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been, are now, or may hereafter be performed by the Government," can not be taken literally, but must be construed as referring to work which, up to the time of the making of the contract therefor, has ordinarily been performed by the Government, and not merely occasionally or to a limited extent, so that to let the same upon contract would indicate an intention to evade the eight-hour restriction of the act of August 1, 1892. To illustrate: In view of your statement that "the War Department has from time to time engaged in the manufacture of clothing, tentage, and various equipments for the Army on its own account, using materials purchased for the purpose, but that as a general rule the Government awards contracts for the manufacture of clothing, furnishing material therefor," I should say that, under the circumstances stated, the eight-hour restriction need not be incorporated in contracts for such clothing.

What has been said, with the statement that, in my opinion, it is immaterial whether the contractor supplies both materials and labor or labor only, appears to answer your first and second questions.

Your third question is whether the provision regarding the employment of labor should be inserted in contracts. now to be awarded for supplies for the entire current fiscal year.

The first section of the act provides that "every contract hereafter made * * * shall contain" an eight-hour work-day restriction, as well as a penalty stipulation for a violation thereof. Section 3 provides that "this act shall become effective and be in force on and after January 1, 1913."

It appears that section 3 was added in the Senate without debate (48 Cong. Rec., 7418, May 24, 1912), so that this provision must be understood as having been accepted by that body as meaning just what it said. When the bill was returned to the House, Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, who was in charge thereof, referring to this amendment, said that "it changes the date upon which the act shall go into effect to January 1 next, the presumption being that that is for the purpose of allowing those who are making bids to have an opportunity to make their establishments

conform to the changed conditions." (48 Cong. Rec., 8152, June 5, 1912.)

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Mr. Wilson's statement suggests that it may have been his understanding that notwithstanding the provision postponing the taking effect of the act, contracts entered into subsequent to the passage of the act and prior to January 1, 1913, should contain the eight-hour restriction and penalty stipulation mentioned, the operation of the same only being postponed until the later date. So the provision of section 2 of the act that "nothing in this act shall be construed to * apply to contracts which have been or may be entered into under the provisions of appropriation acts approved prior to the passage of this act," seems to imply that the act, notwithstanding the provision of section 3, was still to apply to contracts made after its passage. But these inferences are too vague, in my opinion, to justify a disregard of the plain meaning and effect of section 3. That section expressly fixes the time when the act shall become effective and be in force; and as the only requirement of the act is that contracts thereafter made shall contain the eight-hour restriction and penalty stipulation, when Congress said that the act should become effective and be in force on the later date, it can only be understood to have been meant that until that date the mandate of the act in the respect mentioned should be regarded as innocuous. In other words, in view of the provision of section 3 that "this act shall become effective and be in force on and after January 1, 1913," the words "every contract hereafter made" in section 1 must necessarily mean that every contract made after the act becomes effective shall contain the provisions mentioned. To hold that the mandate of the act as to the insertion in contracts of the eight-hour restriction and penalty stipulation became operative on its passage despite section 3, but that such contractual provisions were not to become operative until January 1, 1913, is to write a new act. I therefore answer your third question in the negative.

Respectfully,

GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM-ACCEPTANCE OF DIVIDENDS ON DEPOSITS.

The statute of Indiana, under which the St. Joseph County Savings Bank, of South Bend, Ind., a depositary for postal savings funds, is incorporated, provides that the net profits of savings banks shall be distributed as dividends among the depositors but it does not authorize the payment of interest on deposits, and it is inconsistent with the laws of the State for savings banks to establish a class of depositors who shall receive both interest and dividends. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 26, 1912.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of June 1, 1912, stating that the St. Joseph County Savings Bank, of South Bend, Ind., a depositary for postal savings funds, is incorporated under a State law which provides that its net profits shall be distributed as dividends among its depositors, and that in its account current for the month of April, 1912, the bank has credited the board of trustees of the postal savings system with a dividend of $2.

You wish to be advised whether the board of trustees is authorized to accept such dividends in addition to the 24 per cent interest which the bank is required to pay on its deposits of postal savings funds under section 9 of the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 816), which provides that "the sums deposited shall bear interest at the rate of not less than 2 per cent per annum, which rate shall be uniform throughout the United States and Territories thereof."

According to information received from the auditor of state of Indiana the St. Joseph County Savings Bank is incorporated under the provisions of an act to provide for the organization of savings banks, approved May 12, 1869 (Laws of 1869, special session, pp. 104–116), as amended. (Burns' Indiana Statutes, Revision of 1908, secs. 33483401.) Without going completely into the details of these statutes, I may say that they provide for the association of a certain number of persons for the purpose of organizing and managing a savings bank who are to conduct its affairs without, in general, any compensation, and who have power to adopt such by-laws, consistent with the laws of the State,

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as they may think proper for transacting the business of the corporation. There is no capital stock, and the function of the bank is to receive deposits, make investment thereof, and make return of the profits therefrom to the depositors, less the expenses and the amount retained for reserve. Section 3363 provides

"Every savings bank shall be authorized to receive on deposit any sum or sums of money that may be offered for that purpose by any person or persons * * * and to invest the same, and declare, credit, and pay dividends thereon, as herein authorized, and not otherwise: *

Section 3364 provides:

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The sums so deposited shall be repaid to each depositor or his legal or authorized representatives, when required by him or by them, but at such times, and with such diridends from profits, and under such regulations as the board of trustees may prescribe, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act: * * *

By section 3365 deposits made by aliens, minors, or married women shall be repaid to the depositor "with the dividends thereon."

Section 3376 provides:

"All savings banks shall make up their accounts semiannually to the 1st days of January and July in each year: and all dividends or profits shall be divided, credited, or paid to the depositors on or before the 31st days of January and July, respectively."

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Section 3381 provides:

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"It shall be the duty of the trustees, after deducting the necessary expenses and the reserve for the surplus fund * to divide as nearly as may be practicable all the remaining profits, *ratably among the depositors. except as hereinbefore provided."

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(The provision alluded to at the end of this section merely refers to a permissible discrimination in dividends. between large amounts and small amounts, and between deposits remaining a longer or shorter time.)

Section 3382 provides:

"Any residue of profits remaining undivided after compliance with the provisions of the last section, shall be di

vided as often as once in three years among those who are depositors, when the distribution is made in such manner as the trustees shall direct, so as to be as equitable as practicable:

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A report to the auditor of state is provided for, and among the liabilities the report must state (sec. 3389) "the amount due depositors, including the dividend credited to them" for the 1st day of January, "stating such dividend as a separate item; and any other debts against or claims upon such savings bank which may become a charge upon its assets"; "the amount deposited and the amount withdrawn during the previous year; the whole amount of interest earned; the amount of expenses, specifying separately the amount paid for services and the amount of dividends credited to depositors, for the year preceding said 1st day of January."

The statute nowhere expressly authorizes savings banks to borrow money or to pay a fixed, stipulated rate of interest on deposits.

It is clear that this Indiana statute purports to authorize savings banks of the pure, original type, without any feature of the commercial bank. In such a pure savings bank the depositors, while creditors to the extent that they may require the payment of their deposits after demand made in accordance with the regulations of the bank, are nevertheless in a sense partners or stockholders in the institution, entitled to share in its profits on the one hand, but bound to bear the losses on the other. The status of depositors in such banks has been examined in many cases, of which the following are examples:

In Bunnell v. The Collinsville Savings Society (38 Conn. 203, 206) the court, in holding that the society was entitled to charge a loss, arising from depreciation in its investments, pro rata among the depositors, said:

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In the case of Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn. 173, the court say that savings societies are in fact large, incorporated agencies for receiving and loaning money on account of their owners. They have no stock and no capital. *** They are merely places of deposit where money can be left to remain or be taken out at the

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