material evidence, the questions whether the circuit court erred in declining the defendant's request to direct a verdict for the defendant, and whether that court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, cannot be considered. City of Providence v. Babcock, 3 Wall. 240, 244, 18 L. Ed. 31; Railroad Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 606, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, 36 L. Ed. 829; Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397, 16 Sup. Ct. 571, 40 L. Ed. 746; Yates v. U. S., 32 C. C. A. 507, 90 Fed. 57, 62.

It appears from the record that the plaintiff introduced no evidence that the plaintiff corporation was insolvent at the time of making the calls or assessments sued upon, or that the call or assessment was made for the benefit of creditors or in payment of its debts; but this statement does not cover all the purposes for which calls might be made legally, and the statement that this proof was absent does not make it appear affirmatively that other and sufficient proof was not presented. It does not appear that the call was not regularly made, and for proper purposes. The objection made upon the motion to direct a verdict that the declaration contained no averment or allegation upon what conditions the plaintiff was authorized to make such calls or assessments does not raise the question of the sufficiency of proof that the call was duly made. We are bound to assume, upon this incomplete record, that the proofs of the regularity of this call were sufficient. The necessity for applying in this case the rule of law that regularity of proceedings in the trial court shall be assumed until the contrary appears is shown by the fact that the learned judge, in his remarks preliminary to the 48 C.C.A.-2