dockets and endeavored to bring to the knowledge of all claimants the organization of the court, with its rules and regulations.

Counsel were not expeditious in preparing claims for submission to the court, and for some time after it met in October, 1874, but few cases were presented for trial.

In the month of January, the last month in which, under the act, claims could be filed, 312 more petitions were received than in the previous five months together.

On the 22d of January, 1875, the six months within which claims might be filed expired, and on that day there were 1,383 cases on the dockets, in which the gross amount claimed was $12,673,451.44, exclusive of interest. This sum does not include, however, several claims in which a simple statement was made that certain property had been destroyed, its value not being estimated.

It being found impossible to dispose of this large number of claims before the 22d of July, 1875, when the court would have expired under the act creating it, its duration was extended by proclamation of the President to the 22d of January, 1876, and by an act approved December 24, 1875, to the 22d of July, 1876.

On the 6th March, 1876, an act was approved allowing additional claims to be filed within three months after the act should take effect.

The three months expired on the 6th of June, 1876, when 685 claims had been received, in which the sum claimed was $1,825,865.55, not including interest. As these cases could not be heard and decided before the expiration of the court, on the 22d of July following, Congress extended its duration to the 1st day of January, 1877.

The court has passed upon 2,068 cases, in which the amount claimed was about fourteen and one-half millions of dollars, not including interest, and has awarded the sum of $9,316,120.25, including interest.

Three lists of judgments and decisions have been reported to the Secretary of State, as required by law, the first containing judgments entered on or prior to January 22, 1876; the second containing judgments entered between that date and July 22, 1876; and the third containing judgments entered between that date and the expiration of the

court.

The amount of the judgments in the first list, including
interest, was

The amount in the second list, including interest, was....
The amount in the third list, including interest, was

Total amount

$6,641, 287 26 2,353, 634 21 321, 198 78

9, 316, 120 25

The labors of Mr. Creswell, the counsel on behalf of the United States, in defending this large number of claims, have been most onerous. While represented in many cities of the country by assistant counsel, who were charged with the examination of witnesses on behalf of the Government, and with the cross-examination of those for the claimants, still the task of scrutinizing the voluminous testimony in over two thousand cases, and defending them in court, has devolved upon him personally. In cases of this nature the counsel for the United States is always at a disadvantage, as against private claimants, who possess a full knowledge of their claims, and by reason of their familiarity with all the facts and circumstances are enabled to bring out and fortify the strong points and disguise the weak ones.

In view of the large number of claims disposed of by the court, the time allowed it was very short, and without the untiring industry of Mr.

Creswell, and his constant endeavors to facilitate the speedy disposal of cases, it would have been impossible for the court to have so soon reached the termination of its labors.

Testimony of witnesses was taken on notice, and either on written interrogatories or on oral examination by counsel attending, in almost every State or Territory in the Union, in Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, China, India, Peru, the West India and Hawaiian Islands, and in numerous other foreign countries.

The jurisdiction of the court was limited to claims (filed within a certain period) directly resulting from damage caused by the so-called insurgent cruisers Alabama, Florida, and their tenders, and the Shenandoah after her departure from Melbourne on the 18th day of February, 1865.

Claims for which the party claimant, his assignee or legal representative, should have received compensation or indemnity from any insurance company, insurer, or otherwise, were by law excluded, except for the difference between the loss or damage actually suffered and the indemnity so received. The act also excluded claims "for or in respect to unearned freights, gross freights, prospective profits, freights, gains, or advantages, or for wages of officers or seamen for a longer time than one year next after the breaking up of a voyage" by the acts of one of the inculpated cruisers; also, claims by or in behalf of any insurance company or insurer, either in its own right or as assignee or otherwise, in the right of a person or party insured, unless such claimant should show to the satisfaction of the court that during the rebellion "the sum of its or his losses, in respect to its or his war risks, exceeded the sum of its or his premiums or other gains upon or in respect to such war-risks;" also, claims arising in favor of any insurance company not lawfully existing at the time of the loss under the laws of some one of the United States; also, claims arising in favor of any person not entitled, at the time of his loss, to the protection of the United States in the premises; also claims arising in favor of any person who did not at all times during the rebellion bear true allegiance to the United States. With these limitations upon its jurisdiction, the court was to receive, examine, and decide upon the amount and validity of the claims presented to it in accordance with the provisions of the act of June 23, 1874, the principles of law, and the merits of the several cases.

The court was further empowered to make all "needful rules and regulations regulating the forms and mode of procedure before it," which rules and mode of procedure should conform, as far as practicable, to the mode of procedure and practice of the circuit courts of the United States; and the court was vested with the powers of the circuit and district courts of the United States "to compel the attendance and testimony of parties, claimants and witnesses, to preserve order, to punish for contempts, and to compel the production of books or papers when deemed material to the consideration of any claim or matter pending therein."

Nearly all the claims filed in the court were for the loss of property actually destroyed by one of the cruisers named in the act, or of mariners for loss of wages and personal effects occasioned by the destruction of the vessel on which they were serving. The few exceptions to this rule will be found reported below.

In deciding the cases before it, the court has been obliged to pass upon all the questions of fact, as well as those of law.

I take the liberty of adding to this general statement of the business and powers of the court some remarks upon the principal points decided

and a report of the more important cases in which an opinion was delivered by the court.

The able dissenting opinions of members of the court I have not included in this report, for lack of space, although in each case I have indicated who, if any, of the judges dissented.

The first step in the prosecution of a case was the

FILING OF THE PETITION.

Section 11 of the act provides that all claims not filed within six months next after the organization of the court shall be barred.

The petition of William C. Geohegan was not received until after the six months had elapsed; but it appearing that it was posted at such a date that in due course of mail it would have reached the court within the time limited by law, but for an accident to the postal service, the court made the following order:

Ordered, That the claim of William C. Geohegan be filed nunc pro tunc as of the day when it would have reached this court in due course of mail, viz, on the 16th January; the court being satisfied by the inspection of the papers, including the post-mark, that the petition failed to reach the office of the clerk merely through an accident.

The earlier questions presented to the court related to the form of the petitions, to the necessity of certain allegations therein, and the effect of their omission. Many of these points were raised by the counsel on behalf of the United States on demurrer.

VERIFICATION OF THE PETITION.

Section 11 of the act provides that "all claims shall be verified by oath of the claimant," and Rule III of the court requires every claim to be stated in a petition.

Counsel requested the court to place a construction upon this section of the act, when Wells, presiding judge, read the following memoran

dum:

"The court has been asked by counsel to place a construction upon the second sentence embraced in section 11 of the act of Congress approved June 23, 1874, and under which the 'Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims' was created, and thus determine in advance, and before the question is raised in any given case, whether two or more claimants in the same petition may not have their respective claims verified by any one of such claimants named in said petition. Ordinarily it would be impolitic, if not improper, thus to give an opinion in advance and before such question was raised in the trial of a given case; but in this instance, as many of the cases already on the calendar have several claimants, it may not be amiss at once to dispose of the question for the purpose of facilitating the business of this court. It may be argued in favor of permitting one of several claimants to make the oath in behalf of himself and one or more others in any given case, that the object of the verification by oath is merely to get such case before the court, so that proo ́s and adjudication may be had; that, in fact, the oath of the claimant does not in any case constitute absolute evidence; that the formality of the law in this requirement is, in fact, complied with by the affidavit of one, although the interests of several were involved.

"Some degree of latitude might be tolerated if the court was called upon to construe one of its own rules, to which it would undoubtedly have the right to make exceptions; but in this case it is a provision of

the law itself, and whether a necessary provision or not is not the prov ince of this court to determine. It may be that Congress intended that each claimant, although joining with others in the same case, should make separate verifications under oath of his particular interest in its value, possibly conceiving that estimates of value might be different as presented by the different claimants, and that no one claimant, although presenting his claim jointly with others, could properly make affidavit other than as to his belief in reference to the loyalty of his associate claimant; but this court is impressed with the belief that it is not its province to determine the reasons that induced any particular action on the part of Congress. We find the law plain in its provision 'that all claims shall be verified by oath of the claimant;' and we understand that in the use of the word 'claimant' the law refers specifically to each claimant, and that each claimant when associated or joined with others in any given case must verify by his own oath his claim."

In Matthew A. Chadwick vs. The United States, the petition was filed and verified by Elizabeth L. Chadwick, the wife and attorney of Matthew A. Chadwick, it being averred that the claimant was absent at sea, and was not expected home until November, 1875, too late to file a petition.

Petition demurred to, "because the claim of the said complainant is not duly verified by the oath of the claimant.”

Demurrer overruled, "the court holding that where a party claimant is beyond the limits of the United States, and it is impossible at the time of making the petition to procure his oath, the oath of his authorized attorney is sufficient to make his petition admissible, provided the facts of such absence and inability to procure such oath are set out in the petition, or in an annexed affidavit."

Miguel Ignacio vs. The United States was a claim for personal effects and wages, brought by William Gordon, jr., as attorney and next friend of the complainant. It did not appear at first whether Ignacio was alive when the claim was filed; subsequently, and after the time allowed for filing petitions had expired, his death was suggested and a motion made to substitute an administrator as complainant. At the trial of the case it appeared that Ignacio had died at a date prior to that on which the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed; no opinion was delivered; but the court apparently sustained the position of the counsel on behalf of the United States that the claim being filed by a person having no standing in court (the next friend of a deceased person having no authority to act) cannot be amended by bringing in a new party-claimant after the time for filing claims has expired.

But in later cases this decision seems to have been overruled. See William O. Smith, administrator, vs. The United States, and several other cases.

In these claims a foreign administrator filed the petition as claimant. The cases came on for trial after the time for filing claims had expired, when the counsel for the United States contended that the complainant had no standing in court. Mr. James Lowndes, counsel for complainant, then asked leave to amend by substituting an administrator appointed by the supreme court of the District of Columbia.

After argument, leave was granted to so amend.

And in Robert Montgomery vs. The United States, and other cases, leave was asked to amend by substituting the administrator as claimant when the claim had been brought in the name of a person deceased at the time it was filed.

These motions were allowed, the court remarking that the filing of the

claims in the court on behalf of a veritable individual was a satisfaction of the provisions of the act, the object of which was that the Government should have due notice of all claims to be brought against it, (see MacLeane, admx., & Taylor vs. the United States,) and that owing to the peculiar circumstances of these claims they should not be allowed to perish through a strict adherence to the technical rules of courts of law. The act merely requires that the claim shall be presented. Porter, judge, dissented from this ruling, holding that the parties in whose names the claims were brought being dead at the time they were filed, the petition was a nullity, and could not be amended.

The court, by the presiding judge, stated its opinion early in its session, that letters of administration or letters testamentary granted in any State of the United States would give authority to sue in this court. In the cases of William O. Smith and others, the court denied the right of a foreign administrator to bring suit.

In Abraham Osborn vs. The United States, the claimant (former master of the ship Ocmulgee) prayed damages for the personal effects and wages due to the other officers and seamen of the vessel, and their respective interests in the "catch" in addition to his own claim. He showed no previous authority or subsequent ratification from these officers or seamen, of the names even of some of whom he was ignorant.

The counsel on behalf of the United States demurred to the claim, and, after argument, the petition was dismissed on the ground of the want of authority in the petitioner from the parties for whom he assumed to act.

CATCH.

Many of the seamen sailing on whaling-vessels were paid from the catch, their "lay" depending upon the amount of oil and bone taken by the vessel in which they sailed.

Owing to the difficulty experienced in properly apportioning their claims in accordance with the various contracts entered into by them with the ship-owners, to avoid the danger of a double allowance, to protect sailors absent at sea, and to enable owners to obtain payment of advances made to seamen on the credit of the catch, the court entered judgment in favor of the owners of the vessel for the value of the oil and bone on board the ship at the time of her destruction, which judgment, with the interest thereon, was "to be received and distributed by the said owners according to law, among the respective parties entitled thereto in their due proportion."

The owners, therefore, hold the money awarded by the court in these cases subject to all claims, as they would have held the proceeds of the oil and bone taken, had it arrived at its destination and been sold.

The district court of Massachusetts, acting as a court of admiralty, bas, I learn, been applied to to settle questions arising under these awards, and has adjusted them substantially in accordance with the rulings of this court.

In estimating the value of the oil and bone lost on whaling-vessels, the court seems to have taken their average value for the year during which the vessel would have reached home, in the ordinary course of navigation.

The claim of John Stevens, a seaman on the Ocean Rover, for the value of his share of the oil on board of that vessel at the time of her loss, was dismissed by the court, his remedy being against the owners, a judgment having been entered in their favor for the whole value of the catch.