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No. 83-5753. THOMAS v. MAGGIO, WARDEN. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5756.

Certiorari denied.

REINER V. BIDLACK ET AL. C. A. 6th Cir.
Reported below: 709 F. 2d 1507.

No. 83-5757. CAMPBELL v. GUY ET AL. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 F. 2d 1055.

No. 83-5759. GRAHAM v. EAST ORANGE C. E. T. A. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5760. HILLIE v. MAGGIO, WARDEN, ET AL. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 F. 2d 182.

No. 83-5762. LILLEY V. NEW YORK. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 App. Div. 2d 714, 465 N. Y. S. 2d 369.

No. 83-5763.

Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5766. Certiorari denied.

GOMEZ-DIAZ v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 5th Cir.
Reported below: 712 F. 2d 949.

GENTSCH v. CLARK ET AL.

C. A. 5th Cir.

No. 83-5769. LONG v. RISON, WARDEN, ET AL. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 F. 2d 1400.

No. 83-5775. O'BRIEN v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 F. 2d 742.

No. 83-5777. ANDERSON v. DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, COLORADO. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5779. Certiorari denied.

THEISEN v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 8th Cir.
Reported below: 713 F. 2d 394.

SMITH v. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COM-
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported

No. 83-5781. MISSION ET AL. below: 716 F. 2d 892.

No. 83-5786.

RUFF v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 F. 2d 855.

No. 83-5798. ARNOLD v. UNITED STATES. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

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No. 83-5800. MCKNIGHT v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

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No. 83-5805. HAWKINS v. UNITED STATES. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 461 A. 2d 1025.

No. 83-5812. FOSTER v. FLORIDA. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 436 So. 2d 56.

No. 83-5817.

BENDER v. UNITED STATES.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 F. 2d 681.

No. 83-5822.

C. A. 7th Cir.

BLANCO v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 F. 2d 154.

No. 83-5828. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5834. C. A. 5th Cir. 1095.

No. 83-5839.

SOWARDS v. UNITED STATES.
Reported below: 722 F. 2d 743.

C. A. 6th Cir.

QUINTANA-SAMANIEGO v. UNITED STATES. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 F. 2d

GODWIN v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 F. 2d 839.

No. 83-207. ARIYOSHI, GOVERNOR OF HAWAII, ET AL. v.

PEKARSKY ET AL. C. A. 9th Cir. BLACKMUN would grant certiorari. 352.

Certiorari denied. JUSTICE
Reported below: 695 F. 2d

No. 83-783. DAVIS v. GLADSTONE ET AL. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant certiorari. Reported below: 714 F. 2d 512.

No. 83-243. BROWN & ROOT, INC., ET AL. v. THORNTON ET AL. C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of respondents Billy Thornton and James Broussard for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 F. 2d 149.

No. 83-382. RUSH v. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ET AL. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of peti

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tioner to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 227 U. S. App. D. C. 325, 706 F. 2d 1229.

No. 83-459. WASHINGTON STATE CHARTERBOAT ASSN. v. BALDRIGE, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Quileute Indian Tribe et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 702 F. 2d 820.

No. 83-506. MCKASKLE, ACTING DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. VELA. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 F. 2d 954.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

This petition presents the important question whether the exhaustion rule in 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(b), (c), prohibits federal courts from considering federal habeas corpus petitions that contain specific allegations of error that are integral to the constitutional challenge but were not raised in the state courts. Because the question has great significance for the relations between federal and state courts, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

I

Respondent, Conrado Vela, pleaded guilty to a Texas murder indictment. After a jury found he had killed with malice, respondent was sentenced to 99 years' imprisonment. The conviction was upheld on direct appeal. See Vela v. State, 516 S. W. 2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Respondent then filed consecutive petitions for writs of habeas corpus in state and federal courts, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In both petitions, respondent raised the same three allegations of error as support for his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Both the state courts and the Federal District Court found that the three errors, when considered in the context of the entire record, were not cumulatively of such magnitude to render counsel's conduct of the trial as a whole constitutionally infirm. The courts also held that respondent was not prejudiced from any inadequacy that could be found. See Ex parte Vela, Application No. 9209, pp. 20–22 (June 4, 1980) (state court); Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. E-1-E-8 (Federal District Court).

O'CONNOR, J., dissenting

464 U. S.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presenting the same three allegations of counsel error and, for the first time, raising other allegations of error as well. The Court of Appeals decided that the exhaustion requirement of 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(b), (c), did not prevent it from considering the additional instances of alleged ineffective assistance. Though these additional instances of ineffectiveness had not specifically been brought to the attention of the state courts, the Court of Appeals noted that the alleged errors were contained in the trial record and that the state courts purportedly had reviewed the entire record in finding counsel's performance adequate in the "totality of the circumstances." Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the alleged 'new facts' [were] not new at all," and that respondent had exhausted all available state remedies. Vela v. Estelle, 708 F. 2d 954, 960 (1983). On the merits, it found that respondent had received ineffective assistance at trial because his counsel had committed the three "central errors" raised in the state-court petition and "several other serious errors as well." Id., at 961-965. The court concluded that respondent had suffered prejudice of sufficient magnitude to warrant granting a writ of habeas corpus. Id., at 965–966.

II

Whatever the correctness of the Court of Appeals' “ineffective assistance" determination, see Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. E-2— E-8, this petition raises an issue of considerable importance to the administration of federal habeas corpus. The Fifth Circuit's consideration of factual allegations not specifically raised in the state court undermines the policies behind the requirement that state remedies be exhausted before federal habeas corpus relief becomes available.

The exhaustion rule "reflects a policy of federal-state comity" that is fundamental to our federal system. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275 (1971). It "serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights." Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U. S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam). For the State to have that opportunity, "the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts." Picard v. Connor, supra, at 275. A federal habeas petitioner making a claim critically dependent on specific allegations of error never

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O'CONNOR, J., dissenting

brought to the state court's attention has not "fairly presented" that claim. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 526-527, 531-532 (1982) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment) (interrelated claims requiring exhaustion are those necessitating examination of the entire record). Upsetting a state-court criminal conviction on the basis of such allegations improperly usurps the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law.

Of course, the state courts have the entire record, and thus the essential facts, before them in every constitutional case. But that is obviously beside the point. The exhaustion rule requires that the habeas petitioner do more than make available to the state courts all facts necessary to support a claim. It requires the petitioner to identify for the state courts' attention the constitutional claim alleged to be inherent in those facts. See Picard v. Connor, supra, at 277. Much as with our rules on direct review, the exhaustion rule requires that the habeas petitioner, and not the state-court judges, bear the burden of severing the bad from the good and of raising those errors supportive of an alleged constitutional claim. See Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 499-501 (1981) (principle of comity behind "properly-raised-federal-question" doctrine similar to principle behind exhaustion doctrine). When the state courts are not informed of the specific errors on which a constitutional claim is based, it cannot be said that they were given a fair opportunity to consider the claim in the same posture as was the federal court.

That state courts evaluate the assistance of counsel in the context of the entire trial record cannot mean that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. In Rose v. Lundy, supra, at 519, we said that an exhausted claim could not be considered by a federal habeas court if the claim depended in part on another claim not raised in the state courts, even if the state courts, in rejecting the exhausted claim, had reviewed the entire record. The exhaustion rule requires that the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim first be presented to the state courts, Picard v. Connor, supra, at 278, and the substance of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is identified by the list of alleged errors committed by counsel. See Domaingue v. Butterworth, 641 F. 2d 8, 12-13 (CA1 1981). Unless the state courts have been pointed to a particular error of counsel, a claim based on that error is unexhausted.

A Federal Rule requires habeas petitioners "to set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus speci

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