388 REED, J., dissenting.. Such a change of the course of decision is a disservice to the orderly progress of trials. It stimulates rather than deters the adoption of the strategy of the Dennis case. It intrudes unnecessarily this Court's views of the proprieties into the discipline of bars of regions and communities whose attitude toward courtroom behavior diverges from our own. It is enough if we stand ready to say that an abuse of discretion by a trial court will not be allowed to stand. We should not substitute our discretion for that of the trial judge. Calm and reasoned presentation of facts and law are not only more effective but are essential if administration of justice by the courts is not to be disrupted by such courtroom tactics as were used in the Dennis trial. We demand tolerance for those who differ. Conformity is not expected or desired. There is room for every shade of opinion and expression short of incitement to crime. But there is not room for violence, offensive expletives or interference with orderly procedure in a courtroom, and such an attitude is not to exalt order over liberty but to exalt reason over force. An atmosphere filled with unproven personal charges or innuendoes of wrongful action is not conducive to dispassionate appraisal of the truth of matters under judicial investigation. I would uphold the discipline administered by the bar and trial judge by affirming this judgment. 347 U.S. BURTON, J., dissenting. ALASKA STEAMSHIP CO., INC. v. PETTERSON. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 287. Argued March 8-9, 1954.-Decided April 5, 1954. The judgment below is affirmed on the authority of the cases cited. 205 F.2d 478, affirmed. Robert V. Holland argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Stanley B. Long. John Geisness argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Samuel B. Bassett. PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 100; Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406. MR. JUSTICE BURTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting. The Sieracki1 and Pope & Talbot cases cited as the basis for the Court's decision do not justify the result announced. They evidence this Court's latest and broadest statement of a shipowner's liability for the unseaworthiness of his ship and its equipment, but they do not reach the instant case. They assert the liability of a shipowner to stevedores and carpenters who, in consequence of the unseaworthiness of his ship or its equipment, are injured on board in navigable waters while engaged in work connected with loading or unloading the ship. Those cases establish that such liability for unseaworthiness exists although the injured maritime workers are not employees of the shipowner but 1 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85. 2 Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406. 396 BURTON, J., dissenting. are employees of a third party who is under contract to supply stevedoring services. The question presented by the instant case goes further. It asks whether a shipowner is liable for injuries suffered on his ship by a stevedore, even when those injuries result from unseaworthiness of equipment that does not belong to the shipowner and is not part of the ship's equipment, but belongs to the stevedore's independent employer, is part of that employer's loading equipment, and is brought on board by such employer. There is no suggestion in the cited cases that the shipowner's responsibility extends beyond the seaworthiness of his ship and its equipment, and I see no adequate reason for judicially extending it beyond that limit. As the instant case offers a new precedent, it is important to recite its facts so that its effect may be accurately measured and limited in the absence of a supporting opinion. The Court of Appeals stated the question which it decided as follows: "The question presented is whether a vessel's owner is liable for injuries received by an employee of a stevedoring company (an independent contractor) on board ship while engaged in the loading of the ship where the injuries are caused by a breaking block brought on board by the stevedoring company." Petterson v. Alaska S. S. Co., 205 F. 2d 478. Respondent Petterson was an able-bodied stevedore, 73 years old, employed as a longshore foreman by the Alaska Terminal and Stevedoring Company. That company was engaged by petitioner Alaska Steamship Company, Inc., to load the latter's vessel, the S. S. Susitna. In May 1950 respondent thus became engaged in loading that vessel while it was docked in what is assumed to be navigable water in the State of Washington. Petterson's employer, the stevedoring company, was authorized by BURTON, J., dissenting. 347 U.S. the shipowner to use, in the loading operation, the contractor's own gear or the gear of the ship, at the contractor's option. Respondent and his fellow employees rigged a snatch block which had been standing or lying unused upon the deck of the vessel. It was of a type often found as part of a ship's gear aboard such vessels and also as part of a stevedoring company's gear. The block was treated by each court below as having been brought on board by the stevedoring company and as belonging to that company.3 3 The record shows that the trial court found "There was no proof as to the ownership of said block." The trial court also said that— "the snatch block in question, at the time of the accident, was not under the control or supervision of the respondent [shipowner] but was under the exclusive control and supervision of the libelant [Petterson], his employer and his employer's agents. "The Libelant has failed to establish, through the evidence introduced, that the snatch block involved, which apparently caused the accident and injury to the Libelant, belonged to or was part of the ship gear of the Respondent [shipowner]. "Such finding was conceded, in effect, by Counsel for Libelant in his argument. "Proceeding on that assumption, Counsel for Libelant argued that the logic or reasoning of the case of Seas Shipping Company, Inc., v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, would impose the obligation of seaworthiness of the vessel upon Respondent [shipowner] as to gear-in this case a snatch block-not belonging to Respondent but being used by the stevedore in loading the ship. "The Court can not agree that the Supreme Court ruling in that case would justify such a conclusion." The Court of Appeals said: "It is not clear whether the block belonged to the ship or the Stevedoring Co., it being the type of equipment commonly found as part of the gear of both ships and stevedoring firms. For the purposes of this appeal, it will be assumed that it was brought on board by Stevedoring Co. . . . "The court below granted a decree for the Owner on the ground that it was not shown that the block belonged to or was a part of the gear of the Susitna. Petterson's argument that liability should be 396 BURTON, J., dissenting. While being put to a proper use in a proper manner, the block broke, thus causing some of the loading gear to fall and crush respondent's leg as he was engaged in supervising the work of longshoremen aboard the ship. Petterson filed a libel in personam in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against the shipowner claiming $35,000 damages resulting from the unseaworthiness of the block. After trial, the libel was dismissed without a reported opinion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decree and remanded the cause for determination of damages. 205 F. 2d 478. Because of an alleged conflict with Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 201 F. 2d 418, and the importance of the decision in relation to a shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness, we granted certiorari. 346 U. S. 914. The doctrine of seaworthiness was stated as a settled proposition in The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175, as follows: "That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship." That doctrine was a natural outgrowth of the dependence of a ship's crew upon the seaworthiness of the ship and its equipment. Services of a crew must be rendered with whatever equipment the shipowner supplies. Such seamen are not expected to supply maritime or loading equipment and it is only fair for the law to subject shipowners to an absolute liability to them for the unseaworthiness of the shipowner's ship or equipment. imposed even if the gear belonged to the Stevedoring Co. was rejected by the court on the ground that Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872, 90 L. Ed. 1099, did not go so far." 205 F. 2d, at 479. |