DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

347 U.S.

by Virginia. For the federal Act in no way deals with such conduct and there may be doubt if constitutionally it could do so, at least in such a way as to supersede local law.

The present case is different. The labor organizer's conduct that has led to this judgment for damages is conduct with which the federal Act specifically deals. On the facts found by the state court, the labor organizer and the union have committed an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b)(1)(A), by using threats and the force of a picket line to make employees join a union, contrary to their desires. A state court or a state labor board could not enjoin that conduct, as Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, teaches. And I think like reasons preclude a State from applying other sanctions to it.

This conduct is the stuff out of which labor-management strife has been made, ever since trade unionism began its growth. For years the law of the jungle applied, victory going to the strongest. The emergence of more civilized methods of settling these disputes is familiar history. At first, the law was mostly on the side of management. The courts, as well as the legislatures, shaped the rules against the interests of labor. Gradually the human rights in industry were recognized until they finally received more generous recognition under the Wagner Act.

That Act subjected these industrial disputes to settlement and adjudication in administrative proceedings. For example, the administrative agency was granted power to forbid employers from interfering with tradeunion activities. May a union not only institute proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board but sue the employer as well? Or may it have a choice of remedies? I would think not. But if the union may not sue the employer for the tortious conduct, why may the employer sue the union?

656

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

I think that for each wrong which the federal Act recognizes the parties have only the remedy supplied by that Act and for a simple reason. The federal Act was designed to decide labor-management controversies, to bring them to a peaceful, orderly settlement, to put the parties on the basis of equality which the rules designed by Congress envisaged.* If the parties not only have the remedy Congress provided but the right to sue for damages as well, the controversy is not settled by what the federal agency does. It drags on and on in the courts, keeping old wounds open, and robbing the administrative remedy of the healing effects it was intended to have.

*Section 1(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 141 (b), provides that: "It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce."

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. WISCONSIN ET AL.

NO. 280.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.*

Argued April 6-7, 1954. Decided June 7, 1954.

The Company here involved engages in the production, gathering, processing and sale of natural gas. It does not engage in the interstate transmission of gas from the producing fields to consumer markets and is not affiliated with any company that does so; but it sells natural gas to five interstate pipeline companies which transport and resell the gas to consumers and local distributing companies in 14 states. The gas flows from producing wells through a network of converging pipelines to one of 12 processing plants, where extractable products and impurities are removed. Thence it flows a short distance to a delivery point where it is sold and delivered to an interstate pipeline company. It then continues its flow through an interstate pipeline system until delivered in other states. Held: This Company is a "naturalgas company" within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act, and its sales in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale are subject to the jurisdiction of, and rate regulation by, the Federal Power Commission. Pp. 674–685.

(a) The Company admittedly is engaged in "the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale" within the meaning of the Act. P. 677.

(b) The sales by this Company are not a part of the "production or gathering of natural gas," which are excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction under § 1 (b), since the production and gathering end before the sales occur. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U. S. 682. Pp. 677–681.

(c) Congress did not intend to regulate only interstate pipeline companies. Rather the legislative history indicates a congressional intent to give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not and whether occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate pipeline company. Pp. 681-684.

*Together with No. 281, Texas et al. v. Wisconsin et al.; and No. 418, Federal Power Commission v. Wisconsin et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

(d) Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U. S. 190, do not require a different result. Pp. 684-685.

(e) Regulation of sales in interstate commerce for resale made by a so-called independent natural-gas producer is not essentially different from regulation of such sales when made by an affiliate of an interstate pipeline company. P. 685.

92 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 205 F. 2d 706, affirmed.

Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for petitioner in No. 280. With him on the brief were Rayburn L. Foster, Harry D. Turner and Stanley L. Temko.

Dan Moody argued the cause for petitioners in No. 281. On the brief were John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General, Charles E. Crenshaw, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. Moody for the State of Texas et al., Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, for the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, and Richard H. Robinson, Attorney General, and George A. Graham, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New Mexico et al., petitioners. J. Paull Marshall was also of counsel.

Solicitor General Sobeloff argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission, petitioner in No. 418. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Burger, Melvin Richter, Willard W. Gatchell, William J. Grove and Louis C. Kaplan.

Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Attorney General of Wisconsin, William E. Torkelson, Charles S. Rhyne, James H. Lee and Harry G. Slater argued the causes for respondents. On a joint brief were Vernon W. Thomson, Attorney General, and Mr. Honeck, for the State of Wisconsin, Mr. Torkelson for the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Mr. Lee for the City of Detroit, Michigan, David M. Proctor and Mr. Rhyne for Kansas City, Missouri, and Walter J. Mattison and Mr. Slater for the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, respondents.

Opinion of the Court.

347 U.S.

A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed by Fred S. LeBlanc, Attorney General, for the State of Louisiana, J. P. Coleman, Attorney General, for the State of Mississippi, E. T. Christianson, Attorney General, for the State of North Dakota, Howard B. Black, Attorney General, for the State of Wyoming, and Jay Kyle for the State Corporation Commission of Kansas. J. Paull Marshall was also of counsel.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by J. A. A. Burnquist, Attorney General, and George B. Sjoselius for the State of Minnesota, John F. Bonner for the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, Leo A. Hoegh, Attorney General, for the State of Iowa, and Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General, for the State of Nebraska; and by J. W. Anderson, John J. Mortimer, Dale H. Fillmore, John C. Banks, Henry B. Curtis, Abraham L. Freedman, Alexander G. Brown, Dion R. Holm and Charles S. Rhyne for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers.

MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases present a common question concerning the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission over the rates charged by a natural-gas producer and gatherer in the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale. All three cases are an outgrowth of the same proceeding before the Power Commission and involve the same facts and issues.

The Phillips Petroleum Company 1 is a large integrated oil company which also engages in the production, gathering, processing, and sale of natural gas. We are here concerned only with the natural-gas operations. Phillips is

1 Hereinafter referred to as Phillips.