1 Opinion of the Court. testimony related to matters occurring prior to the marriage. Any residuum which may have been intended to be confidential was so slight as to be immaterial. Cf. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006, 1009. The court below was not in error in admitting Mrs. Joyce's testimony. The petitioners challenge their conviction on the substantive counts on the ground that there was no evidence of any mailing or of transporting stolen property interstate, the gist of the respective offenses. These contentions are without merit. The mail fraud statute provides: "S 1341. Frauds and swindles. "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1341. 288037 0-54- -6 Opinion of the Court. The National Stolen Property Act provides: 347 U.S. "§ 2314. Transportation of stolen goods, securities, monies, or articles used in counterfeiting. "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.. "Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. . . ." 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 2314. To constitute a violation of these provisions, it is not necessary to show that petitioners actually mailed or transported anything themselves; it is sufficient if they caused it to be done. 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 2 (b). Petitioners do not deny that the proof offered establishes that they planned to defraud Mrs. Joyce. Collecting the proceeds of the check was an essential part of that scheme. For this purpose, Pereira delivered the check drawn on a Los Angeles bank to the El Paso bank. There was substantial evidence to show that the check was mailed from Texas to California, in the ordinary course of business. The elements of the offense of mail fraud under 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1341 are (1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme. It is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the use of the mails as an essential element. United States v. Young, 232 U. S. 155. Here, the scheme to defraud is established, and the mailing of the check by the bank, incident to an essential part of the scheme, is established. There remains only the question whether Pereira "caused" the mailing. That question is easily answered. Where one does an act with 1 Opinion of the Court. knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he "causes" the mails to be used. United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U. S. 440. The conclusion that Pereira's conviction under this count was proper follows naturally from these factors. As to the charge of causing stolen property to be transported in interstate commerce, the validity of Pereira's conviction is even more apparent. Sections 1341 and 2314 of Title 18 constitute two separate offenses, and a defendant may be convicted of both even though the charges arise from a single act or series of acts, so long as each requires the proof of a fact not essential to the other. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299. 18 U. S. .C. (Supp. V) § 2314 requires (1) knowledge that certain property has been stolen or obtained by fraud, and (2) transporting it, or causing it to be transported, in interstate commerce. It is obvious that the mail fraud offense requires different proof. The transporting charge does not require proof that any specific means of transporting were used, or that the acts were done pursuant to a scheme to defraud, as is required for the mail fraud charge. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379. When Pereira delivered the check, drawn on an out-of-state bank, to the El Paso bank for collection, he "caused" it to be transported in interstate commerce. It is common knowledge that such checks must be sent to the drawee bank for collection, and it follows that Pereira intended the El Paso bank to send this check across state lines. United States v. Sheridan, supra, at 391. The trial court charged the jury that one who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the commission of an act is as responsible for that act as if he had directly committed the act himself. Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. See 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 2 (a). Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613. The jury found Brading guilty in the light of this instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the evidence supported conviction under this charge.* The evidence is clear and convincing that Brading was a participant in the fraud from beginning to end. Brading made the initial contact with the victim. He persuaded her to part with $5,000, as a loan to Pereira for investment in some nonexistent oil leases. He was present and participated in conversations about buying the hotel lease. He engaged a telephone-answering service under the name of "E. J. Wilson," the name of Pereira's purported broker. The evidence established that he sent a telegram to Pereira authorizing an extension of the supposed option to purchase the hotel, signing it "E. J. Wilson." He supplied the false excuse for Pereira's departure from the victim, and went with Pereira to collect the proceeds of the check. He and Pereira fled together with the money. The "aiding and abetting" instruction entitled the jury to draw inferences supplying any lack of evidence directly connecting the petitioner Brading with the specific acts charged in the indictment from the abundant circumstantial evidence offered. The jury was properly charged on this theory. There is ample evidence of the petitioners' collaboration and close cooperation in the fraud from *The Government argues that Brading's conviction on the substantive offenses can be affirmed on the basis of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, since the record demonstrates that he conspired to defraud Mrs. Joyce and the acts charged in the substantive offenses were acts in furtherance of that design. The Pinkerton case, however, is inapplicable here since the jury was not instructed in terms of that theory. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613. 1 Opinion of the Court. which the jury could conclude that Brading aided, abetted, or counseled Pereira in the commission of the specific acts charged. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, supra, at 619. The Court of Appeals has passed on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Brading's conviction on this theory. We see no reason to upset the findings of the courts below. The petitioners allege that their conviction on both the substantive counts and a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged in the substantive counts constitutes double jeopardy. It is settled law in this country that the commission of a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct crimes, and a plea of double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 643-644, and cases cited therein. Only if the substantive offense and the conspiracy are identical does a conviction for both constitute double jeopardy. Cf. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338. The substantive offenses with which petitioners were charged do not require more than one person for their commission; either could be accomplished by a single individual. The essence of the conspiracy charge is an agreement to use the mails to defraud and/or to transport in interstate commerce property known to have been obtained by fraud. Pereira's conviction on the substantive counts does not depend on any agreement, he being the principal actor. Similarly, Brading's conviction does not turn on the agreement. Aiding, abetting, and counseling are not terms which presuppose the existence of an agreement. Those terms have a broader application, making the defendant a principal when he consciously shares in a criminal act, regardless of the existence of a conspiracy. Nye & Nissen v. United States, supra, at 620. Thus, the charge of conspiracy requires proof not essential to the convictions on |