Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub
[blocks in formation]

capacity" and "duty status" to indicate that an employee is "on the job" and entitled to all the usual liabilities and privileges of employment. See, e. g., §§ 5751, 6322(b) (employee summoned to testify in "official capacity" entitled to travel expenses).14

The difficulty with respondents' argument is that Congress did not provide that employees engaged in collective bargaining are acting in their "official capacity," "on the job," or in a "duty status." Instead, the right to a salary conferred by § 7131(a) obtains only when "the employee otherwise would be in a duty status" (emphasis supplied). This qualifying language strongly suggests that union negotiators engaged in collective bargaining are not considered in a duty status and thereby entitled to all of their normal forms of compensation. Nor does the phrase "official time," borrowed from prior administrative practice, have the same meaning as "official capacity." 15 As noted above, employees on "official time" under the Executive Order regime were not generally entitled to travel expenses and a per diem allowance. See supra, at 100-101. Moreover, as respondents' own examples demonstrate, Congress does not rely on the mere use of the word "official" when it intends to allow travel expenses and per diems. Even as to those employees acting in an "official capacity," Congress generally provides explicit authorization for such payments. See, e. g., §§ 5702, 5751(b), 6322(b). In the Civil Service Reform Act itself, for instance, Congress expressly provided that members of the Federal Service

14 The Authority seemed to rely on this distinction between "duty status" and "leave" in its Interpretation when it stated that an employee negotiator "is on paid time entitled to his or her usual compensation and is not in leave status." 2 F. L. R. A., at 269.

15 Similarly, the statement of Representative Clay that employee representatives "should be allowed official time to carry out their statutory representational activities just as management uses official time to carry out its responsibilities," 124 Cong. Rec. 29188 (1978), does not indicate that Congress intended union representatives to be treated as if they are "at work" for all purposes.

[blocks in formation]

Impasses Panel are entitled to travel expenses and a per diem allowance, in addition to a salary. See §§5703, 7119(c)(4).16

Perhaps recognizing that authority for travel expenses and per diem allowances cannot be found within the four corners of $7131(a), respondents alternatively contend that the Authority's decision is supported by the Travel Expense Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5702(a) (1982 ed.), which provides that a federal employee "traveling on official business away from his designated post of duty. . . is entitled to . . . a per diem allowance." The Travel Expense Act is administered by the Comptroller General who has concluded that agencies may authorize per diem allowances for travel that is "sufficiently in the interest of the United States so as to be regarded as official business." 44 Comp. Gen. 188, 189 (1964). Under the Executive Order regime, the Comptroller General authorized per diem payments to employee negotiators pursuant to this statute upon a certification that the employees' travel served the convenience of the employing agency. See n. 11, supra.

Based on its view that employee negotiators are "on the job," the Authority determined that union representatives engaged in collective bargaining are on "official business" and therefore entitled to a per diem allowance under the Travel Expense Act. 2 F. L. R. A., at 269. In support of this reasoning, the Authority notes that § 5702(a) has been construed broadly to authorize reimbursement in connection with a va

16 As further support for their reading of "official time," respondents contend that union representatives engaged in collective bargaining may be entitled to benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U. S. C. §8101 et seq. (1982 ed.), and may create Government liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b) (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The fact that other federal statutes, with different purposes, may be construed to apply to employee negotiators, however, does not demonstrate that, in enacting the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress intended to treat union negotiators as engaged in official business of the Government.

[blocks in formation]

riety of "quasi-official" activities, such as employees' attendance at their own personnel hearings and at privately sponsored conferences. See, e. g., Comptroller General of the United States, Travel in the Management and Operation of Federal Programs 1, App. I, p. 5 (Rpt. No. FPCD-77-11, Mar. 17, 1977); 31 Comp. Gen. 346 (1952). In each of these instances, however, the travel in question was presumably for the convenience of the agency and therefore clearly constituted "official business" of the Government. As we have explained, neither Congress' declaration that collective bargaining is in the public interest nor its use of the term of art "official time" warrants the conclusion that employee negotiators are on "official business" of the Government."7

IV

In passing the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress unquestionably intended to strengthen the position of federal unions and to make the collective-bargaining process a more effective instrument of the public interest than it had been under the Executive Order regime. See supra, at 91-93. There is no evidence, however, that the Act departed from the basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the pub

17 Our conclusion that federal agencies may not be required under § 7131(a) to pay the travel expenses and per diem allowances of union negotiators does not, of course, preclude an agency from making such payments upon a determination that they serve the convenience of the agency or are otherwise in the primary interest of the Government, as was the practice prior to passage of the Act. See n. 11, supra. Furthermore, unions may presumably negotiate for such payments in collective bargaining as they do in the private sector. See Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706 F. 2d 401, 405 (CA2 1983); Axelson, Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F. 2d 91, 93-95 (CA5 1979). Indeed, we are informed that many agencies presently pay the travel expenses of employee representatives pursuant to collectivebargaining agreements. Letter from Ruth E. Peters, Counsel for Respondent FLRA, Nov. 9, 1983. See also J. P. Stevens & Co., 239 N. L. R. B. 738, 739 (1978) (employer required to pay travel expenses as remedy for failing to bargain in good faith).

[blocks in formation]

lic and the private sector that the parties "proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest." NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 488 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 394 (1982). Nor did the Act confer on the FLRA an unconstrained authority to equalize the economic positions of union and management. See American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S., at 316-318. We conclude, therefore, that the FLRA's interpretation of §7131(a) constitutes an "unauthorized assumption by [the] agency of [a] major policy decisio[n] properly made by Congress." Id., at 318.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Per Curiam

SULLIVAN v. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

No. A-409. Decided November 29, 1983

In 1973, applicant was convicted of murder in a Florida state court and sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, and this Court denied certiorari. After exhausting state postconviction remedies, applicant filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, which denied the writ. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and this Court denied certiorari. After another petition for postconviction relief in state court was denied in 1983 and affirmed on appeal, applicant filed a second habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, which again declined to issue the writ, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Applicant then filed the instant application for a stay of execution with the Circuit Justice, who referred it to the Court. Applicant raises five claims: (1) denial of the right to counsel; (2) denial of the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the jury that convicted him was biased in the prosecution's favor; (4) denial of proportionality review; and (5) the Florida death penalty statute has been applied discriminatorily against blacks.

Held: The application for a stay of execution is denied. The first three claims raised by applicant were presented several times previously in both the state and federal courts, and have been found to be meritless. The fourth claim was found meritless by the Florida Supreme Court, and that ruling will not be disturbed. The fifth claim, first raised in applicant's most recent state habeas corpus petition, was based on data that were available long before that time and that the Florida Supreme Court and both federal courts below have determined to be insufficient to show that the Florida system is unconstitutionally discriminatory. Application for stay denied.

PER CURIAM.

Applicant was sentenced to death in November 1973 for the murder of the manager of a restaurant he had robbed. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court and this Court denied certiorari. Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 428 U. S. 911 (1976). After exhausting state postconviction remedies,

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »