Two trends arose in the 1960's:

1.

2.

GAO began more aggressive compliance audits, such as a series of reports on overpayments to defense contractors. These reports led to the so-called "Holifield Hearings," by the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Military Operations, which produced a committee report critical of how GAO treated the defense industry. This report, together with creation of the Defense Contract Audit Agency, reduced GAQ's involvement in individual contract audits."

GAO developed a new role in evaluating government programs, beginning with an 18month evaluation of economic opportunity programs that Congress mandated in 1967.12

Comptroller General Elmer Staats a former Bureau of the Budget official whom President Johnson appointed to head GAO in 1966 -- stressed program results audits, calling for analytical techniques that related plans, policies, budgets, actual expenditures, and program outcomes. In this work, GAO began to rely less on the measurement of dollars and legality of contracts and vouchers, and more on the evaluation of outcomes or results. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 recognized and codified this approach.13 That law directed the comptroller general to "review and evaluate the results of a program or activity carried on under existing law, including the making of cost benefit studies, when ordered by either House of Congress, or upon his own initiative, or when requested by any committee...." This provision created a direct relationship between GAO and the authorizing committees (in addition to the revenue and appropriations committees with which it was directed to work in the 1921 act).

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197415 took several additional steps affecting GAO. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), also authorized the establishment of an Office of Program Review and Evaluation at GAO". The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 empowered GAO to review each

"Harry S. Havens, The Evolution of the General Accounting Office: From Voucher Audits

to Program Evaluations (GAO/OP-2-HP), January 1990, pp. 5-6 and p. 10.

12 Review of Economic Opportunity Programs (GAO Report B130515), March 18, 1969. 1384 Stat. 1104 (See 31 U.S.C. §§ 702, 717, 719, 720, 731, 734, 1105, 1106, 1112, 1113). "Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 717(b).

1588 Stat. 297. The act had two parts, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93344, Titles I-IX, 88 Stat. 297 to 332, and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93344, Title X, 88 Stat. 332.

1688 Stat. 326.

presidential message rescinding funds or deferring expenditures, inform Congress about the facts, effects, and legality of those actions, and identify any other actions the President should take. It also empowered GAO, for the first time, to institute litigation to compel compliance with the statute."7

Along with general statutes applying to GAO, many laws over the past 20 years created specific mandates for GAO work, including periodic reports and specialized one-time studies on issues not resolved by legislative debate." For example, Congress called on GAO to examine the forces underlying energy price increases after OPEC's first oil embargo, and to review regularly the reliability of data from the Energy Information Agency.19 Requests like this reflected Congress's growing distrust of information sources in executive agencies and the private sector. Congressional demands, in virtually every policy area, have put GAO in the middle of critical policy debates.

Several laws brought GAO into debates on the budget process, culminating in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings). Though it maintained CBO's major support role in Congress's budget process, the law also directed the comptroller general to review OMB's and CBO's estimates related to federal compliance with mandatory deficit limits and report on any additional cuts ("sequestration") required to meet those limits. The law required that the President issue an order to direct the spending reductions that the comptroller general specified.20

In Bowsher v. Synar," the Supreme Court declared the latter provision unconstitutional because it put GAO (which was outside the executive branch) and the comptroller general (removable by joint resolution of Congress) in a position to direct executive branch actions. Bowsher v. Synar clearly stated that GAO lacked authority to direct enforcement of its recommendations by executive action.” Under the 1985 budget law, GAO still monitors spending and recommends to Congress how to cut the federal deficit.

1788 Stat. 336 (See 2 U.S.C. §686, 687).

18 Statutory Provisions Relating to GAO: Fiscal Years 1975-1990, GAO/OIMC-93-3, February 1993, and two internal documents: "Active Mandated Jobs as of 02/23/94" and "Open Mandates With No Job Record as of 02/23/94" (GAO/OGC).

19Havens, pp. 8-9.

20102 Stat. 2515 (See particularly 31 U.S.C. § 1105).

21106 U.S. 3181 (1986).

"As recently as 1964, in a case relating to GAO's review of contracting claims, the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia had stated that the Comptroller General "occupies a dual position and performs a two-fold function," both legislative and executive. This dual GAO role was compared to those of regulatory commissions. U.S. ex rel. Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, D.C.D.C. 1964, 234 F. Supp. 94, 99, aff'd. 339 F.2d 753, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 254.

A major area of GAO's work relates to the government's financial management, accounting, and financial reporting systems, on which Congress and the executive branch have increasingly focused. The Inspector General Act of 1978 created internal auditing and investigation units in executive agencies that report to both executive officials and Congress.23 The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 provided that "internal accounting and administrative controls of each executive agency shall be established in accordance with standards prescribed by the Comptroller General...." It further provided that "the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Comptroller General, shall establish guidelines for the evaluation by agencies of their systems of internal accounting and administrative controls...."24 Subsequent laws directed that GAO collaborate with OMB in areas of financial management.

The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act),25 which GAO strongly supported, requires the appointment of CFOs in 23 federal agencies -- the 14 cabinet departments and nine major executive agencies. Building on themes in the Inspector General Act and the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act, the CFO Act requires executive agencies to prepare annual financial statements that cover revolving and trust funds and commercial operations, and places responsibility for arranging an agency financial audit with the inspector general. In addition, it calls for a pilot program for ten agencies to produce audited department-wide financial statements. The law directs the CFOs to establish cost information systems and systematic measures of performance related to spending in major programs.

Under the CFO Act, the comptroller general may review an agency's or government corporation's audit of a financial statement, and must report to Congress, OMB, and the agency head on its results and make appropriate recommendations. The law gives GAO authority to directly audit financial statements at the comptroller general's discretion or a congressional committee's request.

The CFO Act has brought substantial changes in the level of attention that government agencies must pay to financial managemeṇt. It called for executive leadership from the newly created OMB deputy director for management and established a new position of controller at the head of OMB's Office of Federal Financial Management. It also altered the role for GAO's financial auditors. As part of implementing the CFO Act, GAO has conducted several large-scale financial audits of agency financial statements and has assisted agencies in developing their own financial systems and statements.

2392 Stat. 1101.

2496 Stat. 84 (See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 1113, 3512).

25104 Stat. 2938 (See particularly 31 U.S.C. §§ 501 notes, 502-506, 901, 901 notes, 902, 903, 1105, 3511 note, 3512, 3515, 3515 note, 3521 note, 9105, 9106).

GAO continues selective review of financial management practices across the executive agencies (see Chapter V on GAO work products).26

In discussions leading to the CFO Act, GAO, OMB, and Treasury entered a Memorandum of Understanding to form the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), designed to formulate accounting principles and standards for the federal government. GAO staff are part of the FASAB working teams to develop and assess proposed standards, and GAO is also part of the ninemember board, while the comptroller general is one of the three principals of FASAB assigned the responsibility to vote on adopting any new standard. FASAB moves standard setting from GAO to a cooperative forum with substantial executive branch participation.

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)," which GAO also supported, goes beyond the financial measures and financial programs covered in the CFO Act by requiring each executive department and major agency to develop long-term strategic plans, annual performance plans and performance goals and measures, and annual performance reports covering all major activities and programs, beginning no later than September 30, 1997. In the meantime, agencies can volunteer to participate in pilot projects; to date, OMB has approved more than 70 pilot projects. GPRA directs the Office of Personnel Management to consult with GAO as well as OMB on designing training for managers, and requires the comptroller general to report on the implementation of the law at the end of the three-year pilot period.

The general management principles and processes that GPRA embodies highlight an issue that remains at the core of GAO's work -- how government's resources can be wisely and effectively used to meet national objectives. On this central issue, GAO, Congress, and the executive branch are still working out their roles in the context of evolving executive-legislative relations, executive capacities, and the themes of reforming and redesigning government.

26A 1992 GAO transition report cited serious weaknesses and delays in implementing the CFO Act. Financial Management Issues, GAO/OCG-93-4TR, December 1992. It noted that "The current systems are in extremely poor condition. . . . Sixteen of the 23 agencies covered by the CFO Act have problems related to their financial systems on OMB's high risk list" (pp. 25-26). Moreover, "OMB still has woefully limited resources committed to this office" (p. 16). Congress appropriated only two-thirds of the amount that the administration requested in fiscal 1991 for preparation and audit of financial statements. Of the 23 CFOs required by law, by February 1, 1994, the Senate had confirmed 14 -- nine in cabinet departments, five in other agencies -- while seven were serving in an acting capacity, and two nominees were awaiting Senate confirmation.

"107 Stat. 285 (See particularly, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101 note, 1105, 1115, 1115 note, 11161119, 9703, 9704).

II. PROFILE OF GAO TODAY

GAO is an organization of about 4,500 employees with a fiscal year 1994 appropriation of $430.8 million. Just under two-thirds of GAO employees work in or near Washington, D.C. -- in GAO headquarters or in 29 other "audit sites" near or within the offices of executive branch agencies that GAO studies or audits. The remaining third (1,698 in fiscal 1993) work in field offices.

The comptroller general, whom the President appoints with the advice and consent of the Senate, is GAQ's chief executive officer. The comptroller general serves a 15-year term and may not be reappointed. He or she can be removed by impeachment or joint resolution of Congress, which requires the President's signature.

28

While the President nominates the comptroller general, Congress in 1980 provided for the establishment of a congressional commission to develop a list of individuals for the President to consider for the job.29 The commission recommends at least three individuals for a vacancy, and the President may ask the commission to recommend additional names. Such a commission has been formed once, in 1981, when President Reagan appointed the current comptroller general, Charles A. Bowsher, to the position. The President must next appoint a comptroller general in 1996 for a 15-year term, running through 2011.

By statute and tradition, the comptroller general has a highly visible position in government, with substantial responsibilities.30 In fact, most authorizing legislation related to GAO's responsibilities directs the comptroller general -- not GAO -- to respond to congressional requests and undertake the various studies and activities.

Like GAO's function and structure, its workforce has evolved to meet changing needs and demands. In the 1970s, GAO's predominant focus shifted from accountants and auditors to evaluators with education in social sciences, public administration, business administration, statistics, computer technology, economics, and other non-accounting disciplines. In 1993, GAO categorized 57 percent of its employees as evaluators and another 15 percent as evaluator-related.

28 Grounds for removing the comptroller general are limited to permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.

2931 U.S.C. 703(a)(2)-(3). The commission is composed of the President pro tempore of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate, and the chairs and ranking minority members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations.

3oFrom a constitutional perspective, the Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar found that "the removal powers over the Comptroller General's office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress." 478 U.S. 714, 730.