fied." 28 U. S. C. §2254 Rule 2(c). For federal habeas law to demand less of the petitioner when in state court is inconsistent with the premise of that Rule-that courts are entitled to be notified of the specific basis of a claim, especially if the claim is one for extraordinary relief. See also Fed. Rule Evid. 103(a)(1). It is also inconsistent with the premise of the exhaustion doctrine that state courts provide the primary forum for the adjudication of claims of even federal error in state criminal proceedings. See Rose v. Lundy, supra.

Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are becoming as much a part of state and federal habeas corpus proceedings as the bailiffs' call to order in those courts. Furthermore, other constitutional claims-for example, the right to confrontation, the right to a fair trial, and the right to an impartial tribunal-likewise rest on specific allegations of error and often require review of the entire record as part of the constitutional examination. The Court of Appeals' questionable approach to the exhaustion rule of 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(b), (c), would apply to these claims as well. I would grant the petition for certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals' holding in light of its potential for interference with the relations of state and federal courts.

No. 83-533. NICHOLSON v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ET AL. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of American Farm Bureau Federation et al. and Louisiana Landmarks Society for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. ported below: 229 U. S. App. D. C. 86, 711 F. 2d 364.

Re

No. 83-589. HOPI INDIAN TRIBE v. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL.; and

No. 83-669. NAVAJO MEDICINEMEN'S ASSN. ET AL. v. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of All Indian Pueblo Council et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in No. 83-589 granted. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and these petitions. Reported below: 228 U. S. App. D. C. 166, 708 F. 2d 735.

No. 83-692. LOCAL UNION NO. 47, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA ET AL. Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the full opinion below

granted. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.

No. 83-725. FREY, SUPERINTENDENT, MISSOURI EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY v. ANDERSON. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 F. 2d 1304.

No. 83-748.

IN RE DELGADO. Sup. Ct. S. C. Motion of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 279 S. C. 293, 306 S. E. 2d 591.

No. 83-830. LIMBACH, TAX COMMISSIONER OF OHIO v. BOOTHE FINANCIAL CORP. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 6 Ohio St. 3d 247, 452 N. E. 2d 1295.

No. 83-5365. YOUNG v. GEORGIA. Sup. Ct. Ga. denied. Reported below: 251 Ga. 153, 303 S. E. 2d 431.

Certiorari

JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

I dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari because it lets stand a ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court which violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 794 (1969). Because of the Georgia Supreme Court's blatant misreading of a decision by the United States Court of Appeals which granted habeas corpus relief to the petitioner, he will again be subjected to the State's attempt to impose a death sentence upon him even though a Federal District Court has made an undisturbed ruling that a death sentence recommended by a jury was invalid due to insufficiency of the evidence.

In February 1976, the petitioner, Charlie Young, Jr., was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and robbery by intimidation. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury condemned the petitioner to death after finding that the murder was accompanied by two statutorily defined aggravating circumstances: the murder was committed while the petitioner was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, Ga. Code Ann. §17-10-30(b)(2)

MARSHALL, J., dissenting

464 U. S. (1982), and the petitioner committed the murder for the purpose of receiving money, §17-10-30(b)(4). The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction and the sentence. Young v. State, 237 Ga. 852, 230 S. E. 2d 287 (1976). Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a lower state court's denial of Young's application for habeas corpus relief. Young v. Ricketts, 242 Ga. 559, 250 S. E. 2d 404 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Young v. Zant, 442 U. S. 934 (1979).

Young then initiated habeas corpus proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The District Court rejected Young's challenge to the validity of his conviction but set aside his death sentence. Young v. Zant, 506 F. Supp. 274 (1980). The District Court's order was based upon two holdings. First, the court held that Young had been denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage of his trial, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Id., at 278. Second, the District Court held that

'In addition to the death sentence, the jury also sentenced Young to life imprisonment for armed robbery and to 20 years' imprisonment for robbery by intimidation.

2 The District Court found that the petitioner's attorney had no understanding whatsoever of the Georgia capital trial and sentencing procedures. In a capital case in Georgia, there is first a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. A separate sentencing hearing follows a determination of guilt. In effect, capital sentencing is a trial on the issue of punishment, embodying the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence. See infra, at

1061–1062.

The petitioner's attorney failed to present any evidence during the sentencing hearing in mitigation of punishment, and refused to allow the petitioner to take the stand in his own behalf, thereby depriving the petitioner of the only sentencing phase witness for the defense the petitioner himself. Young v. Zant, 506 F. Supp., at 278–280.

The District Court rejected the petitioner's claim that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel at the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial, finding that the petitioner's attorney afforded him "reasonably effective assistance." Id., at 278. This finding, however, is inconsistent with the court's observation that the petitioner's attorney "had no apparent understanding whatsoever of the bifurcated nature of the Georgia capital trial and sentencing procedures," id., at 278–279, and that the attorney had used the utterly ridiculous strategy of admitting guilt but pleading for a life sentence at the guilt phase of the trial. Id., at 279. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed this finding, holding instead that the petitioner had also been denied effective assistance at the guilt phase of his trial. Young v. Zant, 677 F. 2d 792 (CA11 1982).

1057

MARSHALL, J., dissenting

the evidence presented at trial "was not legally sufficient to support the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in the course of an armed robbery or for the purpose of obtaining money." Id., at 280 (emphasis in original).

3

The United States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's rejection of Young's challenge to his conviction. Young v. Zant, 677 F. 2d 792 (CA11 1982). The Court of Appeals held that Young had also been denied effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial. Finding the conviction invalid, the appellate court directed the District Court to grant the petitioner habeas corpus relief. The Court of Appeals noted the District Court's holding that Young had been denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of the trial, id., at 795, and its holding that insufficiency of the evidence nullified the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances. Id., at 799, and n. 12. However, the Court of Appeals did not discuss either of these holdings.

In the wake of the federal appellate decision, the State reindicted Young for the same offenses. Moreover, the State again sought the death penalty based upon the same two aggravating circumstances previously charged, along with an additional allegation that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1982).*

Young resisted the State's renewed attempt to impose the death penalty upon him, claiming that such an attempt would expose him to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court, however, denied his plea of dou

According to the Court of Appeals, the attorney "did not accord Young even a modicum of professional assistance at any time" during the trial. Id., at 794-795.

'The District Court practically invited the State to renew its attempt to seek the death penalty against Young by suggesting that "the circumstances of this murder may justify a finding of some other aggravating circumstance, such as aggravated battery." 506 F. Supp., at 281. Subsequent to the District Court's suggestion but prior to the State's decision to seek the death penalty at Young's retrial, this Court held in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), that the Double Jeopardy Clause was applicable to capital sentencing hearings like the one to which the petitioner was subjected at his first trial. See infra, at 1061–1062.

MARSHALL, J., dissenting

464 U. S.

ble jeopardy. Young then filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia. That court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the trial court. 251 Ga. 153, 303 S. E. 2d 431 (1983). The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated by this case because, in its view, the Federal Court of Appeals' decision reversing the District Court vacated not only that part of the District Court's holding which related to Young's conviction, but also that part of the holding which related to the insufficiency of the evidence underlying the jury finding of aggravating circumstances. In the words of the Georgia Supreme Court:

"Rather than reversing in part and affirming in part, the court of appeals chose to substitute its opinion for that of the district court. . . . [T]he effect of this reversal was to nullify the entire opinion of the district court and to place the parties in the position quo ante, subject, of course, to the holdings of the court of appeals." Id., at 155, 303 S. E. 2d, at 433.

In other words, according to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals' decision wiped away the District Court's holding that the finding of aggravating circumstances was invalid and thus removed that holding as an impediment to a renewed attempt to impose the death penalty.

This Court should review the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia because it clearly misread the ruling of the Court of Appeals and thereby improperly avoided the petitioner's compelling double jeopardy claim. Purporting to interpret the Court of Appeals' ruling, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the effect of the reversal by the Court of Appeals of part of the District Court's holding regarding federal habeas corpus relief was to nullify the entire opinion of the District Court. In reality, however, the Court of Appeals' decision related only to the question whether petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at the guilt-or-innocence phase of his trial. Reversing the District

"The Court of Appeals did not review the District Court's finding of insufficiency of the evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial because, having ruled that Young's conviction was illegal, there was no need to review the propriety of the sentence. The Court of Appeals thus left that aspect of the District Court's ruling undisturbed.