Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of BureaucracyYale University Press, 1992. gada 29. jūl. - 270 lappuses This seminal book presents a fundamental reconsideration of modern American administrative law. According to Christopher Edley, the guiding principle in this field is that courts should apply legal doctrines to control the discretion of unelected bureaucrats. In practice, however, these doctrines simply give unelected judges largely unconstrained--and inescapable--discretion. Assessed on its own terms, says Edley, administrative law is largely a failure. He discussed why and how this is so and argues that law should abandon its obsession with bureaucratic discretion and pursue instead the direct promotion of sound governance. Edley demonstrates that legal analyses of separation of powers and of judicial oversight of agencies implicitly use three decision-making paradigms: politics, scientific expertise, and adjudicatory fairness. Conventional wisdom maintains, for example, that judges should hesitate to question the political choices of legislators and the expertise of administrators, but need not be so deferential in addressing questions of law. Such judicial efforts to police governance have largely failed because, as Edley shows in several contexts, they attempt to appraise decision-making paradigms as though they were separable when in fact the important decisions of both judges and political officials combine elements of politics, science, and fairness. According to Edley, unsustainable boundaries among these paradigms cannot be a satisfactory basis for deciding when a court should interfere. Law must stop focusing on separation of powers and instead direct attention to such issues as bureaucratic incompetence, systemic agency delay, and political bias. |
Saturs
The Discretion Problem and | 3 |
The Trichotomy of Politics Science | 13 |
Failings | 48 |
The Trichotomys Conceptual Failings | 72 |
Scope of Judicial Review | 96 |
Rethinking Administrative Law | 130 |
HarderLook Review | 169 |
Market | 184 |
From Trichotomy to TrioAnd | 213 |
265 | |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
adjudication adjudicatory fairness admin administrative law agency action agency choice agency decision agency's American Administrative Law analysis applying appropriate argue argument Ass'n assessment attributive duality basis Benzene chapter Chevron Chevron USA claim competence conceptual concerning Congress Conseil Conseil d'état cost-benefit analysis D.C. Cir decision making methods decision making paradigms delegation deregulation disclosure discretionary dissenting distinction doctrine due process emphasis example expert expertise fact Federal FERC Harv institutional interest group representation issue Jaffe Jaffe's judges judgment judicial deference judicial review Justice legislative litigation Mashaw matter NLRB norms NRDC organic statute OSHA policy choices politics positive attributes powers ethos problem procedural questions of law reasoning reform regulation regulatory reviewing court role Rule of Law scientific scope of review separation of powers Sierra Club standard statute statutory interpretation Stewart substantial evidence substantive supra Supreme Court tion tive Treatise trichotomy trichotomy-based Vermont Yankee WNCN
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
Controlling the Bureaucracy: Institutional Constraints in Theory and Practice William F. West Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 1995 |